Luigi Filieri

In this article, I provide a detailed reconstruction of the way in which imagination and reason affect the inner sense in Kant’s account of the sublime. My aim is to show how two different forms of self-affection combine with each other. In Section 2, I isolate and follow Kant’s argumentative strategy for the transition from the displeasure due to the representational failure of the imagination to the counterbalancing appeal to reason – and the related pleasure. Drawing on this reconstruction, in Section 3 I frame the transition according to two complementary schemes meant to show the structural differences at each step of the sublime, as well as the way they consistently belong to each other. Section 4 draws some key implications from Section 3 in order to stress the relevance of the distinction and reciprocity between the failure of the imagination and the arousal of reason.

This volume provides a comparative re-evaluation of central aspects of Kant's and Cassirer's philosophical systems. Instead of seeing Cassirer merely as the historian of Kant's philosophy, or as eclectically introducing Kantian themes to his own philosophy of culture, the contributions collected in this volume advance a mutually illuminating account of Kant and Cassirer. This volume aims to foster philosophical discourse at a number of yet unexplored hermeneutic frontiers: from the status and the consistency of our cognitive activities to their relationship with the positive sciences, from the nature and value of moral agency to the political and institutional challenges of the contemporary world, and from the dialectic between knowledge and morality to the need of a comprehensive perspective on the whole of human practices. The research interests articulated in these essays thus revolve around three main axes. The first is devoted to Kant's legacy and its presence and role in Cassirer's philosophy; the second focuses on Cassirer's own interpretation, appropriation and development of Kant's critique of reason; the third consists in a philosophical confrontation between Kant and Cassirer connected by the idea that our reason shapes the world we live in, and that this formation process is premised on a moral standpoint.

In this article, I provide a detailed reconstruction of the way in which imagination and reason affect the inner sense in Kant’s account of the sublime. My aim is to show how two different forms of self-affection combine with each other. In Section 2, I isolate and follow Kant’s argumentative strategy for the transition from the displeasure due to the representational failure of the imagination to the counterbalancing appeal to reason – and the related pleasure. Drawing on this reconstruction, in Section 3 I frame the transition according to two complementary schemes meant to show the structural differences at each step of the sublime, as well as the way they consistently belong to each other. Section 4 draws some key implications from Section 3 in order to stress the relevance of the distinction and reciprocity between the failure of the imagination and the arousal of reason.

This special volume 6 of "Symphilosophie: International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism" celebrates and engages with Immanuel Kant’s legacy and indelible influence on the romantics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In recognition of Kant’s enduring importance, we have invited authors to mark his 300th birth year with articles, translations, and reviews that take up Kantian themes present in romantic thinkers. Despite the contrast in styles between Kant and the romantics, the importance of Kant’s critical system for the core ideas of romanticism is undeniable and inex- tricable. This year’s issue 6 of Symphilosophie therefore examines the crucial residual influence of Kant on romantic philosophy.

In this paper I argue that 1) art is, for Cassirer, a symbolic language whereby images (or poetic expressions) work analogously to verbal signs in order to frame and codify meaningful objective contents, namely symbolic formations that constitute objects in a specific region of culture. I claim that 2a) both art and language rely on what I call symbolic-poietic mimesis: a function meant to 2b) combine imitative and constructive states in order to shape a proto-meaningful core according to its symbolic pregnance and 3a) employ forms that are, on the one hand, pure (not derived from experience) and, on the other hand, sensuous (figurative signs). The idea is that while 4a) both language and art are oriented towards objectivity as the constitution of cultural objects, 4b) they also differ in their respective directions. On the one hand, language pursues stable and fixed verbal references. On the other, art relies on moving and living forms meant to codify a dynamic weft of aesthetic values.

