Magda Costa Carvalho

A palavra ‘infância’ carrega na sua origem etimológica o afastamento entre as crianças e a voz. No entanto, as vozes das crianças estão aí: acontecem a todo o momento e chegam a surpreender-nos pela pertinência social e política das suas intervenções. O presente texto instala-se nesta perplexidade, procurando recuperar sentidos distintos para a “voz” (não apenas num significado derivado da palavra, entendida enquanto ‘participação’, mas também no seu sentido literal enquanto conjunto de sons emitidos pelo aparelho fonador), no contexto da abordagem pedagógica e filosófica conhecida por ‘comunidade de investigação filosófica’. Procura-se recuperar alguns lugares que têm sido atribuídos às vozes das crianças em diferentes interpretações da comunidade de investigação. Seja enquanto lugar para uma participação democrática de todos os seus membros, independentemente da idade que tenham, seja enquanto oportunidade para a expressão livre e criativa das vozes que a compõem, ou ainda como desafios críticos ao modo como as atuais democracias excluem determinadas emissões acústicas, nos últimos anos têm surgido propostas que permitem recuperar a fonética das vozes infantes no âmbito dos diálogos filosóficos com crianças. Uma dessas propostas consiste numa prática do diálogo filosófico que recusa critérios operativos de validação ditados por dispositivos pedagógicos de mensuração e aperfeiçoamento de competências ou habilidades: a “comunidade de infância”. A nossa proposta não é entender a comunidade de infância como alternativa exclusiva à comunidade de investigação filosófica, mas como acontecimento que, podendo emergir por entre as vozes e as palavras da investigação, permite uma escuta inoperante daquilo que habita foneticamente as fissuras do diálogo partilhado. Esta é a escuta que acolhe as palavras nas suas diversas materializações fonéticas, aceitando que o pensamento emerge quando se diz e se articula, mas também quando se hesita, gagueja ou balbucia.

This reflective, theoretical and philosophical article is part of a post-doctoral internship, in the Philosophy for/with Children Research Line, carried out at the University of the Azores, São Miguel, in Portugal. The starting point for the reflection is a meeting held at the Escola Básica Integrada Armando Côrtes-Rodrigues, in Vila Franca do Campo, São Miguel, on November 2, 2023. It was a philosophical meeting integrated into the Project called Filosofâncias: communities of philosophical research (Santos et al., 2022), whose teaching research and children's practices are developed in this school. This meeting was attended by some Basic Education students, teachers from the Faculty and research teachers from the University of the Azores (UAc. Portugal), São Francisco University (USF-Itatiba/SP-Brazil) and Jaume I University (Castellón, Spain). The proposed activity consisted of the presentation of an animated short film titled “Give in to Giving”, produced in 2018 by Leo Burnett Dubai for Hanzo Film. After viewing the short, philosophical questions and dialogues were developed within the framework of the “philosophical research community” approach, around various topics. The philosophical activity with children and adults resonated with the researchers present far beyond the chronological time of the session, opening spaces between problematization and writing around gentleness, serenity and self-obedience as practices of anticipation of the world. It is on them that this text focuses.

The article explores the rich and varied experiences of a collective writing project, unfolding through an anecdote involving Charlie, a young boy who creatively disrupted conventional photography methods. This incident, during an evening promenade by the sea in Ericeira (Portugal), epitomizes the project's embrace of playfulness and exploration of diverse perspectives–materialized through Charlie's playful insistence on experimenting with different angles. The event embodied the group’s approach to writing, leading to a collective inquiry into the interplay of ages, angles, and other themes like waves, threads, shadows, and liminal spaces. The project, driven by the Between Ages Collective, began with informal gatherings in Plymouth, UK, and expanded into a year-long online reading group. Participants, spanning different generations and academic stages, shared various materials, including films, picture books, and scholarly texts, which inspired individual contributions. Influenced by the Collective's collaborative spirit, these contributions explore the concept of 'between ages' – a metaphorical and literal space of transition and fluidity. Contributors were invited to craft pieces that delve into the 'between ages' theme, often exploring serendipitous moments that transform interactions and experiences. The writing tries to capture a sense of openness and curiosity, embracing the uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in the process. The works do not strictly adhere to conventional academic or narrative forms but rather emerge from the collective's shared experiences, including cooking, eating, swimming and walking together. The article suggests that these writings are not meant to be definitive or conclusive but are explorations that invite readers to engage with the mundane and profound textures of everyday life. The stories and themes explored are marked by their diversity in style, rhythm, and imagery, ranging from reflections on the philosophy of shadows to the profound implications of intergenerational and interspecies relationships. The Collective’s work is presented as an ongoing experiment in thinking and writing together, with each piece offering unique insights into the fluid and often blurred boundaries between different states of being. This openness to the in-between spaces brings into question the notion of fixed identities and experiences, inviting a more nuanced understanding of the relational dynamics that shape existence. The article allows the readers to delve into these narratives and engage with the myriad ways they resonate with broader themes of being, storying, and connecting.

