Lantz Fleming Miller

Rationality is set among two different, broad kinds of concepts: One is rationality in the contexts of related, although not etymological related, cases. These include reasoning, assessing probability, intelligence, and wisdom. The other category is less severe, arising in the context of its morphological cognates, such as irrational or nonrational. Along with other ways of positioning rationality within the world at large, we start to see further hopeful means of sharpening it so the term’s many facets cohere.

Now we stand at the starting line for inquiry into just what kind of a “thing” is rationality, if it is a “thing,” whether there can be an optimal such thing, and how to determine whether one such thing can be the best one. Is it reasoning or the product of reason? Is it a contrivance, with a millennial history of thousands of varieties? Or is it a natural development among human groups, abetted by human witnesses of its arising and potential for species or general use, with deliberate design and deployment? This chapter now sets forth the notion of best theory of rationality, with a systematic way to determine which way leads to a theory with the best explanatory priority over others.

This chapter contends that the best theory of rationality (qualified in the text by an asterisk “*,” which is to be dropped) is that with the greatest explanatory power EP as stipulated herein. It can be considered as the one atop a tree of explanatory theories. The fact that the nodes in the tree depict a hierarchy among the various senses indicates a crucial point: This top node takes into account the need and rightful place for the “subservient” positions in the inclusive theory that includes both the top node and the hierarchy of the subservient ones. In this manner, the (top-node) theory with the greatest EP turns out to retain many of the common intuitions about what rationality consists in. Further, this inclusiveness should do maximal fairness to humanity not only in offering criteria for assessing theories of rationality as they arise but also in strengthening the millennial ongoing project promoting rationality.

Rationality, once this chapter has laid it out into at least 21 complete and substantial senses, now appears overburdened, cumbersome, even messy, and hardly attractive for empirical analysis. It seems, then, we need a way, like a dentist prepares a procedure by cleaning up the target organ, to clean it. We need a plan, an alternative that circumvents all the proposed “rationalities” as a first broad attempt at possibly coordinating and, in time, unifying them. The idea emerging is that of a most explanatory theory or “sense” of rationality: The best that a given rationality provides us of why it can explain itself and other rationalities is now in the lead among theories of rationality.

Rationality is not merely an objective science but is a normative project. It seeks to make changes in people and society. But it has undergone steady abuse over the millennia, with reviling detractors and seemingly constant misunderstandings. But at the same time we do not know if the campaigns, no matter how little we know of the outcomes, can be guaranteed positive. So detractors do have a point. Rationality given via the 12 precepts and receiving strong philosophical support appears to have endangered life on Earth. Should we indeed keep loaning it more chances? This chapter offers it further support but also gives ear to the skeptics.

The list of precepts for rationality runs up against Chap. 6’s paradox that is nonetheless central to the essay. It seems that rational agents seek both independence of thought while rationality demands they seek conformity with widely accepted, determinately rational views. The physicist accepts that one must know quite a bit of what is currently accepted in physics, but also gets strong hunches that certain matters involved just may not jive, one part with the other. This chapter singles out this one highly unstable precept among the 12 for special attention because it does seem the two halves of the paradox cannot be reconciled.

Now that we have established a viable, workable explanation of what rationality consists in, we can consider some of the related precepts and cognate notions within the proposal. To recap: The theory to the best explanation has successfully built upon the notion that an anthropological approach is critical in developing the hierarchical, multi-leveled theory of rationality as a longstanding cultural project. “In the field” (everyday life) one gathers potential precepts and assesses one against the other in terms of how one may pursue rationality as a cultural practice. Thus, rationality as a cultural project, the inquiry into rationality shifts from the philosophical to the anthropological. This project thereby involves a series of precepts in an empirical inquiry: What are these precepts needed in this project? In this kind of “ethnography,” 12 precepts for rationality are gathered—such as empirical epistemology, scientific skepticism, and autonomy of belief. These are offered for assessment of whether, via our intuitions as empirical researchers often do, they are appropriate for rationality in the sense derived in this essay. They remain open for further determination as to whether, given such precepts, they remain cogent. Given this firmer groundwork that the precepts provide, we can turn to the cognate terms of rationality and, given this stronger context for rationality, more sharply test just how it fits into our supposedly rational historic development and deployment of the concept.