The political legacy of classical German philosophy can contribute in a crucial way to the most recent developments of contemporary political thought, thereby also making sense of the contradictions underlying the social practices and institutional values of our societies. What justifies this perspective is, in the first place, the complexity of contemporaneity, which holds within itself a doubleness that can be understood in the light of the conceptual tools of classical German philosophy. On the one hand, contemporary societies seem to be facing relentless crises in the modern idea of democracy, the political subject of the nation-state, and capitalist economic structures. On the other hand, there is an ever-increasing demand for rights and new forms of recognition, not to mention the emergence of grassroots movements that strive for greater political participation and generate new collective subjectivities. By radically questioning traditional philosophical categories, Kant, Fichte and Hegel provide a new and insightful understanding of the crucial challenges of modernity. They outline a conception of practical rationality and its multiple manifestations that is irreplaceable for philosophically understanding our contemporary world.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant provides two different propositions of freedom. According to the first, in the “Analytic of Pure Practical Reason,” freedom establishes the possibility of moral agency—i.e., it is the ratio essendi of the moral law. According to the second, in the “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason,” freedom is the object of one of the practical postulates (CPrR 246–54; AA 5:132–41). Why should Kant postulate something that has been allegedly established as the ground of moral agency? Does Kant appeal to two different conceptions of freedom? In this paper, I argue that Kant (1) in both cases conceives of freedom as an unconditioned form of causality, and (2) pursues two different aims according to two different but complementary arguments. On the one hand (the practical standpoint), he wants to argue that the causality of freedom is actual, through moral agency, in the domain where the laws of nature also apply. On the other hand (the theoretical standpoint), he is aware that the possibility of achieving the highest good would be compromised if we did not assume, along with the other two postulates, a world in which only the causality of freedom applies. While freedom as the ratio essendi of the moral law is actual, freedom as a postulate is a mere object of belief.

In these comments, I share some remarks concerning two main points lying at the core of Gava’s book Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics: Gava’s reconstruction and account of a transcendental deduction, its relation to a metaphysical deduction, and more specifically his reading of the B-Deduction. I will discuss Gava’s arguments in order to highlight the key tenets of his interpretation and raise questions related to (1) the meaning and scope of the notion of ‘transcendental’; and (2) the commitment to – and the extent of – what we might call ‘cognitive constructivism’.

In The Architectonic of Reason Lea Ypi argues that Kant ultimately fails in his attempt at grounding the systematic unity of reason because of the lack of the practical domain of freedom in the first Critique. I aim to advance a more nuanced reading of Kant’s alleged failure by (1) distinguishing between the schematism of the ideas in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the schematism of pure reason in the Architectonic. (2) I suggest that, while the practical domain of freedom is not established in the first Critique, the Canon and the Architectonic do account for its condition: the practical employment of reason and its unity with the theoretical. I point out that while (3) the schematism of the ideas accounts for the sole systematic arrangement of the understanding’s cognitions and the regulative role of the ideas and the ideal, in the Architectonic, (4) the schematism of pure reason instead bears more generally on systematicity as reason’s way of proceeding in framing its own unitary whole and the unity between its two lawful employments.

In this paper, I argue that Sellars’s conceptualist reading of Kant, though less radical than more contemporary approaches (e. g., Brandom, McDowell), relies on a controversial account of the relations between the givenness of intuitions, the productive imagination and the power of judgment. I will discuss: 1) how Sellars reconsidered Kant’s account of intuition; and 2) the kind of conceptualism he argues for. I will raise two main claims. First, Sellars’s conceptualist reading of intuition overlooks the role of space and time as givenness conditions. Second, Sellars’s account of the productive imagination disregards the complementary significance of the power of judgment in a priori synthesis, the role of which is to grant synthetic unity. My aim is to reconstruct a consistent dialogue between Sellars and Kant by discussing Sellars’s reading of a priori synthesis and comparing his views to Kant’s original aims.

In the Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant claims that a highest being is the transcendental ideal of speculative reason. However, the Canon of the Doctrine of Method presents the highest good as an ideal of both the speculative and the practical use of reason. In this paper, I argue (1) that the highest good is the ideal of the unity of reason – unlike the ideal in the Dialectic – insofar as (2) the highest good serves both the speculative and the practical employment of reason. Accordingly, I also argue that (3) these two employments are complementary, not alternative. Kant’s argument for the ideal of the highest good in the Canon shows that the unity of reason combines the two lawful employments of reason. In order to be reason’s highest ideal, this ideal cannot just mirror the demands of speculative reason – it must also involve the other fundamental employment of reason, i. e., the practical. This highest standpoint cannot be merely speculative but must be moral as well: not just a highest ideal, but also a good (the highest good).