This paper argues that the various approaches within P4C (Philosophy for Children) should purposefully integrate the exploration of questioning instead of only presenting children with prepared questions as starting points for inquiry. This is particularly relevant since P4C is one of the few educational settings that offers a space for children to question and explore the variation of their questions’ impact. The purposeful integration of questions does justice to the inheritance of the philosophical tradition, and reinforces questions as a privileged way for human beings to relate to the world. More than simply a methodological step in designing a P4C session, questions are an educational resource and are a central part of thinking and inquiry in a philosophical session. The paper proposes a new way to leverage these tools, arguing that defining philosophy as an obsession to overcome opacity and aim for transparency (Caeiro, 2015) can help participants identify questions that may empower dialogue in a philosophical way.

The paper proposes that taking the notion of “community of inquiry” as a regulative ideal is a valuable working tool for the refinement and improvement of the practice of Philosophy for Children (P4C). Reed (1996) and Sprod (1997) have already drawn attention to this, stating that the community of inquiry is more a regulative idea than a typical occurrence. Building on these claims, we will show that taking the notion of community of inquiry as such gives new light to many of the items and aspects of the description of what constitutes a community of inquiry. Consequently, it provides ways to identify important moments in the philosophical practice that consolidate the community of inquiry, and a working tool to grasp and handle some of the crucial moves that the facilitator, as well as other participants, do to install and strengthen the community in the sessions.

Tópicos de filosofía y educación para el siglo XXI, es continuación de las reflexiones iniciadas en Voces de Filosofía de la Educación. Pretendemos que esos diálogos se encaminen hacia los territorios comunes de la educación, sin trivializarlos. La situación actual marcada por la pandemia por Covid-19 ofrece varias aristas para examinar los temas relevantes de la educación, sobresaliendo aquellos en los que las desigualdades sociales (y, por ende, educativas) se exacerbaron y los modos de enseñar y aprender dieron un giro de 180°. Al remitirnos al Diccionario de la Lengua Española, se rescata el sentido de Tópico como “Perteneciente o relativo a determinado lugar”. En este tenor, se aborda sobre lo que acontece, lo problemático, así como también las posibilidades de cambio en el amplio mundo de la educación. Finalmente, esperamos que en el presente libro logren confluir la Filosofía y la Educación en el lugar común del pensamiento, palabra y acción.

Gert Biesta claims that education involves introducing young people to a pathway from what they want to what it is good for them to want, offering the conditions for children to cross from the former to the latter. This shift from a realm of individual desires to the realm of the desirable constitutes a “de-centered existence”. Since there is an undeniable normative dimension in this view, it seemed important to search for the guiding values or principles that frames it. In his ICPIC talk, G. Biesta refers to the Levinasian concept of responsibility, identifying individual desires (children’s desires) with the egological way of existence. In his 2014’s book, The beautiful risk of education, Biesta mentions the concept of educational wisdom (educators’ wisdom), through an Aristotelian standpoint. In either perspective, the author grants normative privileges to adults, claiming that, in an educational environment, adults have the responsibility to be educators and not learners. We follow from here to question Biesta’s statement of education as a risk, since if there are evaluative standards according to which educators can orient their practices, as well as students behaviors (either the responsibility in face of the Other or the ability to make good and wise judgments), how can one still talk about a risk in education? We end up our commentary by looking for deeper meanings for the concept of risk in education.

