Maura Priest

This chapter discusses the vices of epistemic insensitivity and epistemic obstruction in special relation to contemporary political divides and contemporary habits of media consumption. It argues that both vices threaten to worsen political and social divisions between self-identified conservatives on the one hand, and those that the said self-identified conservatives themselves identify as “elites,” “liberal elites,” “experts,” “progressives,” or, “the left.” In turn, this worsening divide worsens distrust in news sources associated with “the wrong” political perspective. Partisans can become increasingly suspect of all news sources outside of their own political bubble; the entrenchment of the aforementioned vices makes persons more and more likely to deem any source outside their bubble “fake news.”

A necessary criterion of Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology is his safety condition. A believer cannot know p unless her belief is safe. Her belief is safe only if p could not have easily been false. But “easily” is not to be understood probabilistically. The chance that p is false might be extremely low and yet p remains unsafe. This is what happens, Pritchard argues, in lottery examples and explains why knowledge is not a function of the probabilistic strength of one’s evidence. This paper argues that, contra Pritchard, modality holds no epistemic advantage over this type of “probabilistic evidentialism” that he criticizes. I begin with a review of Pritchard’s argument supporting modality over probability; second, I explain the problems with this argument, and third, I offer an alternative explanation of the lottery example. At the completion of the paper, modality and probability are on equal epistemic footing.

Berry, Daniels, and Ladin make a strong argument for discontinuing the use of, “lack of social support,” as an organ transplantation listing criterion. This argument, however, actually leads to conclusions much stronger than those that the authors’ propose: The argument works equally well against using, (1) any “psychosocial” factors at all as a listing criterion, and, (2) any criteria other than factors that directly relate to empirically established medical need, and/or empirically established survival rate. Moreover, while the authors rightly point to a lack of empirical evidence connecting social support to survivability, they neglect mentioning that the empirical literature on social support provides grounds to favor listing persons who seem to, sadly, lack a social support system.

In 2010, a South Carolina mother was taken to court when her fourteen‐year‐old son reached 555 pounds. An article on the story reported, “His mother, Jerri Gray, lost custody of her son and is being charged with criminal neglect. Gray is facing 15 years on two felony counts, the first U.S. felony case involving childhood obesity.” If the caretakers of obese children are negligent, then they are also morally and legally blameworthy. I want to suggest, however, that important ethical differences exist between negligent or abusive caretakers and the caretakers of obese children and that these differences ought to make a moral and legal difference. The distinctions are nuanced, and the ethical pictures in cases of abuse, neglect, and obesity are far from black and white. However, the various types of harm that children face from their caretakers should be placed in neither the same ethical nor the same legal category.When children are beaten or sexually molested, the justification for taking them out of the home is clear: the caretakers are violating the rights of their children. Similarly, with neglect, caretakers are failing to provide their children the necessities to which they are entitled. The central question that I want to address in this article is whether the actions (or inaction) of caretakers that allow a child to become obese are morally or practically analogous to physical abuse or neglect. Ultimately, I will argue that parenting that allows a child to become obese is so morally different from both abuse and neglect that it is best understood as falling outside these categories altogether. This conclusion has important moral, practical, and legal implications.

In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that the consequences of the current United States health insurance scheme on both physician and patient autonomy is dire. So dire, in fact, that the only moral solution is something other than what we have now. The United States healthcare system faces much criticism at present. But my focus is particular: I am interested in the ways in which insurance interferes with physician and patient autonomy. I will argue in favor of an expansion of the traditional conception of what I call “medical autonomy” or “healthcare autonomy” and the usual role it plays in bioethical discussions. More generally, I show that in morally designing or evaluating any healthcare system, serious attention should be paid to how this system helps foster what I call active autonomy.

Credit theorists claim to explain the incompatibility of luck and knowledge and also what makes knowledge valuable. If the theory works as well as they think, it accomplishes a lot. Unsurprisingly, however, some epistemologists remain unsure. Jennifer Lackey, for instance, proposes a dilemma that suggests credit theories are either too strong or too weak. Her criticism has been hard to overcome. This paper suggests a modified account of knowledge as credit for true belief that allows credit theorists to better counter Lackey’s criticism. I call my version of credit theory Risk Sensitive Credit. Under my account, an agent deserves credit just in case she believes truly on account of her reasonably accurate epistemic risk assessment. This assessment need not include higher order beliefs or even enter into conscious thought. Recent work in cognitive science, for instance, suggests that our visual faculties, in the absence of our direct awareness, work in accordance with a risk sensitive framework. This research will be referenced to help explain the dynamics of barn facade Gettier cases.

In Part I, this paper argues that Duncan Pritchard’s version of safety is incompatible with closure. In Part II I argue for an alternative theory that fares much better. Part I begins by reviewing past arguments concerning safety’s problems with closure. After discussing both their inadequacies and Pritchard’s response to them, I offer a modified criticism immune to previous shortcomings. I conclude Part I by explaining how Pritchard’s own arguments make my critique possible. Part II argues that most modal theories of knowledge will run into problems similar to those found in Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. I hence offer my own theory grounded in risk assessment and explain why and how it does much better.

Political parties seem inclined to dogmatism. Understanding party politics via a plural-subject account of collective belief explains this phenomenon. It explains inter-party outrage at slight deviations from the party line and dogged refusals to compromise. It also aligns with an alternative theory of political representation. I argue that party dogmatism is unlikely to change and can be a democratic good. I conclude that not parties but patriots counteract the democratic ills of dogmatic party politics

When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I forgave him!” In other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness.

Literature in the epistemology of disagreement has focused on peer disagreement: disagreement between those with shared evidence and equal cognitive abilities. Additional literature focuses on the perspective of amateurs who disagree with experts. However, the appropriate epistemic reaction from superiors who disagree with inferiors remains underexplored. Prima facie, this may seem an uninteresting set of affairs. If A is B’s superior, and A has good reason to believe she is B’s superior, A appears free to dismiss B’s disagreement. However, a closer look will show otherwise. I first distinguish competent from incompetent inferiors and then argue that disagreement from the former often gives superiors reason to adjust credence and reevaluate belief. In other words, epistemic inferiority alone is insufficient grounds for dismissing opinion. More nuanced difficulties arise with incompetent inferiors. When superiors disagree with incompetents, this might provide evidence to bolster belief credence; however, agreement from incompetents can defeat justification. In either instance, inferior opinion carries epistemic weight. Yet, this fails to cover all ground; at times, superiors learn nothing from inferior disagreement. I finish by exploring these uninformative disagreements, how to distinguish them from the informative cases, and the proper epistemic reactions thereof.