Leszek Kopciuch

This article attempts to present the most significant ideas developed by Zdzisław J. Czarnecki. After providing an overview of his biography, we demonstrate main topics he covers in his publications on the history of philosophy, the philosophy of history and the philosophy of man. These publications primarily focus on three fundamental concepts: man, values, and history. Specific topics include the role of religion in Plato’s thought, Marxist criticism of religion and its philosophical foundations, the conditions and typologies of the idea of historical prospection, the nature and theoretical status of the philosophy of history, the historical function of values, and the significance of values and value judgements in philosophical reflection on the human world and its transformations. Other topics include understanding historical time, the structure of the idea of historical optimism and pessimism, and the history of the philosophy of history, especially in the modern and contemporary thought. Czarnecki also explores the history of the ideas of freedom and human subjectivity. Finally, we discuss Zdzisław J. Czarnecki’s contribution to the academic community at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology at UMCS.

This article presents the most important philosophical ideas developed by Stanisław Jedynak (1939–2015). After providing biographical information, I discuss selected publications in the following areas: Eastern philosophy; Western (mainly Anglo-Saxon) social and ethical thought; Polish social, ethical and axiological thought; the social and ethical history of Central and Eastern European countries; selected issues of systematic social philosophy and ethics; the condition of contemporary society, politics and culture; philosophy of education. Then Jedynak’s other ideas, particularly his views on the nation, tolerance and values, are demonstrated. Jedynak's philosophical stance is unmistakably humanistic, with a clear positivist methodology, ethical situationism and a resounding critique of ethical universalism. The article concludes with an analysis of Jedynak’s impact on the academic community at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology at UMCS.

W artykule zostały przedstawione główne motywy filozofii społecznej Thomasa Hobbesa, które były kontynuowane w późniejszych stanowiskach filozofii dziejów. Są to następujące motywy: 1) pogląd mówiący o egoistycznej i konfliktowej ludzkiej naturze oraz społecznej i historycznej roli takich uczuć jak zazdrość, współzawodnictwo, ambicja i zawiść; 2) teoria „prostej” zależności między budową ludzkiej natury a przebiegiem życia historycznego; 3) pogląd mówiący o niesamodzielności motywacji moralnych; 4) teza mówiąca o instrumentalnym charakterze rozumu. W szczególności analizowane są koncepcje Kanta, Nietzschego, Gumplowicza, Witkiewicza, Spenglera oraz Fukuyamy.

This special issue is devoted to the philosophical legacy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950), one of the most compelling and systematic thinkers of twentieth‑century philosophy. In recent decades, Hartmann’s work has attracted renewed scholarly interest, particularly in light of contemporary debates in ontology, philosophical anthropology, epistemology and the theory of values. Researchers have begun to rediscover the depth and relevance of his layered ontology, his concept of the real, and his critical engagement with both Neo‑Kantianism and German idealism. They are also starting to explore the Russian context of Hartmann’s thought.

The paper is devoted to a discussion of the metaphysical and ontological theories concerning values formulated within the German material value ethics. The general position of this school is adequately described as absolutistic and objectivistic one. However, there is a number of significant differences between the theories of Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Hans Reiner. The author indicates these differences by an analysis of five main problems: the relation between value and axiological experience; the metaphysical status of the value; the value structure and hierarchy; the value validity; and the problem of the axiological relativism. Key words VIRTUE ETHICS, SCHELER, HARTMANN, HILDEBRAND, REINER

THE RELATION OF NICOLAI HARTMANN TO GEORG WILHELM LEIBNIZ In this paper I demonstrate the main aspects of the relation between the philosophy of N. Hartmann and G.W. Leibniz. Firstly, I present Hartmann’s two ideas of the history of philosophy. Secondly, I consider some chief domains in which Hartmann referred to the ideas formulated by Leibniz. These are ontology, epistemology, anthropology and ethics. Thirdly, I analyze several concrete examples of this relation (individuality, the principle of sufficient reason, free will). Keywords: NICOLAI HARTMANN, GEORG WILHELM LEIBNIZ, INDIVIDUALITY, PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON, FREE WILL

In diesem Aufsatz werden zwei Hauptmomente der Hartmannschen Ontologie des Realens präsentiert. Erstens betrachtet der Autor den Hartmannschen Begriff der Realität (ihre Individualität, Zeitlichkeit und Prozessualität) und ihren vierschichtigen Stufenbau. Zweitens analisiert der Verfasser die kategoriale Gesetzlichkeit der Realität: (1) Gesetze der kategorialen Geltung; (2) Gesetze der kategorialen Kohärenz; (3) Gesetze der kategorialen Schichtung und (4) Gesetze der kategorialen Dependenz. Der Autor zeigt auch die Rolle, die diese Gesetze (besonders aus dritter und vierter Gruppe) für die praktische Philosophie haben.

The purpose of this article is to identify the most important elements of Hartmann’s understanding of “feeling of value” and to point out the ambiguities associated with this notion. The most important stages in the formation of this concept are delineated by the publications: Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Ethik, Vom Wesen sittlicher Forderungen.[1] In all of these texts, Hartmann treats feeling of value as a proper way of knowing value, in relation to which philosophical cognition of value is only secondary and dependent. Hartmann’s understanding of feeling of value in ethics is, however, very broad, so that it somewhat loses the subtle divisions that were characteristic of the views of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. At the same time, however, Hartmann’s concept introduces several new elements that are important for the understanding of the nature of the feeling of value, such as, among others, the limited capacity of the axiological consciousness, the shifting horizon of values, or the relational reference of values to the person as the subject and addressee of an action and the reference to the situation in which a given action is taken. Moreover, to a greater extent than Scheler and von Hildebrand, Hartmann develops a field for the presence of rationalistic elements in the cognition of values.

Dla materialnej etyki wartości typowa jest teza, że wartości są ujmowane w akcie czucia. W artykule rozważam pytanie, co jest właściwym przedmiotem czucia wartości w etyce N. Hartmanna, który odróżnia wartościowy charakter, treść wartości oraz powinność. Stwierdzenie, że takim przedmiotem jest wartość, jest zatem zbyt ogólne. Analiza poglądów Hartmanna ukazuje, że w aksjologicznym czuciu dane są wprawdzie wszystkie te momenty wartości, ale niejasno. Faktem jest jednak, że tylko czucie ujmuje wartościowy charakter oraz powinność. Tę rolę czucie spełnia zarówno w praktycznym życiu, jak i w badaniu filozoficznym.