• The Fallacy of Favouring Gradual Replacement Mind Uploading Over Scan-and-Copy
    Keith Wiley and R. A. Koene
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4): 212-235. 2016.
    Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.
  • Uploading: A Philosophical Analysis
    In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Intelligence Unbound, Wiley-blackwell. 2014.
    This chapter describes three relatively specific forms such as destructive uploading, gradual uploading, and nondestructive uploading. Neuroscience is gradually discovering various neural correlates of consciousness, but this research program largely takes the existence of consciousness for granted. It presents an argument for the pessimistic view and an argument for the optimistic view, both of which run parallel to related arguments that can be given concerning teletransportation. Cryonic tech…Read more
  • Taking the simulation hypothesis seriously
    David Chalmers
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3): 1058-1067. 2024.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  • Rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities has drawn fresh attention to the prospect of consciousness in AI. There is an urgent need for rigorous methods to assess AI systems for consciousness, but significant uncertainty about relevant issues in consciousness science. We present a method for assessing AI systems for consciousness that involves exploring what follows from existing or future neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Indicators derived from such theories can be u…Read more
  • When we talk to large language models, who or what is our interlocutor? First, I address some issues about how best to characterize the interlocutor in terms of mental states. Second, I discuss questions in the philosophy of computation about what sort of AI system an LLM interlocutor might be. Third, I analyze some issues about personal identity in LLM interlocutors. Fourth, I draw some conclusions for issues about AI welfare and moral status.