Maximilian Kiener

People often enter contracts under pressure, including economic pressure. Businesses bargain hard, and parties sometimes exploit the fact that others are in financial difficulty. Contract law has long struggled to say when this kind of pressure crosses a line. The problem is how to distinguish legitimate commercial pressure from impermissible economic duress: that is, when pressure renders a contract voidable rather than constituting strategic, even aggressive, bargaining that the law and ethical principles should accept. This article addresses the problem by offering a philosophical analysis of key cases and the widely used three-pronged test. We argue that duress lies not in the presence of psychological pressure or limited alternatives, but in whether the party applying pressure disqualified themselves from claiming contractual rights. This view, which we call Contextual Disqualification, offers a novel and improved account of economic duress that builds upon, but also advances, current legal doctrine. We ground this account in a neglected insight from early modern contract theorist Samuel Pufendorf and extend it by drawing on Stephen Darwall's view on the second-person standpoint.

Anscombe defined intentional action in terms of what she called ‘the special question “Why?”’ In the first part of this article, we present four objections to defining intentional action in this way. Then, in the second part, we show that Anscombe’s special question can instead be used to define a much broader category of conduct, namely that for which an agent is responsible. We thereby repurpose one of the most influential ideas in twentieth-century philosophy of action within a novel theory of responsibility.

This paper focuses on voluntary consent in the context of living organ donation. Arguing against three dominant views, I claim that voluntariness must not be equated with willingness, that voluntariness does not require the exercise of relational moral agency, and that, in cases of third-party pressure, voluntariness critically depends on the role of the surgeon and the medical team, and not just on the pressure from other people. I therefore argue that an adequate account of voluntary consent cannot understand voluntariness as a purely psychological concept, that it has to be consistent with people pursuing various different conceptions of the good and that it needs to make the interaction between the person giving consent and the person receiving consent central to its approach.

This paper focuses on the use of ‘black box’ AI in medicine and asks whether the physician needs to disclose to patients that even the best AI comes with the risks of cyberattacks, systematic bias, and a particular type of mismatch between AI’s implicit assumptions and an individual patient’s background situation.Pacecurrent clinical practice, I argue that, under certain circumstances, these risks do need to be disclosed. Otherwise, the physician either vitiates a patient’s informed consent or violates a more general obligation to warn him about potentially harmful consequences. To support this view, I argue, first, that the already widely accepted conditions in the evaluation of risks, i.e. the ‘nature’ and ‘likelihood’ of risks, speak in favour of disclosure and, second, that principled objections against the disclosure of these risks do not withstand scrutiny. Moreover, I also explain that these risks are exacerbated by pandemics like the COVID-19 crisis, which further emphasises their significance.

This essay defends duress as a complete defence in specific cases of murder through discussing the case of Erdemovic, who was convicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) after he killed innocent people to save his own life. To begin with, I will present two objections to the Court’s judgment. Firstly, the Court cannot achieve its objective of deterrence without violating a fundamental legal principle. Secondly, the judgment itself permits that criminals sometimes remove the protecting shield of the criminal law. I will then develop these objections into arguments favouring acquittal and generalise my results.

In this essay, I oppose the ‘Asymmetry Thesis’ according to which moral matters are simply different in kind from non-moral matters when it comes to testimony because moral matters require understanding in a way in which non-moral matters do not. I argue that the requirement of understanding is not unique to morality and also deny that there is a genuine requirement of understanding after all. Instead, cases of moral and non-moral testimony are often troubling for the same reason, namely the violation of the requirement of using one’s own cognitive faculties when it is both possible and feasible. I will argue for this account in two stages: Firstly, I will present particular examples of testimony which aim to render this proposal initially plausible via inductive reasoning. Secondly, I will present a transcendental argument from the social function of testimony and explain why such a requirement in fact holds.

This essay criticises the attempt to explain the so-called normativity of law with reference to a model of coordination conventions. After specifying the explanandum of the normativity of law, I lay out the conceptions of ‘coordination’ and ‘convention’ and how the combination of both sets out to contribute to legal philosophy. I then present two arguments against such an account. Firstly, along a reductio ad absurdum, I claim that if an account of coordination conventions tries to explain the normativity of law by focusing on a coordination problem among judges it leads to self-contradiction. Secondly, I argue that even if one allows for widening the coordination problem beyond the group of judges, one is unable to account for the notion of duty. I will substantiate this second argument by distinguishing different scopes of the deontic operator “ought”. I conclude by reconsidering what explaining the normativity of law could amount to.