Lukas Licka

Cet article reconfigure la chronologie des disputes quodlibétiques à la Faculté des arts de l’Université de Prague à la fin du xiv ᵉ siècle et apporte de nouvelles perspectives sur ces débats, notamment grâce à des textes et sources savantes récemment découverts. Pour deux de ces disputes – à savoir les quodlibeta organisés par Nicolas Magni de Jawor (1395) et Henri de Homberg (1396) – il propose un inventaire de 153 quaestiones et 64 problemata, fondé sur des manuscrits quodlibétiques nouvellement mis au jour. Cette étude confirme en outre qu’il n’était pas rare, même à la Faculté des arts, d’utiliser des textes liés à l’étude de la théologie, ces débats constituant les rassemblements savants annuels les plus importants et couvrant l’ensemble du cursus universitaire.

This chapter delves into several texts from the quodlibetal materials preserved in codex MS Praha, KMK, L 45, generally taken as connected with Matthias of Knín’s 1409 quodlibet, namely those dealing with sensory perception, especially vision, and light phenomena, such as the rainbow. It is argued that some of these materials are textually dependent on what was popular at the Prague Faculty of Arts, such as works by Albert the Great, Robert Grosseteste, Nicole Oresme, and Themo Judaei. These textual dependencies, especially many complex arguments copied from the source texts, corroborate the standard understanding of the materials preserved in MS Praha, KMK, L 45, as products of textual copying in a scriptorium (as opposed to written reports of spoken argumentation in an auditorium).

This article builds on the recent discovery of the Perspectiva cum sit una (PCSU), a previously unknown early 14th-century optical treatise, and presents several new findings on its reception in late medieval manuscript sources from Paris, Germany, and Italy. The first of these sources is a Franciscan sermon from Thuringia, whose exact quotations from the PCSU, attributing the text to Thomas Bradwardine, provide further evidence of Bradwardine’s possible authorship. Second, the article identifies scattered borrowings from the PCSU in two sets of glosses to John Peckham’s Perspectiva communis in the manuscripts Vat. lat. 3102 (probably Parisian) and Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 5447 (most likely Italian). Thirdly, it uncovers the crucial role the PCSU plays in Wigandus Durnheimer’s Perspectiva, completed in Paris in 1390. This comprehensive compilation of medieval optical knowledge incorporates nearly forty excerpts from the PCSU. Along the way, the article offers new insights into the manuscript and textual interplays surrounding late medieval optics, such as the reception of Blasius of Parma’s Questiones super Perspectiva communi within the glosses to Peckham, and the profound influence of Parisian authors – including Henry of Langenstein, Nicole Oresme, Themo Judaei, and Pierre d’Ailly – on Durnheimer’s treatise. The article is complemented by a synopsis of the PCSU’s propositions and structure, edited from the main manuscripts of the treatise.

In examining the roles of the shadow (umbra) in medieval science, this paper analyses a hitherto unstudied early fourteenth-century optical treatise with the incipit Perspectiva cum sit una (PCSU), which, on the basis of medieval evidence, may arguably be attributed to Thomas Bradwardine. The third part of this treatise, on shadows, presents the doctrine of three shadow shapes – a doctrine which was popular in pre-modern optics and astronomy and was important in explaining eclipses – as well as the theory of umbra recta and versa, parallels of (co)tangent functions, which were essential for (instrumental) measurements. While the bulk of the treatise draws on John Peckham’s Perspectiva communis, an extensive analysis of medieval canons to astronomical tables, manuals of practical geometry and texts on instruments leads us to Campanus of Novara’s Practica quadrantis as the chief source of the last chapter of PCSU. Finally, the paper reflects on whether the light-centred conception of optics embodied in the PCSU may echo an alternative current to the otherwise predominantly sight-centred approach in pre-modern optics.

This article analyses theories of visual representation extracted from various, mostly unpublished, texts from the 15th-century University of Vienna: disputation materials, commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima and John Peckham’s Perspectiva communis, and compendia of natural philosophy. It examines two idiosyncratic claims developed and defended by Vienna masters: the first claim proposes that visual representations are extended and, in some way, ‘shaped’ according to the objects seen, with parts distinctly representing the respective parts of the latter. The second claim is that acts of the external senses are concepts of a sort, signifying the substance of the object seen and connoting its colour, shape, place, and other accidents. Thus, the Vienna masters advocated and expanded the Buridanian idea of the rich content of visual representation: we see not only colours, but objects as modified by diverse visible properties. The article investigates whether any Vienna scholar endorsed both claims, and whether they are compatible in principle.

