Luca Zanetti

This paper offers an interpretation of the reflections Wittgenstein wrote up to 1930 on aesthetics and the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. I argue that, for the early Wittgenstein, the fundamental source of aesthetic experience lies in a sense of wonder at the inexplicable existence of the world. Drawing on his scattered remarks on this issue, I reconstruct a sketch of a phenomenology that connects the experience of existence with aesthetic experience. From an exegetical perspective, the main contributions of this paper are threefold: first, it provides an explanation of the otherwise puzzling nexus Wittgenstein draws between the view sub specie aeternitatis, aesthetics, and the experience of wonder at the existence of the world; second, it relies on this explanation in order to shed light on his so-called ‘Engelmann remark’; and third, it offers reasons to consider Wittgenstein’s early view on aesthetics as plausible, by showing how it can illuminate a range of aesthetic experiences, both in Wittgenstein’s own writings (e.g., the experience of the stove) and in those of other authors (e.g., Murdoch’s experience of the hovering kestrel).

In this commentary, I will discuss a particular category of epiphanies, which we might call “epiphanies of existence.” These are experiences in which the existence of something (oneself, a bird, or the whole) is suddenly revealed through a specific pathos. I will focus on the reports of six experiences (by Coleridge, Hadot, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Kant, Murdoch), but I shall mostly concentrate on Wittgenstein’s, Sartre’s and Murdoch’s interpretations of their own respective experiences. I will begin my discussion by highlighting common features between their accounts, suggesting on this ground that they are all undergoing the same type of experience. Then I shall argue that Sartre’s epiphany of existence, as described in his novel Nausea, is not, contrary to what Chappell thinks, a dysepiphany. Finally, I shall argue that Murdochs’ epiphany of the kestrel, one of Chappell’s favorite examples of epiphany, is indeed an epiphany of existence akin to the one described by Sartre in Nausea. On this ground, I shall argue that Chappell’s reading of Murdoch’s epiphany might be wrong.

Fernando Pessoa’s Fausto occupies a crucial place within his vast and fragmented body of work, extending from his earliest literary activity to the final years of his life. Composed largely before the emergence of the heteronyms, these texts already anticipate many of the themes that would later define Pessoa’s writing. At its core, Fausto stages the horror before the mystery of being and of the world—a motif that recurs throughout Pessoa’s oeuvre. Building on Pittella’s recent chronological edition, this study examines how that central theme unfolds across the different texts of Fausto.

O presente artigo explora os elementos-chave necessários para adotar uma postura crítica em relação à transformação digital em curso na educação, focando como a metodologia Filosofia para Crianças (FcC) pode auxiliar uma transição saudável que promova o pensamento colaborativo e inclusivo. Para ilustrar essa proposição, o texto apresenta o projeto Erasmus+, denominado EACH, descrevendo seu desenvolvimento e seus resultados iniciais, que incluem a aplicação de materiais desenvolvidos em contextos de Educação Infantil. O trabalho desenvolvido no âmbito do projecto sugere que a educação sustentável beneficia ao tornar-se uma preocupação central dos processos de transformação digital, sobretudo na promoção de práticas pedagógicas de colaboração e de inclusão. Após delinear o projeto e destacar os seus principais objetivos na descrição dos primeiros documentos que resultaram da parceria internacional, descrevemos também algumas das conclusões da primeira implementação prática que teve lugar na Itália, Polônia e Portugal, simultaneamente. Isso permite reforçar a identificação de algumas áreas promissoras para futura investigação que visem fortalecer uma abordagem humanística à transformação digital.

According to Alberto Caeiro—one of Fernando Pessoa’s main heteronyms—we must learn to free ourselves from thought and language in order to see reality as it really is and to be in harmony with it. But what does it mean, for Caeiro, to free ourselves from thought and language? And once we are finally liberated from them, what remains? In other words: what does Caeiro see? These are some of the philosophical questions that have stimulated reflections in the philosophical literature on Pessoa-Caeiro’s poetry. As I will argue in this article, Caeiro’s silent mind is fundamentally one that apprehends the naked being or existence of beings. And it is precisely the experience of being that, in Caeiro—but not in Pessoa’s Faust and Campos—constitutes the source of its existential peace.

