Mauricio Lecon Rosales

In most academic works laughter is praised because of its social, religious, and psychological benefits. However, when laughter’s morality has been historically discussed it usually has been condemned. To assign human responsibility to the act of laughing, it must be acknowledged as voluntary. However, studies indicate that laughter is not a voluntary action, but rather a neurophysiological reaction. If this is so, there is no basis on which to ground the moral relevance of laughter. In this article, I will put forward an argument that can help to ground the ethics of spontaneous laughter at least. I claim that humans have the power to avoid laughing or suspend it because they can voluntarily prevent some of the circumstances that are necessary for it to happen. If humans fail to do so when they are expected to, laughter becomes relevant as a kind of negligent omission.

Francisco Suárez claims that forms may be efficient causes. There is an action whose proximate efficient cause is a substantial form, namely, the natural resulting. Also a substantial form is the principal efficient cause of the eduction of other forms, although it causes this through the substance’s own accidents. The souls insofar as substantial forms participate of both features. However, they pose a new complexity because of the actions they are exclusively principles of, namely vital actions. This kind of actions may seem no different from natural resulting, if vitality is mainly described as some sort of immanence. However, there is a Suarezian approach to vital actions that does not rely completely on the immanence and therefore allows to consider souls as efficient causes without turning their actions into natural

De acuerdo con Francisco Suárez, la acción humana de elaborar una ley implica la producción de una obligación en los súbditos a través de las palabras del legislador. El objetivo de este trabajo es defender que la posición de Suárez acerca de la ley humana y su producción puede describirse como un acto performativo. Para justificar esta idea presentaré, primero, las facultades y disposiciones que el legislador humano debe poseer para promulgar una ley, según Suárez. En segundo lugar mostraré que la promulgación de una ley debe hacerse según ciertas convenciones, entre las cuales se incluye la formulación proposicional de la ley para poder producir exitosamente una obligación. Por último, argu-mentaré que las condiciones internas y las convenciones externas consideradas por Suárez se corresponden a las condiciones descritas por J. L. Austin para que una proposición sea performativ

In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Francisco Suárez offers a rich account of the psychology and physiology of laughter. Among other claims, he asserts that laughter is a voluntary act, without giving any further explanation. The aim of this paper is to glean from his texts a philosophically compelling argument for this claim. I will claim that for Suárez laughter is a commanded act of the will, since it somehow needs the will’s consent to be elicited. This kind of voluntariness is enough to make laughter morally relevant.

El objetivo de este trabajo es defender que la doctrina de Francisco Suárez de la potencia y el acto debe considerarse como una teoría de raigambre aristotélica. Revisaré las nociones suarecianas de potencia y acto predicamental y trascendental para compararlas con las nociones aristotélicas de δύναμις, ἐνέργεια y ἐντελέχεια. Después, argumentaré que la posición de Suárez no ha de pensarse como una teoría reduccionista, según la cual la potencia queda reducida al acto, sino como un intento de recuperar la doctrina de Aristóteles.

Resumen: En este artículo reviso la interpretación de Eduardo Nicol de la teoría de la propiedad de Francisco Suárez. Para ello, presento la posición de Suárez acerca de la propiedad y la propiedad privada atendiendo dos cuestiones fundamentales. La primera es si la propiedad y la propiedad privada son derechos; la segunda es si ambos pertenecen a la naturaleza humana o no. Al final, argumento que la lectura de Nicol es insostenible, pues difícilmente puede admitirse que Suárez defendió algún tipo de comunismo.: In this paper I revisit Eduardo Nicol’s interpretation of Suarez’s theory of property. To this purpose, I present Suárez’s account of property and private property focusing on two main aspects. The first is whether property and private property are rights; the second is whether they belong to the human nature or not. Finally, I argue that Nicol’s reading of Suárez is untenable for it can hardly be accepted that Suárez defended some kind of communism.