Mihaela Popa-Wyatt

Misogyny online is not simply offensive speech at scale—it is a coordinated, systemic practice of silencing. Drawing on feminist analyses of misogyny as the “law enforcement branch” of patriarchy Manne (Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Oxford: Oxford University, 2018), and extending work in speech act theory (Langton 22 (4): 293–330, 1993; McGowan 29 (2): 458–473, 2014; Caponetto 40 (1): 191–202, 2021), this paper argues that the sheer volume of online misogyny silences women. Platform affordances, especially algorithmic amplification and the rapid formation of ad hoc hostile groups (Barnes 25 (2): 251–281, 2023), transform misogynistic hostility into an environment where women’s speech is not merely contested but actively erased. We identify three systematic modes of silencing: locutionary silencing (women are deterred from speaking at all), illocutionary silencing (women’s speech is not recognised as what it is), and sincerity silencing (women’s speech is recognised but discredited as inauthentic). We argue that far from being side-effects of individual prejudice, these forms of silencing are built into the architecture of digital discourse. We proceed by showing how online hostility is made frictionless and rewarding for misogynists, producing predictable patterns of silencing. This phenomenon raises urgent normative concerns: when half the population is structurally constrained from full participation, public discourse itself becomes an echo chamber for patriarchal norms. We conclude that counter-speech, though important, is insufficient without structural reforms to platform design.

Derogatory language is studied by philosophers of language, linguists, and social and political philosophers. Paradigmatic forms of derogatory language include pejoratives and slurs. These are conventionally used to refer to and evaluate individuals, with the evaluative component being derogatory. Both pejoratives and slurs are expressive devices. They differ from each other in scope, function, and social impact. A unified analysis of pejoratives and slurs is challenging because they do not fit into a single linguistic category. In discussing some difficulties in classifying pejoratives and slurs, we highlight their linguistic properties and existing theoretical frameworks. We also devote space to the harms and effects on the social world carried over by slurs.

We admit concepts like ‘sexual harassment’ into our collective hermeneutical pool, yet hesitate to do the same with the incel notion of ‘blackpill’ or ‘monkeybranching.’ Why this disparity? Incels present themselves as marginalized, and their own efforts to create new conceptual tools as legitimate responses to such marginalization. At face value, such a standpoint aligns with anti-oppression epistemologies, according to which we should take conceptual contributions from marginalized groups seriously. This raises the question whether the ‘incel standpoint’ warrants consideration, and whether our reluctance to do so is driven by an a priori moral condemnation of their political agenda. One response is to simply reject that incels are meaningfully marginalized. This paper takes a different approach. We accept that incels suffer marginalization in some important respects, yet suggest that it is nevertheless possible to distinguish, in a non-arbitrary way, genuine attempts to overcome what Miranda Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice from conceptual innovations which merely reinforce dominant ideologies, or even constitute forms of self-deception. Thus, it is possible to accept the marginalization of incels yet have good reasons to be sceptical about their conceptual and interpretive innovations. We do so, first, by putting forward a novel understanding of what hermeneutical empowerment consists in; second, by offering three criteria to assess conceptual engineering efforts. The two proposals, combined, enable a more robust (i.e. less arbitrary and less moralized) way to assess conceptual innovations. This approach can, in principle, apply to cases beyond that of incels.

Cultural evolutionary models of bargaining can elucidate issues related to fairness and justice, and especially how fair and unfair conventions and norms might arise in human societies. One line of this research shows how the presence of social categories in such models creates inequitable equilibria that are not possible in models without social categories. This is taken to help explain why in human groups with social categories, inequity is the rule rather than the exception. But in previous models, it is typically assumed that these categories are rigid – in the sense that they cannot be altered, and easily observable – in the sense that all agents can identify each others’ category membership. In reality, social categories are not always so tidy. We introduce evolutionary models where the tags connected with social categories can be flexible, variable, or difficult to observe, i.e. where these tags can carry different amounts of information about group membership. We show how alterations to these tags can undermine the stability of unfair conventions. We argue that these results can inform projects intended to ameliorate inequity, especially projects that seek to alter the properties of tags by promoting experimentation, imitation, and play with identity markers.

One account of slurring utterances is that they function as a power grab in conversation (Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt in Philos Stud 175(11):2879-2906, 2018). The speaker assigns a powerless role to the target while taking on a dominant role. This establishes a power imbalance in the conversation. However, this power asymmetry creates further conversational effects that differ across the participants. For example, the target is humiliated, while the speaker is not; the speaker’s status is elevated while that of the target is diminished. This is the foundation of an _act of humiliation_. A robust dialogical theory should be able to capture these divergent effects. In this paper, we propose to model this power asymmetry using an existing formal model of dialogue KoS (in: Ginzburg The interactive stance: meaning for conversation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012). Core to KoS is the idea that conversations and interactions are modelled in terms of individual but coupled cognitive states. This framework enables us to model how slurring utterances have differential effects across the speaker and target by capturing these variations through participant-sensitive update rules. We develop a formal account which relates the perceived emotional signals (‘_Mood_’) and power relations evolving or already operative in society. However, slurs do more than merely humiliate; they enact sustained oppression over time. To address this, we introduce the concept of _oppressive history_ which draws on two interrelated processes: a cumulative history of slur usage and its emotionally charged impact.

Harmful language occupies an increasingly important place in philosophy of language. The focus to date has been on the nature and impact of harmful speech. This includes hate speech, slurs, pejoratives, derogatory expressions, and certain types of propaganda. This language changes social norms. Harmful speech first raises problems of defining the bounds of civil speech and harmful speech. It also requires explanation of how it alters conversational and social norms. Harmful speech is not just a matter of words that offend. It contributes to oppression. Given the recent rise in hate speech and the concomitant decline in civil discourse, it is an important and timely topic of study. It is also a topic studied by sociologists, linguists, computer scientists, philosophers, and others. The chapters in this volume thus offer a multidisciplinary examination of how harmful speech works and considers avenues for resistance, remedy, and contestation.