Starting from Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s remarks on wonder and astonishment, in this article I highlight the difference between relative wonder, which is relative to our temporary ignorance of the causes of phenomena, and absolute wonder, which grasps the existence of the world, and of everything in it, as a miraculous event which is in principle inexplicable. I then highlight how this absolute wonder can also be accompanied with less luminous emotions, such as anguish and horror. If the experience of childhood is characterized by this kind of wonder, then, I argue, it is important to reflect upon its value and the ways in which we can be with children when confronting the fascinating and terrible mystery of existence.

It seems to me that I am the bearer or owner of experience. However, this impression is misleading. If I am external to experience (that is, if what I am is not reducible to the way in which I appear in the present experience), then I can’t know with absolute certainty that I exist. But I do. Hence I am not external to experience, and a fortiori I am not the external bearer of experience. If I am internal to experience, then what I am is reducible to the way in which I appear in the present experience. However, if I am a part of experience, I can’t be its owner or bearer, for an owner or bearer of something can’t be a part of what it bears or owns. Therefore, I am not the internal bearer of experience.

In Wittgenstein’s early remarks on value and the mystical, we find a particular philosophical problem that I shall call ‘Wittgenstein’s Kōan’. The problem emerges because Wittgenstein holds three prima facie incompatible claims: the totality of what exists is the totality of facts, that is, the world; absolute value cannot be part of the world; yet there are experiences, such as the experience of wonder at the existence of the world, that somehow seem to have absolute value. In this paper I shall argue that this problem should be treated like a Zen’s kōan, that is, a paradox that can’t be solved through canonical discursive moves but requires a non-discursive experiential breakthrough, what is called ‘kenshō’ in Zen Buddhism. To support this contention, I shall argue that canonical discursive solutions are exegetically or theoretically implausible or both and I shall describe the key experiential breakthrough which Wittgenstein lived and made him feel that there is indeed a kōan to be explored and solved. In this way, the paper intends to contribute to the ever-growing interest in the dialogue between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Zen Buddhism.

Most of the time we see how objects are, but sometimes we see that they are. When we see that some object exists, it seems rational to ground our judgement that it exists on the basis of this experience. How do we explain these observations? A Lockean View says that it is possible to represent the property of existence in perceptual experience and that we ground our perceptual existential judgements on this basis. A Humean View says that it is not possible to represent the property of existence in experience and that we ground our perceptual existential judgements on perceptual experiences that represent objects as having some other properties that indicate their existence. In this article, I shall argue that both views face formidable challenges. A Lockean View faces Hume's Challenge, that is, it seems that there is no property of existence represented in perceptual experience. A Humean View faces the Epistemic Gap Challenge, that is, it is hard to explain the rationality of perceptual existential judgements if they are grounded on experiences that do not represent things as having the property of existence.

The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as towhetherpin so far as one takes the truth ofpto be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth ofpto be certain, one is no longer able to genuinely wonder whetherpis true; third, to ask the question whetherpis to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging thatpwe commit ourselves top’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty.

The aim of this paper is to clarify under what conditions a philosophical problem arises. I will describe two ways in which we might perceive a question as a problem. First, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that appear incompatible with each other. Second, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that seem incompatible with our desires. I will discuss both of these cases and articulate a didactic strategy – the Clash Strategy – which can be used in order to plan and facilitate dialogic inquiry in the classroom. This strategy suggests introducing stimuli that will help students appreciate the clash that drives the philosophical question to be explored during the dialogue. In summary, this paper aims to ofer insights to all teachers interested in promoting dialogic inquiry, whether philosophical or otherwise, in education.

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein's feeling of wonder stems from perceiving the existence of the world as an absolute miracle, that is, as a fact that is in principle beyond explanation. Based on this analysis, I will suggest that Wittgenstein's experience is akin to what has been described by other authors such as Coleridge, Pessoa, Heidegger, Scheler, Sartre, and Hadot, among many others. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein and Coleridge on the experience of existence, I shall highlight some core features of this experience, chief among them the use of the notion of nothingness in clarifying what is understood in the experience, the role of intuition, and the presence of a specific pathos. As a whole, this paper aims to provide a contribution to the project of a phenomenology of the experience of existence and intends to create a bridge for a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition on the enigma of existence.