This final chapter attempts to tie morality with rationality—although they appear to insist of independence from one another. Common between them is normativity. The essay has contended that rationality is primarily (as witnessed when seen in the context) normative. That fact would mean that they arise in practical, not speculative, philosophy. To help put these assertions in a concrete background, consider the moral situation referred to in previous chapters: human reproduction. Can both rationality and morality have something to say that distinguishes one from the other, or do they coincide substantially? The answer, I believe, indicates the two indeed fall under practical philosophy, but still are of quite different ontology and even origin in the universe.

Being rational in complete social isolation seems veritably useless. One may remain credible religious if stuck for life on an otherwise uninhabited island. But rationality seems to concern how one behaves in a social context, not about merely what, say, one believes about the universe. A number of writers have looked to the seemingly, purely, inherent social context of rationality, notably Weber and Habermas. Their explicitly social concern adds further useful angles and insights into rationality. Can a society be considered an agent, and if so, can it act rationally? This question helps round out the argument of what rationality consists in.

We may believe we have a good intuition about what “rationality” is. It has something to do with reasoning. Employing it in daily use is reputed to help improve our lives. It is not tied to a religion, although the religious may use it as effectively as anyone. Perhaps some agents may use it better than others. It may involve a capacity. But, while all these cases apply to some degree to rationality, as a whole they do not even seem to capture rationality in one swoop. For that reason, this book aims to set forth a theory, explanation, and unification of the kindred and disparate understandings of this elusive concept, rationality.

Rationality has been philosophers’ concern stretching back to ancient times. But just what is rationality? In trying to answer this question, we find rationality more complex than supposed. That supposition has not been insufficiently investigated. This work aspires to bring together the facets of this peculiar phenomenon, rationality. It is both more complex than presumed and yet more accessible than many may have feared. One argument concedes the common assumption that those interested in rationality need only rely on intuitions about this phenomenon. Yet, even moderate research reveals the concept’s profound fuzziness. This book’s systematic approach should make this puzzle much less obscure. By the end, rationality and its critics provide more luminous light than has long been missing.

Is the Kantian basis of valuing in humanity sufficient or sound enough to account for all valuing? At least two other such bases have been proposed across the ages, that of the sentiments and the valuing of life itself. This article focuses on the Kantian view, the first of these three possible bases of valuing. The concern is: by which criteria can we assess whether a given theory of or approach to basing a value is in fact usable and optimal, that is can in fact explain why a value can be assuredly based on a theory of value. That is, can a possible theory of value indeed explain all other values? That is, it seems a “meta” analysis of the situation is due. The article looks to five perspectives on the Kantian concept of humanity to determine if that humanity, as a theory of all valuing’s bases, is at least supportable / sustainable, if not yet sufficiently fleshed out. The article concludes that these five perspective may each and severally leave some cogent doubt of humanity as the basis of all other value, while leaving unsettled the possibility the perspective is flawed or is not thorough enough for due criticism of humanity as basis.

Why do so many—including philosophers—care about equality? Mere envy? This book investigates how Homo sapiens developed, thrived in, and nurtured a certain social condition that happened to abet our continual survival. Empirical evidence points to a natural, possibly inborn, sense that humans live most humanly as equals: No one told them what to do; no one had significantly more goods. Humans evolved in such a condition of social equality and autonomy. This condition of individual autonomy in turn shaped our species and led humans to demand social equality to this day. All changed when groups stopped roving for food, settled down, and cultivated land. Some individuals started storing goods clandestinely, gaining wealth and power. Inequality set in and, ever since, a struggle between haves and have-nots. People strive to reestablish some degree of equality, philosophical theories notwithstanding. This book’s empirical theory of equality’s ontology explains why humans over the millennia strive for equality and help assess whether theories of equality, if implemented in policy, could accommodate this need. Equality is essentially bound up with autonomy, liberty and justice. Any political theory neglecting these interconnections may fall short of its goals. While industrial societies will unlikely implement the book’s theory, at the least it can illuminate common theories of equality and where they fly or fail.