The main goal of Henri Bergson’s philosophy of nature is to offer a dynamic understanding of living phenomena. It is in this context that we main­tain that the author left us a “bio-philosophy,” that is, an interpretation which, by adopting a positive model of biology as a cognitive paradigm, describes the essential character of living activity as time or duration (durée). Bergson’s posi­tive metaphysics, which brings science to the metaphysical field and provides an inner perspective of the vital principle, consolidated itself in the study of evolutionary theories like Darwinism. However, the specificity of the perspective Bergson presents to us lies in the fact that he positions himself as a philosopher and not as a scientist: he does not seek a merely scientific explanation of reality, but an integral vision that allows us to give scientific evolution a metaphysical reading. Thus, when Bergson upholds the insufficiency of pure Darwinism, and proposes a true evolutionism, it is because he thinks that the only way to understand the evolutionary nature of life is by overcoming a strictly mechanistic perspective. For Bergson, such an interpretation results from the artificial way in which our intellectual functions deconstruct reality and lead to an incomplete and fragmented reading of the evolution of organisms. As a philosopher he seeks an explanatory level which, being scientifically based, is not restricted to the physico-chemical limits of reality. For that reason, Bergson claims that the inner cause of evolution is an activity where growth and division occur as a natural result of the divergence of life’s tendencies.

The expression “end of nature” has been coined by American environ-mentalist Bill McKibben is his 1989 famous book, The End of Nature. Since then, the philosophical implications of such an obituary have been explored, mainly on an ethical perspective over the environment. The conceptual end of nature is one of those implications, in the context of a post-naturalistic environmental philosophy. Our purpose is to build upon the ambiguities of “nature” and reframe some readings of the concept of “integrity” as a guiding principle in the relation between human beings and the environment.

Os debates produzidos pelas éticas ambientais contemporâneas tendem a recusar, na sua maioria, qualquer abordagem de fundo antropocêntrico, identificando esta postura com uma desvalorização absoluta da natureza em detrimento dos interesses humanos. Para além disso, é comum entenderem-se os interesses da espécie humana como uma instrumentalização abusiva do ambiente, sobretudo com a finalidade de produzir bem-estar social e económico. A presente reflexão pretende contestar estas posições, promovendo uma distinção entre a legítima percepção e valorização da natureza a partir do ponto de vista humano e uma ilegítima atitude de arrogante desvalorização e instrumentalização do meio ambiente. Procuraremos defender que o equilíbrio e a sustentabilidade bióticas dependem da promoção de uma atitude que tem sido caracterizada, entre os especialistas, como um antropocentrismo fraco ou moderado, e cujo alcance e potencialidades éticas não nos parecem ter recebido ainda a devida atenção.

The paper arises from a shared event that turned into an experience: the finding of a childlike piece of paper on our way to a conference about philosophy in schools and how it affects our educational ideas and research practices on listening to children. Triggered by the question of what it means to listen, we are led to the exercise of self-questioning inspired by some of the authors that have already written about the topic, specifically in the context of the community of philosophical enquiry. The thinking unfolds with the telling of the story about the found piece of paper, crossing different layers of questioning and trying to keep the enquiry open for the readers: what is it that we do not know about listening to children? And to what extent might that, which we do not know, be the cause of biased and adultist practices? Is it necessary to return to what philosophy is and where one can find it inside the school environment? Is it already there when the adults arrive? Are we not listening to it? Or are there specific places for philosophical conversations, such as the classroom? Is philosophy also invited to the margins of those spaces? Who decides what counts as philosophical? It is not about answering questions and giving closure to our concerns as educators and researchers, but rather sharing with the readers how even in the least suspected place - an academic event about bringing philosophy to school - one might still not be listening to children. In returning to this self-questioning movement, we want to echo some of the troubling in the thinking and practices of listening in the so-called movement of Philosophy for/with Children: this for/with phenomenon, its politics and relations; some of the assumptions that might be present in the dilemmas in practice for educators and researchers; but also its aesthetics resonances, the sheer beauty of troubling, the (out of) tune of self-questioning, the questions it raises for us as researchers and the space of doubting and uncertainty it offers, like a hesitation or a breathing space. And perhaps, we wonder, it is in-between spaces, in its cracks and transitions, that important things can find their way into our thinking and conversations about childhood. Just like a piece of paper in a hotel room.

