•  9
    Uncertainty for Uncertain Decision-Makers
    Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 16 (1). 2023.
  •  3
    Uncertain Policy Decisions During the Covid-19 Pandemic
    Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 14 (1). 2021.
    The Covid-19 pandemic has shaken the world. It has presented us with a series of new challenges, but the policy response may be difficult due to the severe uncertainty of our circumstances. While pressure to take timely action may push towards less inclusive decision procedures, in this paper I argue that precisely our current uncertainty provides reasons to include stakeholders in collective decision-making. Decision-making during the pandemic faces uncertainty that goes beyond the standard, pr…Read more
  •  33
    Non-Empirical Uncertainties in Evidence-Based Decision Making
    Perspectives on Science 30 (2): 305-320. 2022.
    The increasing success of the evidence-based policy movement is raising the demand of empirically informed decision making. As arguably any policy decision happens under conditions of uncertainty, following our best available evidence to reduce the uncertainty seems a requirement of good decision making. However, not all the uncertainty faced by decision makers can be resolved by evidence. In this paper, we build on a philosophical analysis of uncertainty to identify the boundaries of scientific…Read more
  •  18
    Making policy decisions under plural uncertainty: responding to the COVID-19 pandemic
    History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (2): 1-5. 2021.
    In this paper, I contend that the uncertainty faced by policy-makers in the COVID-19 pandemic goes beyond the one modelled in standard decision theory. A philosophical analysis of the nature of this uncertainty could suggest some principles to guide policy-making.
  •  23
    The Interpretation of Probability in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1): 131-144. 2021.
    In this paper, I propose an assessment of the interpretation of the mathematical notion of probability that Wittgenstein presents in TLP (1963: 5.15 – 5.156). I start by presenting his definition of probability as a relation between propositions. I claim that this definition qualifies as a logical interpretation of probability, of the kind defended in the same years by J. M. Keynes. However, Wittgenstein’s interpretation seems prima facie to be safe from two standard objections moved to logical …Read more
  •  10
    Fiction, imagination, and normative rationality
    Argumenta 1 (6): 135-146. 2020.
    Rationality is a cornerstone of economics. The properties defining rationality are embodied by the Rational Agent, whose actions are prescriptive for economic agents. However, the Rational Agent is a fictional character: so why should real agents act like it? The Rational Agent takes its normative force from the arguments in support of the properties it embodies. In this paper, I explore the grounds for the normative force of the Rational Agent by looking at one of them. I explain the compelling…Read more