Lori Gallegos

Some proponents of moral bioenhancement propose that people should utilize biomedical practices to enhance the faculties and traits that are associated with moral agency, such as empathy and a sense of justice. The hope is that doing so will improve our ability to meet the moral challenges that have emerged in our contemporary, globalized world. In this paper, we caution against this view by arguing that biomedically inducing more empathy may, in fact, diminish moral agency. We argue that this type of increase in empathy would not be effective for addressing empathy’s vulnerability to the biases that can undermine moral judgment. Furthermore, doing so may undermine the important capacity to regulate empathy. We determine that if the moral enhancement project is to be a serious one, it must address these challenges.

If the growth of popular self-care movements is any indicator, individuals are often viewed as largely responsible for cultivating and protecting their own flourishing. This view is often helpful, but it risks generating unrealistic and harmful expectations about individual agency. This chapter pushes back against these expectations. Wellbeing has many dimensions, including the material, the personal, and the interpersonal. As a result, the pursuit of wellbeing in any one dimension of life can conflict with the pursuit of wellbeing in other areas of life. These conflicts are the inevitable result of our human finitude, but they are also exacerbated by oppressive social conditions. The chapter investigates how philosophical thinking might be useful in light of the recognition that wellbeing often depends not merely on one’s personal psychological management, but also on the transformation of oppressive social conditions.

The Latinx Philosophy Reader showcases a wide range of significant philosophical works about Latinx people and their experiences, displaying the breadth, distinctiveness, originality, and diversity of Latinx philosophy. Readings include discussions of what it is like to be perceived as undocumented, ethical quagmires affecting those who interpret for their family members, the difficulty of pursuing career success without compromising one's cultural identity and values, the nature of citizenship, disputes about labels, the significance of language, and debates about the nature of Latinx identity. The editors' detailed introduction orients readers with an overview of the origins of the field of Latinx philosophy, a guide to terminology, and a history of the idea of Latinx identity in the United States. The volume's 35 readings are made up of both widely read and cited articles from journals and books and newly commissioned contributions from the leading voices in the field. All of them are organized into seven thematic units in contemporary Latinx philosophy: I. Social Identity II. Mestizaje and Indigeneity III. Cross-Cultural Challenges IV. Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Coloniality V. Language and Communication VI. Immigration/Citizenship VII. Metaphilosophy Each of these seven units includes its own introduction that connects each reading to the overarching themes of the unit and volume. Throughout, the readings provide an accessible entry point to readers new to philosophy. The texts generate opportunities for philosophical reflection without requiring readers to consult additional resources to grasp the major insights. They can be read in any order, allowing for ready adaptation to the particular interests of instructors and students.

This article proposes that linguistic shame is a form of affective injustice and describes some of the benefits of classifying it as such. Linguistic shame involves feelings of embarrassment, a sense of inferiority, and attitudes of self-reproach that arise in relation to the way one speaks. The article gives an account of three main types of linguistic shame to which Latinx people are subject: the shame of the English as a second-language speaker; the shame of the Spanglish speaker; and the shame of the English-only speaker. In all cases, linguistic shame emerges in the context of linguicism, a system in which some ways of speaking are privileged and the way one speaks is an indicator of the speaker’s social status. Classifying linguistic shame as an affective injustice highlights the political nature of the emotion and provides some guidance for how to resist this injustice.

It has been said that all philosophy begins with a set of concerns and a set of intuitions. With this idea in mind, we ask: Would it be helpful to understand Mexican-American philosophy as a kind of philosophy that begins with the concerns and intuitions of the Mexican-American community? On this view, what distinguishes Mexican-American philosophy is the orientation from which the philosophical investigation proceeds. Such an orientation is shaped by the experiences and relationships that are characteristic of those who identify as Mexican-American. We offer a list of concerns and intuitions that we suggest are widely held by the Mexican-American community. Focusing on questions surrounding linguistic assimilation in the U.S., we illustrate how beginning from these particular starting points might alter the way we think about philosophical issues.

Some of the central questions that have been explored by Latin American and Latinx philosophers are questions of metaphilosophy. "Metaphilosophy" refers to philosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy itself. For example, we might ask: What is the purpose of doing philosophy? How does philosophy compare and contrast with other disciplines, such as science, theology, or literature? And what is the best way of categorizing the different kinds and traditions of philosophy? These are philosophical questions about philosophy as an activity and as a discipline. In this chapter, we discuss some ways that Latin American and Latinx philosophers have addressed these and other metaphilosophical issues. Our focus will be on the following questions: What are the defining characteristics of Latin American philosophy and Latinx philosophy? Do they constitute distinctive traditions of philosophy, and if so, what is especially valuable about these traditions?

Studies have shown that a person can consciously believe that they value racial equality and desire not to perpetuate racial stigmas, but unwittingly exhibit racist attitudes and beliefs. In order to explain this discrepancy between conscious beliefs and behavior, scholars have turned their attention to unconscious racial prejudice. One approach that is gaining wide acceptance is the Implicit Bias Model, which appeals to distinct implicit and explicit cognitive processes, coupled with an account of the ways in which people unconsciously internalize widespread stereotypes and stigmas. This article claims that although the Implicit Bias Model is in many respects useful, it leaves out a central aspect of unconscious racial prejudice: the underlying motivations and incentives for harboring racist attitudes and beliefs, which generate psychological resistances to knowing about or changing prejudices. A more complete account of unconscious racial prejudice can be developed by turning to theories of active ignorance, which contribute to what this article calls the Resistance Model.