This text was written after hearing a childlike question about voice, a question asked by Lara, a girl at a “basic” school in a rural area of the Azores islands that resulted in a diferent way of understanding the motives and intentions that are implicit in the way we practice community of philosphical inquiry with children and adults. This question also unveiled important aspects of the way we construct ourselves as adults who believe in the importance of teaching philosophy in elementary school. This text describes an attempt to follow the trail of inquiry triggered by Lara’s question, and documents three moments or possibilities of re-questioning. These moments – which are not understood as forming an orderly sequence, but rather represent inroads into the initial question – emerge as possibilities marked by the rhythm of inquiry that followed. Those questions were: What do we hear when we talk about voice? What do we say when we talk about listening? And what do we think about when we share voices and listen actively? The text invites us to focus on voice as a concept aligned with a certain paradigmatic model of thinking commonly referred to as “philosophy,”and also invites us to consider the concept of listening as a construct that returns us to the origins of western philosophy. Finally, the text invites us to consider different ways of understanding voice and listening as based on the idea of thinking as an in-between space of sharing, focusing specifically on activities centering philosophical dialogue with children.

The paper begins with the concept of voice and questions its different meanings, especially in educational settings, to propose a philosophical framing of people-of-young-age’s material voices. It then proposes to understand those voices as disruptive differences or opportunities to (re)think about our roles as educators and, most of all, to return to the question of what a philosophical approach to childhood might disrupt. In doing so, it outlines some ideas about “voice” as sound and materiality (Cavarero, 2005) and also about “listening” as a permanent attention to what might emerge (Nancy, 2002; Davies, 2014), to then extend particular meanings of these concepts to the practice of thinking philosophically with people of different ages in the community of philosophical inquiry educational setting (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012). It also builds on the concept of “event” by Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, 2013), as a potential immanent within a confluence of forces, to then ask how we can foster a philosophical way of living (in) education that takes people-of-young-age’s material voices as something we cannot afford to lose. Finally, the paper proposes to frame the community of philosophical inquiry as a philosophical community of voices, in the sense of an opportunity to experience the materiality of all the voices as something that matters in the shared thought of its participants.

A child arrives as a new world because in her and with her we feel that the whole world can start over. But that is not the only reason. A child also arrives as a new world because her arrival tells us what, being so simple, we had almost forgotten: that the world is not just old and unquestionable. The child doesn’t let us be indif-ferent; she breaks with conformity and arrives as hope, reeking of the unpredictable. Of questions. A similar arrival to that of a child is that of certain childlike ideas, such as the idea offered by Matthew Lipman when he created “philosophy for children.” We cele-brate his childlike, daring, irreverent, inquiring character, commemorating his birth nearly 50 years ago. With this childlike idea, a new world began—or at least it be-came possible to start—in worlds which were already a little old and stuck in con-formity. When those in institutionalized philosophy and education heard about the audacity of welcoming children among their reputable interlocutors in dialogue and thought, they frowned and turned up their noses. Philosophy for children? How come? Childhood in philosophy?

Henri Bergson’s statements on Plotinus are an interesting case-study for his readers, contrasting between an avowed sympathy (in the Courses at the Collège de France) and an almost absence of references (in his writings). While Bergson-the-professor is interested in the study of Plotinus’ work for its own sake, Bergson-the-philosopher identifies the Neoplatonist with the matrix of an entire metaphysical body of knowledge: the Ancient Greek philosophy. The article seeks to highlight the articulation between the professor and the philosopher, exploring the scope of Plotinian influences in the construction and consolidation (albeit implicit) of Bergson’s thought - whether by adherence or demarcation -, focusing on three essential concepts: soul, sympathy, and causality.

