•  50
    Anti-Anti-Reductionist Considerations about the Justification of Testimonial Beliefs
    Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group on Epistemology 2 161-170. 2016.
  •  197
    Suspension, entailment, and presupposition
    Erkenntnis 1-17. forthcoming.
    The paper is concerned with the rational requirements for suspended judgment, or what suspending judgment about a question rationally commits one to. It shows that two purported rational requirements for suspended judgment cannot both be true at the same time, at least when the entailment relation between questions is understood a certain way. The first one says that one is rationally required to suspend judgment about those questions that are entailed by the questions that one already suspends …Read more
  •  161
    How should we ascribe the third stance?
    In Alexandra Zinke & Verena Wagner (eds.), Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond, Routledge. forthcoming.
    Epistemologists often describe subjects as being capable of adopting a third kind of categorical doxastic stance regarding whether something is the case, besides belief and disbelief. They deploy a variety of idioms in order to ascribe that stance. In this paper, I flesh out the properties that the third kind of categorical stance is supposed to have and start searching for the best ways to ascribe it. The idioms ‘suspends judgment about whether’ and ‘is agnostic about whether’, among others, ar…Read more
  •  161
    There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, or from how the speaker chooses to express the…Read more
  •  277
    Evidential support and its presuppositions
    In Hinge Epistemology and Religious Belief, . forthcoming.
  •  44
    Reliable deduction
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3): 725. 2017.
    Neste artigo trato da questão sobre o que torna uma dedução confiável. Uma resposta satisfatória a tal questão nos ajudaria a entender como dedução pode expandir ou gerar conhecimento. Eu exploro duas respostas a tal questão. A primeira faz uso da noção de acarretamento lógico-formal, enquanto que a segunda faz uso da noção de acarretamento metafísico. A última é superior à primeira, pois nos permite explicar a confiabilidade de uma classe mais ampla de deduções.
  • Introduction and overview : two entitlement projects
    In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press. 2020.
  •  379
    Doubt
    In Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Dancy (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd edition), . forthcoming.
  •  3
    Explaining Rationality with Attributions of Knowledge-How
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 500-526. 2015.
    In the first part of this paper, we argue that the claim that a subject S believes that ϕ on the basis of good reasons cannot be the only type of explanation why S rationally believes that ϕ. Explaining attributions of rationality only by means of the notion of a belief being based on good reasons generates one version of the problem of regress of reasons. In the second part we flesh out a hypothesis according to which some beliefs are rationally held by a subject S in virtue of the fact that S …Read more
  •  4
    Correction to: Coherence and Knowability
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1): 300-300. 2022.
    This is a correction to: Luis Rosa, Coherence and Knowability, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2022, pqab076, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab076.
  •  471
    Ambiguous Statements about Akrasia
    Journal of Philosophy 119 (11): 581-601. 2022.
    Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s evidence’ might be seen as a sheer indexical or as a descriptive singular term. The first interpr…Read more
  •  547
    Coherence and Knowability
    The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4): 960-978. 2022.
    Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all…Read more
  •  1357
    Suspending judgment the correct way
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10): 2001-2023. 2023.
    In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to a…Read more
  •  44
    Inferential basing and mental models
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2): 102-118. 2017.
    In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less empi…Read more
  •  181
    Rational requirements for suspended judgment
    Philosophical Studies 178 (2): 385-406. 2021.
    How does rationality bind the agnostic, that is, the one who suspends judgment about whether a given proposition is true? In this paper I explore two alternative ways of establishing what the rational requirements of agnosticism are: the Lockean–Bayesian framework and the doxastic logic framework. Each of these proposals faces strong objections. Fortunately, however, there is a rich kernel of requirements of agnosticism that are vindicated by both of them. One can then endorse the requirements t…Read more
  •  811
    Logical Principles of Agnosticism
    Erkenntnis 84 (6): 1263-1283. 2019.
    Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logica…Read more
  •  9
    On the probability of theism
    Dissertatio 41 (S2): 215-228. 2015.
    A proposição expressa por “Deus existe”, se é verdadeira ou falsa, ela é ou necessariamente verdadeira/falsa ou não necessariamente verdadeira/falsa. Em outras palavras, se G é capaz de ter um valor de verdade v, então ela é ou necessariamente v ou contingentemente v. por “Deus” eu quero significar um ser sobrenatural, com uma mente poderosa e imaterial que supostamente criou o universo. Certamente existem outros significados que estão vinculados a esse termo em certos contextos, mas os argument…Read more
  •  8
    Reliable deduction
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3): 725-747. 2017.
    Neste artigo trato da questão sobre o que torna uma dedução confiável. Uma resposta satisfatória a tal questão nos ajudaria a entender como dedução pode expandir ou gerar conhecimento. Eu exploro duas respostas a tal questão. A primeira faz uso da noção de acarretamento lógico-formal, enquanto que a segunda faz uso da noção de acarretamento metafísico. A última é superior à primeira, pois nos permite explicar a confiabilidade de uma classe mais ampla de deduções.
  •  9
    Explicando a racionalidade com atribuições de conhecimento-como
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 500-526. 2015.
    Na primeira parte deste estudo, defendemos que a afirmação de que um sujeito S crê que ϕ com base em boas razões não pode ser o único tipo de explicação para o fato de que S racionalmente crê que ϕ. Explicar atribuições de racionalidade somente por meio da noção de uma crença baseada em boas razões gera uma versão do problema do regresso das razões. Na segunda parte, apresentamos uma hipótese de acordo com a qual algumas crenças são racionalmente mantidas por um sujeito S em virtude do fato de q…Read more
  •  733
    Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1): 156-173. 2018.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples …Read more
  •  153
    Reasoning without regress
    Synthese 196 (6): 2263-2278. 2019.
    In this paper I explore alternative ways of addressing the infinite regress problem of inference, as it was depicted in Lewis Carroll’s ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. Roughly put, the problem is that if a claim to the effect that one’s premises give support to one’s conclusion must itself be part of one’s premises, then an infinite regress of reasons ensues. I discuss some recent attempts to solve that problem, but I find all of them to be wanting. Those attempts either require the reason…Read more
  •  45
    In this paper, I deal with a version of the epistemic regress problem. After rejecting foundationalism as a solution to it, I consider two versions of infinitism. The first one is found to be unacceptable, for it fails both to cohere with certain attributions of justification and also to maintain its internal coherence. The second one avoids both problems, and it is found to be the best way of addressing the epistemic regress problem. As the successful version of infinitism makes use of the noti…Read more