Michael Meyer

We share aesthetic experiences, for instance by going to the movies or the theater or by tasting wine together. Sharing aesthetic experiences has received less philosophical scrutiny than it deserves, given its apparent pervasiveness in everyday life and its philosophical import. There are philosophical as well as empirical grounds for thinking that sharing aesthetic experiences can be more meaningful and richer in both phenomenal and epistemic content, as contrasted with solitary ones. This paper sketches an account of sharing aesthetic experience and, in doing so, draws connections between sharing experiences of aesthetic objects on the one hand and aesthetic judgments and education on the other. It then introduces a notion of aesthetic conversations as a central aspect of such experiences, judgment, and learning. The paper concludes with a discussion of ways in which sharing aesthetic experiences is a rich area for further philosophical exploration.

We often go out to the movies, theater, or ballet, preferring to share the experience with others rather than watch at home alone. We do the same with food and drink, for instance, by going to tasting rooms to sample wines and talk with others. To have these sorts of experiences, we plan, coordinate, and engage in a range of complex social practices. These practices often lead to the formation of audiences, and philosophers since Aristotle have argued that the success of certain art forms depends on audience reactions.1 In addition, many processes of aesthetic education involve individuals learning about aesthetic objects and judgments together. If so, then understanding how groups experience aesthetic objects...

The report of the President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity, addresses the central ethical, political, and policy issue in human embryonic stem cell research: the moral status of extracorporeal human embryos. The Council members were in sharp disagreement on this issue and essentially failed to adequately engage and respectfully acknowledge each others' deepest moral concerns, despite their stated commitment to do so. This essay provides a detailed critique of the two extreme views on the Council (i.e., embryos have full moral status or they have none at all) and then gives theoretical grounding for our judgment about the intermediate moral status of embryos. It also supplies an account of how to address profound moral disagreements in the public arena, especially by way of constructing a middle ground that deliberately pays sincere respect to the views of those with whom it has deep disagreements

This paper argues that patients' duties are derivable from the idea which typically grounds the idea of patients' rights: patient autonomy. The autonomous patient, joined in partnership with the health care professional, has self-regarding obligations and obligations to others, including health care professionals. Patients' duties include, but are not limited to: a duty to be honest about why the patient seeks care; a duty to collect information on available treatments and likely side-effects; a duty for a patient who has an infectious condition to act on that information which can best prevent further transmission. Keywords: autonomy, duty, paternalism, patient, rights, self-care CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?