•  23
    The Grounds of Excuses
    Philosophia 51 (5): 2379-2394. 2023.
    According to a popular view, excuses undermine blameworthiness. At the same time, philosophers commonly accept that blameworthiness is composed of two necessary conditions: a moral objectionability condition and a responsibility condition. For excuses to do their job, they must undermine at least one of these conditions. In this paper, I conclude that excuses do neither. By inference to the best explanation, I propose a view that reconciles this conclusion with the function of excuses.
  •  43
    Implicit bias: a sin of omission?
    Philosophical Explorations 24 (3): 325-336. 2021.
    It is widely believed that implicit bias is common and that it contributes, in part, to the perpetuation of systemic injustice. Hence, the existence of implicit bias raises the question: can individuals be blameworthy for their implicit bias? Here, I consider what it is about implicit bias that renders agents blameworthy. I defend the claim that, when individuals omit to engage in activities that could prevent the influence of implicit bias on their behavior, they may be blamed for their implici…Read more
  •  2
    Responsibility for Irrational Beliefs.
    Dissertation, University of Zürich. 2020.
    Each of us harbor all sorts of irrational beliefs. That is, we maintain and acquire beliefs that violate norms of good reasoning and of virtuous inquiry. Sometimes in spite of our best efforts to be rid of them; sometimes in blissful ignorance of their presence. Other times, we would rather not check if our beliefs conform with the evidence. In some of these instances, it should be possible to be responsible for this type of beliefs, just like we are sometimes responsible for our rational belief…Read more
  •  33
    Responsibility for self-deception
    Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2): 119-134. 2018.
    Marie van Loon | : In this paper, I argue that Alfred Mele’s conception of self-deception is such that it always fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. This is because self-deceptive mechanisms of belief formation are such that the kind of beliefs they bring about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for doxastic responsibility from epistemic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele describes the relation of the subject to the evide…Read more