• The most important problem is philosophical deontic logic is to determine the logical form of expressions of conditional obligation. The dissertation shows first that this problem is closely related to David Lewis's well-known "problem about permission"--a problem concerning the characterization of changes in normative systems. The dissertation contains a solution to the problem about permission, as well as an argument that expressions of conditional obligation cannot be represented satisfactori…Read more
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    Doing the Best We Can
    International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3): 101-102. 1990.
  •  63
    Dyadic deontic detachment
    Synthese 54 (2). 1983.
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    Doing the Best We Can: An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3): 101-102. 1990.
  •  34
    Help for the good samaritan paradox
    Philosophical Studies 50 (1). 1986.
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  •  187
    Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David L…Read more
  •  236
    Hector meets 3-d: A diaphilosophical epic
    Philosophical Perspectives 8 389-414. 1994.
  •  78
    Notes on relation R
    Analysis 56 (1). 1996.
  •  24
    Absolute obligations and ordered worlds
    Philosophical Studies 72 (1). 1993.
  •  21
    President Kennedy once said, “Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” The purpose of my presentation this evening is to show why a strike against Iraq is dangerous, unjustified, and unnecessary. Since Saddam Hussein has not engaged in any aggressive behavior since the Gulf War, launching an attack would be pre-emptive in nature.
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    Intentional Social Action and We-Intentions
    Analyse & Kritik 8 (1): 86-108. 1986.
    In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of "we-intention" plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela's concept of "we-intention". Tuomela's introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions …Read more