This article examines an uncommon materialist argument preserved in late medieval Prague quodlibets by Matthias of Knín (1409) and Prokop of Kladruby (1417). The argument connects the Galenic claim that the human body has the noblest and best-balanced complexion possible with the Alexandrist claim that the human rational soul emerges from such well-balanced matter without any supernatural intervention. Of the various medieval renderings of these claims, John Wyclif’s De compositione hominis is singled out as the most probable source of the argument. Far from attributing plain materialism to Wyclif, the article highlights a semimaterialist position, mentioned in two fifteenth-century De anima commentaries of Prague origin, grafting the immortal spirit postulate onto an Alexandrist-like doctrine of the intellect as educed from the harmoniously complexioned body. Finally, it is argued that this semimaterialist position may not only encapsulate how Bohemian masters read Wyclif, but also be close to Wyclif’s actual anthropological stance.

The paper delves into manuscript sources connected with various disputations held at Prague University from around 1390 to 1420 and singles out a set of hitherto unknown quaestiones dealing with the nature of the human intellect and its relation to the body. Prague disputations from around 1400 arguably offer a unique vantage point on late medieval anthropological issues, since they encompass an entanglement of numerous doctrinal influences from Buridanian De anima commentaries to John Wyclif’s theories. The paper delineates several conceptual tensions regarding the nature of the intellect, e.g., between materialism (entailed by the emphasis on the intellect’s inherence in the body) and personal immortality. It presents several strategies Prague masters employed to overcome these tensions. For example, an anonymous participant of the 1409 quodlibet develops the Buridanian distinction between the rationally demonstrable materialist tendency and the indemonstrable “catholic truth” about the intellect both inhering in and separable from the body. On the other hand, Wyclif’s adherents (Jacob of Mies and another anonymous master) postulate an immortal spirit hypostatically united to each human being beside the human soul educed from the potency of the matter. Yet, the boundaries between the doctrinal standpoints in question seem permeable, whereby a rigid definition of antagonistic groups in late medieval Prague intellectual milieu (e.g., Buridanians vs Wycliffites) is rendered ineffective.

This paper inquires into how the new techniques of 14th-century physics, especially the doctrines of the maxima and minima of powers and the latitudes of forms, were applied to the issue of propagation of light. The focus is on several Prague disputed questions, originating between 1377 and 1409, dealing with whether illumination has infinite or finite reach and whether illumination’s intensity remains constant (uniformis) or is rather uniformly decreasing (uniformiter difformis). These questions are contextualised through examination of Oxford, Paris, and Prague sources of the era (John Dumbleton, John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Henry of Langenstein, John of Holland) to construct a fresh survey of late medieval theories of light. Along the way, the discovery of a hitherto unknown Prague disputation from the 1370s is announced, and new evidence for the dating and Central European dissemination of Jacobus de Sancto Martino’s De latitudinibus formarum and Nicole Oresme’s Questiones super Geometriam is uncovered.

This paper investigates how later medieval intellectuals dealt with perspectiva – the medieval discipline of optics, which had seen considerable popularity in Latin Europe since the 13th century and was epitomized in several “books of knowledge” of differing scopes, levels of difficulty and intended audience. This paper is focused narrowly on one of these intellectuals – Reimbotus de Castro (fl. 1350s–1380s), who was not only personal physician to the Roman Emperor Charles IV but was also a diligent copyist and abbreviator of many quadrivial and medical texts, and the owner of several codices now kept in the Bibliotheca Palatina. One of these codices, Pal. lat. 1380, includes two optical treatises copied by Reimbot himself. A closer reading of these texts, hitherto unnoticed by historians of medieval science, provides fresh insight into the reception of optical knowledge in the intellectual milieu of Paris in the 1360s, when Reimbot resided here. The first text is Reimbot’s reportatio of lectures on the famous optical textbook Perspectiva communis by John Peckham; the second is Reimbot’s redaction of the unknown optical compendium Perspectiva cum sit una. Finally, this paper addresses the issue of why optics was interesting at all for people at the intersection of the scholarly and courtly communities like Reimbot (and late medieval scholars generally). It is suggested that medieval optics, being useful for astronomical observations, could be considered a sort of auxiliary discipline for astrology and astrological medicine.