Violence seems to be such that, once it has set in, it is hard to extract. Getting rid of violence appears to require violence. It reproduces only itself. Peace appears but a sheep exposed to predators. If the world were to abruptly become peaceful, it would only await the next Thrasymachus to reimpose tyranny. This sticky nature of violence and how to cope with it are the most potent themes of this much-needed work. It provides a fair though critical overview of the subject of politics and violence through history. Violence and Political Theory examines a judicious selection of political thinkers, from Hobbes and Locke to Gandhi and Ruddick, on their notions of the role of violence in political life.

Human-sciences research often focuses on social problems to create tools for solving them. Yet, in using common prejudices in gathering and sorting data on their subjects, they risk propagating those same prejudices. This article proposes that a major subject matter of human sciences is human concepts themselves. Concepts about “what we are,” individually and as a species, are deeply embedded, if not essential. It concludes that for greater precision, practitioners in human sciences must take maximum advantage of this characteristic of the subject, making individuals’ concepts about what they consider themselves to be integral criteria of data gathering and sorting.

Two Socratic dialogues often considered “comic”—Ion and Hippias Major—have also been contested as to their Platonic authenticity. Plato’s dialogues; while certainly engaging, can also seem grim in their philosophical intensity: At least one author has contended that the dialogue more firmly established as genuinely by Plato, Symposium; has some comic elements: This article goes a step further in suggesting that this dialogue does not merely have comic elements but is in fact a comedy. It draws on several texts in the literature on Greek comedy over the past century and suggests that; although the dialogue sets itself serious philosophical challenges, its structure; style; and method are deeply steeped in comedic modes from around Plato’s day. This is not to presume whether Plato was deliberately writing a comedy. In general, writers are often strongly influenced by literary fashions of the day, so it would not be far stretching the matter to understand the work as comedic. Thereby, the article offers, via textual analysis, an argument for how the dialogue is a comedy along withcounter-arguments against such a notion. In the end, indeed, acknowledging it is a comedy promises to open up new angles on interpreting that dialogue

This article serves as either an addendum or as an expansion of ideas and work developed in my 2024 book, The Rationality Project: Across the Millennia, issued by Palgrave Macmillan. The book explores 21 potential theories for explaining rationality in terms of why and how one among these can serve in the position of explanatory power. The book does not fully explain all of these candidate theories, assigning that complete role to this addendum or work-in-progress. The main reason for this abbreviation in assessing all the theories in the book is that the complete coverage—which this addendum allows—of all 21 theories would become too detailed for some philosophical readers. This addendum; one may consider, is then for the more technically minded reader—although certainly not-too-technically minded readers are welcome to explore it. If it becomes too bogged in detail for those latter kinds of readers, they may end up skimming the material in this addendum, trying at least to get the general idea of how these addendum sections fit into the book's goals.

If any area of current philosophy is so incendiary as to veer on violence, it is argument about a divide being’s existence. Hinman’s sober offering is possibly one of the most thorough apologetics in contemporary times, meriting serious consideration yet certain to draw fire. Since Darwin, the religious have taken up arms, both metaphorically and, in the case of World Trade Center and its imitators, literally. In turn, growing atheist movements reacted against such defensiveness. This upsurge in side-taking and regrouping evidences a powerful human need for settling the issue. A peek at the arguments reveals a mess. One advantage of Hinman’s new work is that, among other goals, it attempts to order the mess. The work exudes care and some respect for the various perspectives. Its sheer breadth and depth of scholarship and capacity in articulating it attests the generally due respect of the many sides, which often exhibit the rational and irrational in one commentator. The central theme tying the various arguments together is that ideologies outside of the sciences’ themselves are informing science-based, evidential arguments about any divine’s existence. Many sides of the debate, including the monotheistic, are equally guilty.