Delfim Santos foi um dos mais destacados discípulos de Leonardo Coimbra e, nesse contexto, teve ao seu dispor um ambiente especulativo propício ao contacto precoce com a filosofia de Henri Bergson. Na sequência do encontro que teve com o filósofo francês, em Paris no ano de 1935, Delfim Santos contribuiu de form a decisiva para a aproximação de uma determinada facção do pensamento português da época à filosofia de Bergson. Ainda que tenha posteriormente construído a sua própria perspectiva filosófica em estreita ligação com o pensamento alemão contemporâneo, em especial sob a influência de nomes como Heidegger ou Hartmann, os primeiros escritos de Delfim Santos deixam bem clara uma aproximação especulativa a determinadas orientações bergsonianas. Contudo, já no final da sua vida - abruptamente interrompida -, as referências a Bergson surgem a propósito da filosofia de Leonardo Coimbra e visam fundamentalmente acentuar o que para Delfim Santos constituía o antibergsonismo do antigo Mestre português.

Este ha sido el mundo infantil – imposible y contradictorio – que sentimos habitar en este escrito, en esta escritura. En ese mundo, como ahora, el inicio y el final coinciden. En ese mundo, que Heráclito llamaría aión, es la infancia la que gobierna. Un gobierno infantil. Por lo tanto, es tiempo de callarnos. De estarnos sin tanta luz y sin tantas palabras. Para dormir y soñar. Es tiempo de terminar. O de comenzar. Los y las lectores infantiles (no) tienen la palabra. Nosotros ya (no) la tenemos… (¡hipo!)

The present text is a childlike exercise in writing. In responding to an invitation to write an adult, academic text, we the authors found that the presence of a child's standpoint acted to change the expressions that were to be elucidated, and that the project that adult writing represents was suspended by the creative force of childhood. "Philosophy for children" became "children for philosophy"; "moral education" became "the end (of) morality" and "conceptions of childhood" became the "childhood of conceptions." As such our text is divided into different sections, in each of which we explore the implications of allowing ourselves to be transformed in our practice by recognition of the child’s voice; the problematization of conventional educational programmatics for one, and the opening of new pedagogical pathways, which recognize childhood as a moving force of thinking, as opposed to an object of study and manipulation. To this end, we engage several interlocutors from different fields--literature, philosophy, education, "philosophy for children", and from chronological children themselves. We conclude by proposing, based on an encounter with the work of H. Cisoux and J. Derrida, that we think about the relations between deconstruction and childhood in such a way that our affirmation of childhood leads to a transformation of the text itself—not only in its content but in its form. As such, we present the reader with a fundamentally childlike text.