The paper presents a preliminary estimation of the extent of dissemination of optical texts, ideas, and issues among the masters connected with the Prague faculty of arts in the late 14th and early 15th century. Investigation of this topic, so far rather neglected, is based chiefly on manuscript research. The paper brings evidence that perspectiva was taught in Prague at least since the 1370s. It suggests that investigation of Prague quodlibetal disputations (ca. 1390s – 1410s) and consideration of perspectivist authorities employed in these texts can also shed some light on the issue. However, the paper is mainly devoted to the question on the mechanism of vision disputed by Bohemian arts master John of Borotín (Iohannes de Borotin, 1378 – after 1458) in the quodlibet organised by John Hus in 1411. It is suggested that the single extant exemplar of the question (preserved in the codex Prague, National Library, X.H.18) probably is Borotín’s autograph. The structure and sources of the question are analysed, with the conclusion being that Borotín proposes a compromise between intromission and extramission influenced by John Peckham’s Perspectiva communis. A critical edition of Borotín’s question is appended to the paper. / / / Please note this article is published with Brepols Publishers as a Gold Open Access article under a Creative Commons CC 4.0: BY-NC license. The article is also freely available on the website of Brepols Publishers under this same license.

[Sight Darting Forth from the Eyes: 13th-Century Franciscans and Augustine’s Authority in the Issue of Extramissionist Theory of Vision] One of the positions sometimes ascribed to Augustine is the so-called extramissionist conception of vision, i.e. the assumption that the sight is effectuated by something being sent out from the eyes, as opposed to more intuitive receptionist understanding of sight. The paper investigates the attitudes of eleven 13th-century Franciscan thinkers (from Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle in 1230s to Roger Marston and Peter of England in 1280s) to this philosophical problem and Augustine’s authority in this issue. It is demonstrated that whereas the earliest generation of Franciscan thinkers does not conceptualise the issue at all, accepting rather Aristotelian receptionist account at face value, the later Franciscans (such as Roger Bacon) try to the reconcile both positions, which is, in turn, abandoned by the next generation (e.g., Peter of England). The unique example of paying tribute to Augustine without renouncing the philosophical scrutiny is Peter Olivi, who reformulates extramission into a more plausible account of the role of attention in the visual perception.

Is vision merely a state of the beholder’s sensory organ which can be explained as an immediate effect caused by external sensible objects? Or is it rather a successive process in which the observer actively scanning the surrounding environment plays a major part? These two general attitudes towards visual perception were both developed already by ancient thinkers. The former is embraced by natural philosophers (e.g., atomists and Aristotelians) and is often labelled “intromissionist”, based on their assumption that vision is an outcome of the causal influence exerted by an external object upon a sensory organ receiving an entity from the object. The latter attitude to vision as a successive process is rather linked to the “extramissionist” theories of the proponents of geometrical optics (such as Euclid or Ptolemy) who suggest that an entity – a visual ray – is sent forth from the eyes to the object. The present paper focuses on the contributions to this ancient controversy proposed by some 13th-century Latin thinkers. [...]

The study of perception and the role of the senses have recently risen to prominence in philosophy and are now a major area of study and research. However, the philosophical history of the senses remains a relatively neglected subject. Moving beyond the current philosophical canon, this outstanding collection offers a wide-ranging and diverse philosophical exploration of the senses, from the classical period to the present day. Written by a team of international contributors, it is divided into six parts: Perception from Non-Western Perspectives Perception in the Ancient Period Perception in the Medieval Latin/Arabic Period Perception in the Early Modern Period Perception in the Post-Kantian Period Perception in the Contemporary Period. The volume challenges conventional philosophical study of perception by covering a wide range of significant, as well as hitherto overlooked, topics, such as perceptual judgment, temporal and motion illusions, mirror and picture perception, animal senses and cross-modal integration. By investigating the history of the senses in thinkers such as Plotinus, Auriol, Berkeley and Cavendish; and considering the history of the senses in diverse philosophical traditions, including Chinese, Indian, Byzantine, Greek and Latin it brings a fresh approach to studying the history of philosophy itself. Including a thorough introduction as well as introductions to each section by the editors, The Senses and the History of Philosophy is essential reading for students and researchers in the history of philosophy, perception, philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, aesthetics and eastern and non-western philosophy. It will also be extremely useful for those in related disciplines such as psychology, religion, sociology, intellectual history and cognitive sciences.

