Manuel García

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’—first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se—have a distinctive character that traditional views of contents cannot characterize. Drawing on Anscombe, Annalisa Coliva has argued that a feature she calls Real Guarantee marks apart de se thoughts—as opposed to others including Immunity to Error through Misidentification that have been proposed for that role. I'll argue that, while her work points to a truly distinguishing feature of the de se, we need an account of the notion other than hers and Echeverri's recent development of it. I'll offer an alternative, drawing on Léa Salje's work. Finally, I'll briefly outline how, thus understood, the Real Guarantee feature could be adequately explained by theories of de se thoughts like the one I favour, even if it is an open option to just explain it away.

En el presente trabajo, pretendo explorar la historia de una búsqueda de la filosofía medieval, que trasciende incluso su propia época, ya que condujo a la ciencia de lo material, dejó sentadas las bases para el futuro desarrollo de las ciencias y de la propia filosofía occidentales, ya en los tiempos modernos; y donde creo percibir la presencia de una constante: la búsqueda de lo individual, de lo singular, dentro de los conceptos filosóficos que el pensamiento medieval fue formando. Es lo que llamo la Adversus Pluralitas de la filosofía escolástica occidental. Esta exploración la realizo tanto desde el punto de vista del análisis doctrinal como del contexto histórico, mediante el estudio de fragmentos de las obras de los más importantes representantes de la filosofía de la época medieval, así como de textos más recientes a ellos referidos. In the present work I intend to explore the history of a quest of medieval philosophy that transcends even its own era, since it led to the science of material things, laid the foundations for the future development of Western sciences and of philosophy itself, already in the modern age; and in which I believe I perceive the presence of a constant: the search for the individual, for the singular, within the philosophical concepts that medieval thought was forming. This is what I call the adversus pluralitas of Western scholastic philosophy. This research is carried out both from the point of view of doctrinal analysis and historical context, through the study of fragments of the works of the most important representatives of the philosophy of the Medieval time, as well as more recent texts referring to them.

La Iglesia católica se encuentra en un proceso de reflexión sobre la sinodalidad. En este contexto, se ha hecho notar que las Iglesias orientales han funcionado históricamente sobre la base del sínodo como método de gobierno y reflexión comunitaria. Así pues, puede ser recomendable analizar cómo estas Iglesias han vivido la sinodalidad en su historia. El autor pretende contribuir a esta tarea presentando el pensamiento de Teodoro Abu Qurra, un significativo autor cristiano árabe del siglo ix, en particular, su tratado Sobre los Concilios.

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced.

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of _immunity to error through misidentification_ (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, _episodic_ memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions.

Propuesta de un nuevo y complementario enfoque —el traductológico— para el estudio de los romanceamientos granadinos considerados en cuanto que testimonios únicos para la historia de la traducción del árabe al español y la historia del arabismo en España. Dicho enfoque se lleva aquí a la práctica ilustrado con dos romanceamientos inéditos llevados a cabo en 1517 por Bemardino Xarafí, escribano público y romanceador de la ciudad de Granada y su Reino. La edición de los mismos se acompaña de un amplio estudio traductológico, una panorámica general sobre los Xarafí y otros romanceadores granadinos del primer tercio del XVI y un análisis descriptivo comparado con otros romanceamientos del siglo XVI y con los procedimientos de traducción actualmente aceptados en la traducción jurada del árabe al español.

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom's normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.

In this paper I explore two possible ways of being quietist in philosophy and relate them to the work of Wittgenstein and McDowell. On the one hand, quietism could be understood as an imperative to remain quiet regarding what we value the most. The final aphorisms of the Tractatus seem to gesture in this direction. On the other hand, it could be seen as a refusal to produce philosophical theories regarding general and abstract issues such as meaning or thought. McDowell has recommended reading the Investigations under this light and has followed the advice in most of his work. I discuss some consequences of this approach to issues such as rule following, mental externalism and ethical particularlism and try to show that there is much exciting philosophical work to be done even after abandoning grand theoretical aspirations.

The effect of ASDEX Upgrade edge localized mode -mitigation coils on fast ion wall loads was studied with the fast particle following Monte Carlo code ASCOT. Neutral beam injected particles were simulated in two AUG discharges both in the presence and in the absence of the magnetic field perturbation induced by the eight newly installed in-vessel coils. In one of the discharges beams were applied individually, making it a useful basis for investigating the effect of the coils on different beams. However, no ELM mitigation was observed in #26476, probably due to the low plasma density. Therefore, another discharge demonstrating clear ELM mitigation was also studied. The magnetic perturbation due to the in-vessel coils has a significant effect on the fast particle confinement, but only when total magnetic field, B tot, is low. When B tot was high, the perturbation did not increase the losses, but merely resulted in redistribution of the wall power loads. Hence, it seems to be possible to achieve ELM mitigation using in-vessel coils, while still avoiding increased fast ion losses, by simply using a strong B tot. Preliminary comparisons between simulated and experimental fast ion lost detector signals show a reasonable correspondence. © 2012 IAEA, Vienna.

John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone to sceptical attacks and waters down McDowell’s holism. We propose to retain McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature—without appealing to McDowell’s Kantian conception of experience—, and argue that it is sufficient to avoid the oscillation and to make sense of the objectivity of thought.