Kant had thoughts on language, but his account of language is not explicit and cannot be found in any dedicated section of his works, so it needs to be philosophically reconstructed. The essays in this volume address the linguistic ramifications of Kant's thought and investigate his views on language from unique perspectives. They demonstrate that Kant's notions of thinking, knowing, communicating, and acting have linguistic implications: from the problem of empirical concept-formation to the categorial structure of experience, from the exhibition of aesthetic ideas to the role of analogies and metaphors, from poetry as the art of language to the moral relevance of rhetoric and the problem of persuasion, and from the source of Kant's philosophical vocabulary to the role of language in defining 'humanity'. The volume offers a new and distinctive interpretive context in which Kant's approach to language can be critically appreciated"-- Provided by publisher.

In this paper I argue that 1) Kant’s power of judgment is constitutively always reflecting, as its lawful employments involve a preliminary self-reference of the faculties the power of judgment itself is required to connect and let them match with each other. Accordingly, I claim that 2) the principle of purposiveness is the principle of the power of judgment as such, and not just of an allegedly self-standing reflecting branch of this faculty. I criticize the view that Kant draws a dichotomy between reflecting and determining judgments and argue that 3) Kant’s point in the third Critique is to rule out the amphiboly between the reflecting and the determining employment of the principle of purposiveness. The power of judgment is, as such, always reflecting: while in the case of cognition it also works in a determining way, in the case of both aesthetics and teleology it is only reflecting, i.e., self-purposive – as it sets its function as its own end.

In this paper, I discuss Kant’s concept-less schematism (KU, 5: 287) in the third Critique1 and make three claims: 1) concept-less schematism is entirely consistent with the schematism in the first Critique; 2) concept-less schematism is schematism with no empirical concept as an outcome; and 3) in accordance with 1) and 2), the imagination is free to synthesize the given manifold and leads to judgements of taste without this meaning either that the categories play no role at all or that these judgements are full-fledged cognitive determining judgements. While most commentators read the freedom of the imagination as its independence from the understanding, I argue that the freedom of the imagination is based on a non-determining employment of the pure concepts of the understanding. The freedom of the aesthetic imagination consists in the temporal schematization of the categories without any complementary determination of the empirical concept.

This paper explores Beck’s theory of original representing in order to discuss both its historical and theoretical relevance and its implications concerning Kant’s views on the capacity to judge. My first concern will be to highlight the main points of Beck’s Kant interpretation and to show at which points he misunderstands Kant. My analysis also contains a positive aspect, for I adopt Beck’s claim that there is only one possible standpoint from which critical philosophy ought to be judged. Unlike Beck, I shall argue that this standpoint is that of Judgment’s normativity. I will consider the normative structure of Judgment from three perspectives: the proto-synthetic import of sensibility; the normative character of the pure concepts of the understanding; the lawfulness of the principles of the understanding. My basic idea is that only a normative account of Judgment can prove how and why all experience depends on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. On Kant’s account, the capacity to judge applies transcendental rules to establish the laws which make our experience and knowledge both possible and legitimate. Every single object is an object of experience only insofar as it conforms to the normative structure of Judgment. For Kant, to constitute an object means to apply the rules which make something possible as an object of experience and cognition.

Scopo della presente ricerca è identificare all’interno della «Dialettica» della prima Critica i due tipi di necessità, naturale e funzionale, di cui sono portatori i concetti puri della ragione nonché di chiarire in che modo l’uno sia legato all’altro. Partendo da un chiarimento terminologico relativo alla parola idea si vuole rendere conto del significato del completamento della serie delle condizioni dell’intelletto da parte della ragione, tanto nei termini di una sistematizzazione dell’esperienza quanto nell’ottica di un rimando alla libertà come forma incondizionata di causalità nel regno della ragion pratica.