The paper investigates relations between the notions of intentionality and cognition in medieval philosophy. (The investigation is restricted to Latin works written between ca. 1240–1320, mainly those by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol.) It is argued that two different conceptions of intentionality (or esse intentionale) were endorsed by medieval philosophers. In the first conception (called “Aristotelian” here) “to be intentional” is a physical property of the form insofar as abstracted from the matter. On the contrary, the proponents of the second conception (called “Scotistic”) ascribe the property of being intentional to the objects insofar as they are grasped by a cognitive act. Further, it is argued and documented (against some Thomistic commentators) that only the second notion of intentionality relates to the notion of cognition. Esse intentionale in the first meaning, as demonstrated here, is neither sufficient nor even necessary condition of being cognitive.

(From editorial:) This volume aims to refute the disparaging image of scholastic philosophy as a rather homogeneous tradition of commentaries on Aristotle lacking in originality. Although Aristotelianism was, of course, a very important philosophical paradigm among the scholastics, their works also evince many features and tenets of Platonic or Augustinian origin. Several issues characteristic for Platonism and Augustinianism are discussed in this volume – for example, the role of attention in perception, the extramissionist theory of vision, the metaphysics of light, the illumination theory, the fi rst-person perspective, and self-refl ection. The topics investigated primarily in Aristotelianism include the ontology of sensibles, their causal effi cacy, the role of the medium, and the distinction between the internal senses.

In the paper I argue that medieval philosophers proposed several notions of the senses’ activity in perception. I illustrate the point using the example of two Franciscan thinkers – Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) and Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322). Olivi’s notion of active perception assumes that every perceptual act demands a prior focusing of the mind’s attention. Furthermore, Olivi is partially inspired by the extramissionist theories of vision and reinterprets the notion of a visual ray postulated by them as a useful model for explaining attention and attentional shifts. In Auriol’s view, perception is active because it participates in producing a perceptual content. e senses not only receive information from the environment, they also actively process it and, in Auriol’s words, put the external object into apparent being. e peculiar feature of Auriol’s account is his obvious tendency to conceive perceptual content as both dependent on our perceptual activity and external to the senses. Finally, I consider the two theories in the context of mirror perception – while Olivi focused on the ability of mirrors to switch attention’s direction, Auriol investigated the metaphysical nature of mirror images.

[Supposition of Mental Term according to William of Ockham :] This paper investigates Ockham ’s claim that there is a diversity of suppositions of a mental term. First, it summarizes the hitherto research in Ockham ’s theory of concepts and the theory of mental language ascribed to him. Secondly, it describes his theory of supposition, focusing on the interpretation of this theory which describes it as a device for interpretation of propositions. Thirdly, the paper examines the problems which arise from combining Ockham ’s theory concepts and his theory of supposition – namely, the problems concerning the nature of mental proposition, the question of mental syncategoremata, and of equivocation in mental language. Part 8 then reveals the absurdity of understanding the supposition of a mental term as an instrument for interpretation of mental propositions. Finally, I propose a new interpretation of the whole issue, based on Ockham ’s early commentary on the Sentences. According to this interpretation, the diversity of supposition of a mental term is not triggered by the need of distinguishing various meanings of a mental propositions, but by Ockham ’s nominalistic theory of science.