Indecisão plena de promessas: imagens da vida e da infância na filosofia de Henri Bergson Resumo: Numa passagem da obra Évolution Créatrice, Bergson recupera a imagem da criança para afirmar que a natureza viva opera através de tendências divergentes. Apesar de não ter desenvolvido um pensamento de pendor educacional, encontram-se na obra bergsoniana referências que, por um lado, recuperam a dimensão criativa e criadora da infância e, por outro, acentuam a forma infantil dos movimentos do élan vital. Estas referências fazem parte da imagética do autor, mostrando como o seu pensamento sugestiona leituras ímpares. O convite para cruzar a imagem da vida como infância com a imagem da infância como vida revela-se, assim, sugestivo para repensar o que nos habita como constitutivamente outro: a criança que fomos e a natureza que somos. E será através da imagem – como forma de contacto dinâmico com o real – que poderemos encontrar algumas respostas para a sugestão bergsoniana de se promover nas escolas um conhecimento infantil.Palavras-chave: infância; criança; natureza; imagem; Bergson. Indecision charged with promise: Images of life and childhood in Henri Bergson’s philosophy: In a passage in his Évolution Créatrice, Bergson reclaims the image of the child to argue that living nature works through divergent tendencies. Although Bergson’s work doesn’t focus specifically on education, it does contain references that, on the one hand, reclaim the creative and creating nature of childhood, while on the other hand accentuating the childlike nature of élan vital’s movements. These references are part of Bergson’s repertoire of imagery and demonstrate how his thought evokes uneven readings. The invitation to cross the image of life as childhood with that of childhood as life ultimately evokes a rethinking of what inhabits us as constitutively other: the child we were and the nature we are. And it is through the notion of image – as a form of dynamic contact with reality – that we will find some answers for Bergson’s suggestion that schools promote a childlike knowledge.Key-words: childhood; child; nature; image; Bergson. Indecisión cargada de promesas: Imagénes de la vida y de la infancia en la filosofía de Henri Bergson Resumen: En un pasaje sobre la obra Évolution Créatrice, Bergson recupera la imagen del niño para afirmar que la naturaleza viva opera a través de tendencias divergentes. A pesar de no haber desarrollado un pensamiento de carácter educacional, se encuentran en la obra bergsoniana referencias que, por un lado, recuperan la dimensión creativa y creadora de la infancia y, por otro, acentúan la forma infantil de los movimientos del impulso vital. Estas referencias hacen parte de la imagen del autor, mostrando como su pensamiento sugestiona lecturas impares. O convite para cruzar la imagen de la vida como infancia con la imagen de la infancia como vida se revela, de esta manera, sugestivo para repensar lo que nos habita como constitutivamente otro: el niño que fuimos y la naturaleza que somos. Y será a través de la imagen – como forma de contacto dinámico con lo real – que podremos encontrar algunas respuestas para la sugestión bergsoniana de promoverse en las escuelas un conocimiento infantil.Palavras-clave: infancia; niño; naturaleza; imagen; Bergson. Data de registro: 20/08/2020Data de aceite: 30/11/2020.

Apresentamos um trabalho composto por um conjunto de reflexões nascidas em tempos e espaços distintos. A maior parte dos capítulos retoma textos já publicados, mas que foram repensados e reescritos a partir do que hoje vemos. Outros só agora se tornam dia. Paralelamente à escolha dos textos, à depuração da escrita e ao afinamento da redação, um outro exercício emergiu: pensar cada capítulo como evento de um processo cujo dinamismo próprio não se deixa fixar. Os textos mostraram-se, então, como inscrições provisórias, fotografias que captaram certos contornos de uma continuidade, formas instantâneas fotografadas numa transição permanente. O mesmo é dizer que, tendo nascido em tempos distintos e com espaços próprios, os textos são ações em processo, rastos de uma mudança: o estar-em-viagem que foi emergindo.

Following Lévinas, for whom the Bergsonian defense of duration beyond time that is merely chronological corresponds to the release of terror of a world where novelty is impossible, this article proposes, in the field of philosophy for children, a thought exercise beyond what is known and mastered, that upsets the comfortable and habitual rhythms of the predictable and dislodges itself from naturally accepted ideas. Starting from the intersection of the Bergsonian concepts of possibility and temporality, we propose promoting collaborative, problematizing dialogue in an educational setting. We do so by dividing our reflection into two lines of thought, which we formulate as guiding questions: Is time possible in the community of philosophical inquiry? Is there time for the possible in the community of philosophical inquiry? Using the Bergsonian notions of time and possible like photographic lenses through which light is captured, we are interested in problematizing the practice of philosophical dialogue with children, specifically the preparation and the development of activities in a community of philosophical inquiry.

After almost a decade of study, research, and dissemination in the field of philosophy for children (p4c), the University of the Azores has created a Master’s degree in Philosophy for Children. While it may appear to be just another university course of study in the academic field of philosophy, we believe that this Master’s is a case study in its own right, as it has allowed us to think about what p4c is capable of when it takes over the university. Not only has the Master’s degree helped shape p4c, but p4c has itself driven the development of the Master’s. Through this process, a different way of existing “within the university” emerges, revealing points worthy of attention that conventional academia does not always value. This article reflects on some of the ideas relating to this process and, without any pretension of establishing rules or claiming to be a finished product, offers some considerations that in our view constitute a turning point for the way people exist within the university. After experiencing a Master’s based upon p4c, neither the university nor philosophy itself can be understood in the same way as before. What is it about p4c, then, that makes it capable of transforming whatever it touches?