According to some Philosophy for Children theorists, the pedagogy of the Community of Inquiry hinges upon the acceptance of a pragmatist epistemology. The underlying idea is that it is possible to participate, and to justify participation, in a community of inquiry only if some pragmatist view of truth and knowledge is true and accepted by the participants engaged in dialogue. In this article we argue that this claim is false. In this way, we want to free the pedagogy of the Community of Inquiry from some epistemological assumptions that we regard as unwarranted. To support our contention, we shall highlight two distinctions that are important in order to appreciate the connection between epistemology and education: first, the distinction between the disposition of intellectual humility and the belief in fallibilism; second, the belief in the existence of Cartesian certainties and the attitude of psychological certainty. Finally, we also argue that to vindicate dialogic inquiry it is neither necessary to adopt a pragmatist theory of truth, nor is it necessary to regard warranted judgement as the primary aim of inquiry. In contrast, we argue that truth is the aim of inquiry, and so is the aim of children when they participate in a dialogic inquiry. In this way we also suggest a justification of philosophy with children that does not instrumentalize it.

The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as to whether p in so far as one takes the truth of p to be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth of p to be certain, one is no longer able to genuinely wonder whether p is true; third, to ask the question whether p is to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging that p we commit ourselves to p’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty.

Contemporary views of truth-directedness endorse what I shall call the Common-Element Argument. According to this argument, there is something in common between judgment and other attitudes like assumption and imagination: they all regard their contents as true. Since this regarding-as-true feature is not distinctive of judgment - the argument goes - it can’t explain its truth-directedness. On this ground, theorists have been motivated to endorse an inflationary view that tries to capture truth-directedness by appealing to some further feature: intentions, second-order representations, sub-personal mechanisms, or subjugation to norms are the most discussed candidates for fulfilling this role. In this paper I will argue that the Common-Element Argument is unsound. It rests on a false premise, namely that there is some common element such as a regarding-as-true component between judgment and other cognitive attitudes. I shall reject Velleman’s and Railton’s defenses of the Common-Element-Argument. Then I will discuss three influential inflationary accounts of truth-directedness: Railton’s account, Velleman’s teleological account, and Shah and Velleman’s conceptualist account. I shall argue that they all face a phenomenological and an explanatory challenge. Finally, I shall sketch a deflationary view of truth-directedness that evades these challenges.

According to constitutivism, we can justify the authority of aims and norms on the ground that they are inescapable. Constitutivist views divide between ambitious and modest ones. According to ambitious constitutivism, the inescapability of aims grounds their unconditional authority, whereas according to modest constitutivism, the inescapability of aims only grounds their conditional authority. Either way, both forms of constitutivism share the assumption that inescapability grounds authority, which in turn presupposes that at the foundation of normativity we find aims and norms that can be evaluated as having or lacking authority. In this paper I shall defend a form of constitutivism that rejects this assumption. According to this view, which I shall call Hinge Constitutivism, at the foundation of epistemic normativity we find an aim, the truth-aim, that is altogether beyond the evaluation in terms of the ordinary notion of authority. Moreover, I shall argue that to aim at truth is a condition of possibility for justifying the authority of any other aims or norms. In this sense, to aim at truth is a hinge of deliberation.

In this paper I discuss a new kind of hinge epistemology which is called transcendental hinge epistemology. According to this view, hinges are immune from doubt because it is impossible to doubt them coherently, and this impossibility arises because any attempt to doubt them will presuppose their truth. Such an immunity is possessed only by inescapable hinges, that is, hinges that must be presupposed in every inquiry. I will argue that current hinge epistemologies fail to provide a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy because they focus on escapable hinges, that is, hinges with respect to which one can entertain coherent doubts.

Children ask existential questions, that is, questions about death, the meaning of existence, free will, God, the origin of everything, and kindred questions. P4/wC has the aspiration to give to children the occasion to discover and explore their questions in a safe environment, the community of inquiry. Thus, existential questioning should be possible in a community of inquiry. However, it is unclear whether the pedagogy of the community of inquiry can accommodate existential questioning. The chief trouble is that existential questioning might be a cause of suffering: children might be unable to contain the emotional intensity that is experienced when we inquire about topics like death and the meaning of existence. In a community of inquiry, the emphasis over the community and the autonomy that children experience in choosing the questions for their inquiry might create occasions of suffering: some children might not be prepared to discuss existential issues or might be troubled by the candidate answers they explore and eventually end up to endorse. In this paper I highlight some of the main challenges that we need to face if we want to make room for existential questioning in the community of inquiry.

In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the very belief in determinism cannot count as justified. On this ground Lockie argues that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we are free. In this paper I discuss and reject Lockie’s transcendental argument for freedom. Lockie’s argument relies on the assumption that in judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations – e.g., the obligation to believe that determinism is true, or the obligation to aim to believe the truth about determinism. I argue that this assumption rests on a wrong conception of the interplay between judgments and commitments.