Centre and Periphery in the Historiography of Philosophy: Peter Olivi and Medieval Psychology The paper inquiries into the (historiographical) question what does it mean to be a “marginal thinker” in the context of the medieval philosophy. The question is investigated on the example of Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Olivi (1248/49–1298) and his philosophical psychology. First, a preliminary option is introduced: for a thinker, being “marginal” depends on his relation to who is considered to be canonical. Since the most famous thinker of the Middle Ages is Thomas Aquinas (at least according to the traditional canon of medieval philosophy), Olivi’s positions in psychology are compared with these of Aquinas. It is revealed that Olivi’s psychology is very different from the Aquinas’ one. (E.g. Olivi stresses the activity of perception, proprioceptual nature of the sense of touch, and direct access of the intellect to its own acts.) Moreover, Olivi is very critical towards the Aristotelian philosophy as is done by some thinkers of his time. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Olivi is a marginal thinker only because of his dissimilarity from the more Aristotelian-minded ones. It is argued that “centre” and “periphery” in the history of medieval philosophy depends not on the canon (which is rather a historians’ construct and instrument), but rather on the tradition. Hence, although Olivi can be considered as a marginal thinker if we take into the account the Aristotelian tradition of medieval philosophy, he is definitely a central and important thinker, if considered as a member of the Augustinian tradition.

[Sensation, Causality, and Attention: Roger Bacon and Peter Olivi] This paper investigates what conditions are to be met for sensory perception to occur. It introduces two diff erent theories of perception that were held by two medieval Franciscan thinkers — namely, Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292) and Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298). Bacon analyses especially the causal relation between the object and the sensory organ in his doctrine of the multiplication of species. In his view, a necessary condition of perception is the reception of the species in a fully disposed sensory organ. On the contrary, Olivi stresses the active role of the sensory power. A necessary condition of sensation is the aspectus — i.e. the focus of our power’s attention on the object. Furthermore, the paper investigates whether and how each of the two thinkers can deal with the arguments proposed by his opponent — namely whether Bacon’s theory is able to explain attention and what the causal role of the object in Olivi’s theory is.

[What is the Human Being? Peter Auriol and the Role of Cognitive Psychology in the Medieval Definition of the Human Being: ] This paper explores how medieval philosophers used cognitive psychology in defining what the human being is, paying special attention to the Franciscan thinker Peter Auriol (c. 1280 – 1322). First, I examine the motivations of Auriol’s claim that the property of being alive is bound to the property of being cognitive (i. e. being capable of cognition). Then, the foundations of medieval faculty psychology and Auriol’s conception of cognition are introduced. I also argue that the emphasis which Auriol puts on the activity of soul’s faculties leads him to the conclusion (unusual in his days) that the distinction among these faculties is established from the first person perspective. Finally, Auriol’s cognitive definition of the human being is introduced – human beings are human beings precisely because their cognitive experience differs from the way the cognition works in animals on the one hand and in God on the other hand. Whereas animals have only sensory soul’s faculties, humans have the intellect in addition and, therefore, they are capable of universal cognition. Moreover, since humans have not only intellect but also the inner senses (particularly, the phantasy), the universals appear to the human intellect only as blended with the individual that the universal was abstracted from, and the human intellect is not capable of paying attention to no more than just one object at the same moment. Since God and angels have only intellect, these distinctively human features are absent from their cognitive experience.

The main aim of this paper is to propose an adequate interpretation of the concept esse ap-parens (apparent being) which was used by Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol (c. 1280 – 1322), especially focusing on his account of sensory perception. Basing on the analysis of relevant passages of the commentary on the Sentences by Auriol, first, I introduce his famous account of sensory illusions, and then his own claims about nature of esse apparens (Auriol refuses both that it is separate entity serving as a mediator of perception, and that it is only extrinsic denomination of the perceived object). In the next part, I refuse the interpretation which esse apparens identifies with mental representation. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to engage this concept into the context of scholastic doctrine of objective or intentional being (popularized mainly by Duns Scotus and his disciples). In the end of the paper, I return to the Auriol’s account of illusions and show that it is compatible with esse apparens understood as mode of being.

This article discusses the theory of perception of Peter Auriol. Arguing for the active nature of the senses in perception, Auriol applies the Scotistic doctrine of objective being to the theory of perception. Nevertheless, he still accepts some parts of the theory of species. The paper introduces Auriol's view on the mechanism of perception and his account of illusions. I argue for a direct realist reading of Auriol's theory of perception and propose that his position becomes clearer if we use the distinction between the first- and third-person perspectives which he seems to presuppose.