In the world of Philosophy for Children, the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a problem with regards to the concept of method in P4C, and to question the consequences of that concept in the practice of philosophical dialogue with children. To better situate the concept of method within P4C, we will identify two different historical understandings—represented by Rene Descartes and Hans Georg Gadamer—of the concept, and suggest new possibilities for understanding philosophical practice with children in light of their difference.

O Programa de Filosofia para Crianças de Matthew Lipman e Ann Margaret Sharp tem pouco mais de 40 anos e à sua criação de imediato se sucederam a difusão e a adaptação em diversos contextos geográficos e culturais. Quer isto dizer que a história da Filosofia para Crianças, sobretudo nas últimas décadas, tem consistido numa marcha, mais ou menos vertiginosa, de inovação e renovação. E nem sempre este ritmo de rápida disseminação se tem mostrado compatível com a sedimentação de reflexões apuradas sobre as diferentes dimensões e problemáticas que a prática coloca. A formação dos facilitadores de sessões de Filosofia para Crianças, de acordo com o modelo da comunidade de investigação filosófica de Lipman e Sharp, é uma das dimensões deste projeto pioneiro que aguardam um debate de maior desenvolvimento. A presente reflexão pretende contribuir para essa discussão, apresentando de forma concisa algumas posições que consideramos relevantes para a compreensão do que está em causa. Não temos a pretensão de assumir a forma acabada de um cânone, mas de justificar opções que nos parecem decisivas no presente contexto de implementação da Filosofia para Crianças em Portugal. Esperamos, assim, contribuir para que se possa gerar uma comunidade alargada de diálogo sobre este tópico.

This work aims to consider philosophically the issue of the method in philosophical practices with children. It analyzes some influences received by the creators of Philosophy for Children, Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, like the pragmatism of J. Dewey. It describes the meanings of three similar expressions in Lipman's work: methodical, methodological and method. It offers some criticisms of method: Hans-Georg Gadamer, but especially Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze. Finally, he questions the need of a method for doing philosophy with children or, more broadly, for thinking childishly in education. Este trabajo tiene como objetivo pensar filosóficamente el tema del método en las prácticas filosóficas con niñas y niños. Analiza algunas influencias recibidas por los creadores de Filosofía para Niños, Matthew Lipman y Ann Margaret Sharp, como el pragmatismo de J. Dewey. Describe los significados de tres expresiones similares en el trabajo de Lipman: metódico, metodológico y metodológico. Ofrece algunas críticas del método: Hans-Georg Gadamer, pero especialmente Henri Bergson y Gilles Deleuze. Finalmente, cuestiona la necesidad de un método para hacer filosofía con niñas y niños o, más ampliamente, para pensar infantilmente en educación. Este trabalho busca pensar filosoficamente a questão do método nas práticas filosóficas com crianças. Analisa algumas influencias recebidas pelos criadores da Filosofia para Crianças, Matthew Lipman e Ann Margaret Sharp, como o pragmatismo de J. Dewey. Descreve os sentidos de três expressões afins na obra de Lipman: metódico, metodologia e método. Oferece algumas críticas a leituras do método: Hans-Georg Gadamer, mas sobretudo Henri Bergson e Gilles Deleuze. Finalmente, problematiza a necessidade de um método para fazer filosofia com crianças ou, de um modo mais geral, para pensar infantilmente na educação.

In the 1970s, Lipman and Sharp created the Philosophy for Children programme, which was later adopted by several countries and implemented according to specific settings and pedagogical nuances. At the same time, Philosophy for Children is nowadays an autonomous subject in Philosophy and its history has been acknowledged. Its purpose goes beyond the logical structuring of thought, and its philosophical-educational premise offers an operative complementarity between rationality and affectivity. Demanding challenges are put to the facilitators of the communities of philosophical inquiry, for it’s vital to be able to detect the philosophical potential beneath the children’s interventions, as well as to model a net of connections that creates an ambiance conducive to thinking. In this article, we defend that the process of affectivity to be achieved is built on a dynamic structure of ethical nature, where affectivity promotes thinking and is materialised in acts.