Thanks to mounting discussion about projected technologies’ possibly altering the species mentally and physically, philosophical investigation of what human beings are proceeds robustly. Many thinkers contend that whatever we are has little to do with how we should behave. Yet, tampering with what the human being is may tread upon human rights to be whatever one is. Rights given in widely recognized documents such as the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples assume what humans are and need depends upon ontological assumptions about human existence. Godman turns to human ontology—just what kind of beings humans are (from an angle distinct from the other two books) and how these play into rights. She is concerned with how well the social sciences accord with what we are. Gunkel homes in on a more specific moral topic than Godman's general concern with identity’s role in rights: automata moral status and rights. He enjoins us to inquire into what human rights are before we take on the new technologies’ challenge to it. Schneider’s Artificial You, while not explicitly about rights, poses a rights quandary. Certain individuals with reputable resources and practical backing explicitly seek to evolve the species as they see fit. The urgency among these works concerns how we need a sharper idea of what we are, how we should act and be treated, and how our rights fare among potential human improvements.

As to what distinguishes music from other sound, some investigators in both philosophy and cognitive scientists have answered “tonality.” It seems subservient even to rhythm. Tonality is considered to be the central factor around which the piece is oriented; it gives a sense of home, expectation, and completeness. Most important, much of this inquiry builds on naturalistic, evolutionary explanation to account for human nature and behavior. The conclusion of such line of thought is that sounds missing tonality or tonal focus cannot be music. This article challenges such sort of naturalistic criteria distinguishing music from nonmusic. Permitting certain sets of sounds to be considered music does not necessitate denial or approval of naturalistic explanations but does allow nontonal music to serve a part of human and musical evolution.

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the question of whether humans should reproduce. Some say human life is too punishing and cruel to impose upon an innocent. Others hold that such harms do not undermine the great and possibly unique value of human life. Tracing these outlooks historically in the debate has barely begun. What might philosophers have said, or what did they say, about human life itself and its value to merit reproduction? This article looks to Kant, who wrote much on whether, by reproducing, humans do wrong or right morally. It assesses two main arguments: one examining whether perfect or imperfect duties condone reproduction, the other whether Kant’s teleological or, in the opposite sense, his eschatological outlooks can salvage reproduction. These two arguments are essential for building the entire argument. This article finds that, although Kant’s arguments against reproducing are strong, some of his writing seems to support reproduction as a good. Yet, must we must assume an author, even one who strove for systematicity, must be consistent over his entire oeuvre on every issue, especially if not handled directly in a single work? The article concludes that Kant does not sufficiently, systematically support anti-natalism as more moral than pro-natalism. It is best for the current debate to grapple with the very dilemma that daunted Kant.

There is a conflict between a strictly political approach to LGBT rights, in which the battle must never cease. and the less encountered notion that individuals can let the battle settle into the background and simply get on with unpolitical life. at least unpolitical at home. The article takes the example of India as a salient place to view this conflict. As a democratic nation, India has had some limited progress in protecting LGBT rights. How its massively differentiated and traditional society has adopted and tolerated this moral enjoinder is another matter. Certainly, acceptance is as important as legal recognition. But how are the politics faring at the individual level? One of the best media for feeling a nation’s political pulse is not internet or television but literature. Two current Indian authors exemplify how, at the personal level, some sexual politicking has already succeeded, in some social realms, by almost disappearing from the narrative.

The multi-millennial philosophical discussion about life after death has received a recent boost in the prospect of immortality attained via technologies. In this newer version, humans generally are considered mortal but may develop means of making themselves immortal. If “immortal” means not mortal, thus existing for infinity, and if the proposed infinite-existing entity is material, it must inhabit an infinite material universe. If the proposed entity is not material, there must be means by which it can shed its material substance and exist nonmaterially. The article examines arguments for how an infinite life would be possible given current physical understanding. The paper considers a Pascalian-style wager weighing the likelihood of adjusting to existence wholly within a finite universe versus betting on there being some way to construe the universe(s) as a viable medium for infinite beings. Conclusion: The case for a finite being to exist infinitely has little viable support.