Mary Peterson

This book promotes entirely new insights into women’s contributions to the history of philosophy and boasts papers spanning the centuries from Antigone until twentieth century phenomenology, covering fields from logic to mysticism, stretching from Brazil to Early Modern Europe. The book is of interest for all scholars and students of the history of philosophy, but especially for those who are interested in women philosophers and in new narratives in the history of philosophy. The book is representative of the immense scope of academic discussion women were involved in over the centuries as well as their varying styles and methods. It features papers in logic and in mysticism, presents papers on female authors in Antiquity and in the twenty-first century and it includes papers on phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The chapters consider philosophical positions in literature and drama, in letters and in classical philosophical treatises, ensuring this book contributes significantly to research on the individual women authors, who are all to date still understudied figures.

In this article, we explore how to engage with the work of ethicists facing public allegations of professional sexual misconduct. Rather than disengaging or proceeding as usual, we propose citing their work alongside impartial information about credible allegations. We choose to isolate the work of ethicists as the target of this proposal because ethicists are distinct on two fronts: they are distinct among philosophers because they have moral authority, and distinct among others with moral authority, such as religious leaders and civil rights activists, because their power is reproduced in part through citations. Our approach offers a nuanced perspective on the power conferred through citations. We argue that individual scholars have a moral and intellectual responsibility to cite using this practice, especially when institutional enforcement of justice is lacking.

I argue that in her first novel Near to the Wild Heart, Clarice Lispector puts forth a critique of Baruch Spinoza’s idea of freedom from Books IV and V of the Ethics. Although scholars have noted that Lispector was influenced by Spinoza, and that she quoted the Ethics in Near to the Wild Heart, none have yet explored her critical engagement with Spinozism. I argue that through the intimate relationship of two characters in Near to the Wild Heart, both of whom strive to be free in Spinozist terms but fail, Lispector shows that freedom must depend on more than reason alone. For Lispector, I argue, freedom depends additionally on circumstances such as human relationships and societal structures. I give biographical background to establish Lispector’s stake in the question of what freedom means and how it can be achieved, then explore the ways her two respective characters, Otávio and Joana, strive yet fail to be free.