In this paper, we explore how taboos act as drivers for reproducing countercultures. We define taboo utterances as those that either constitute socially prohibited acts (e.g., slurs), express elements of a prohibited ideology (e.g., claims advocating the subjugation of women), or promote socially prohibited actions (e.g., violence against women). We show how in certain communities, taboo utterances are not only tolerated but become highly rewarded in that they function as mechanisms of resistance and identity formation. We examine this dynamic in incel communities (involuntary celibates) as a case-study. We show how by embracing taboos, incels not only signal their rejection of mainstream norms and values, but primarily seek to forge a shared ideology and a group identity. This requires an explanation of how and why taboos can be repurposed to gain value within incel counterculture. We propose that one such explanation is the driver for social status. We argue that exploiting taboos becomes a currency of status for incels: they gain acceptance and approval within the community, and this in turn creates an arms race to become more and more transgressive and extreme. We explain this via the creation of ideological roles that serve to justify and rationalise overt extreme misogyny. We conclude with brief ethical considerations about normalizing misogyny in incel communities and spilling over into mainstream culture.

This paper identifies a novel function of slurs—compensatory manhood acts (CMAs)—alongside their more widely recognised subordinating, weaponised, and insider/outsider functions. CMAs occur when men perceive their masculinity as being under threat and respond by engaging in hypermasculine behaviours, including the use of misogynistic and homophobic slurs. Drawing on sociological findings, we argue that in their compensatory function, slurs are effective tools to restore status, assert dominance, and maintain hegemonic masculinity. Using a conventionalist framework for speech acts, we argue that CMSAs are illocutionary acts in their own right, separate from but interwoven with other functions of slurs. We conclude by raising the theoretical question of how multiple illocutionary forces can coexist in a single utterance and suggest that illocutionary relativism may provide a fruitful approach to understanding these speech acts.

Incels (involuntary celibates) are part of a broader misogynistic culture known as the manosphere. Some communities within the manosphere, including incels, promote gender-based violence through misogynistic rhetoric and ideology. Incels are men who struggle to form romantic relationships and thus seek solace in online forums to find a sense of purpose and community. The community is organised around an ideology and a hierarchical classification of members. This paper presents a computational linguistic analysis of the utterances made within the community. We analyse the linguistic patterns of six different ranks of users: paragons, high-rank users, low-rank users, greycels, banned users, and self-banned/deleted users. We conducted an analysis of the sentiments expressed between ranks and of the affective attitude of posters when discussing a variety of topics. We then we analysed linguistic features, also conditioned on the rank of the poster. These analyses reveal qualitative differences between users of different ranks in how they express themselves and their sentiments. Finally, we trained models based on the linguistic features of users’ posts and show that already based on this information it is possible to predict the rank of users. Overall, our results indicate that the incel community has developed distinctive linguistic patterns to disseminate their ideology and that these linguistic patterns vary according to the rank of an incel within the community. This methodology offers a robust framework for studying similar echo chamber-like communities.

This paper provides a theory of how language is used in projects of resistance, whether this be towards actual or merely perceived oppression. The theory is based on the idea of social roles, which have previously been used to explain the offence caused by slur terms (Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018). We examine two types of resistance projects. The first is a reclamation project. This consists in re-purposing existing slur words and associating them with new roles. The second project is neologism. This creates new words and uses them to create new roles. To explain both projects of resistance, we use the idea of role revision. In reclamation projects, when members of the target group use a slur term among themselves, this creates conditions to revise the subordinate role assigned by the slur into a positive role with the potential for re-empowerment. The neologism projects employ a similar mechanism of role revision with different effects. An example of neologistic resistance against perceived oppression is that occurring within incel communities (involuntary celibates). Incel communities have a sense of social stigmatization and incel individuals perceive themselves as being in subordinate roles relative to women and other men. In response, they construct an ideology which aims to provide moral comfort and a promise of future reward. Critical to this ideology are new (ideological) roles, associated with new words, which promise to improve the social status of incels. We argue that this type of neologism project has similarities to insular reclamation in that both projects aim to transform subordinated roles into positive ones.

This edited book explores how harmful speech works, how it can be used to change societies in bad ways and how we can defend against it. Harmful speech comes in a variety of forms, including hate speech, dehumanizing speech, misogynistic speech, derogatory speech, misgendering, marginalizing speech, and much more. What is common to all these types of speech is that they don’t just offend but seek to harm members of vulnerable groups, so that they feel humiliated, attacked, denigrated, silenced, and dehumanised. These harms are not confined to the conversation in which such speech is used, but may involve various downstream effects such as moral, social, and epistemic harms. Harmful speech may also shift social norms by changing people’s opinions and ultimately changing norms about how targets ought to be treated. Harmful speech uses this effect to establish and maintain oppressive norms, entrench hierarchies and shape power relations. The contributions in this volume examine the mechanisms underlying various forms of harmful speech and possible responses and remedies. They combine a variety of tools and perspectives, including philosophy of language, linguistics, ethnography, with a particular focus on issues in the semantics/pragmatics of derogatory expressions, speech acts and conversational dynamics. The chapters bring these conversations together and highlight the ways in which philosophers of language have sought to build bridges in recent years with social and political philosophy concerned with the nature of oppression and responses to it. These topics offer the opportunity for a valuable integration of insights from different perspectives.

A body of work proposes that social-norm change can be explained in terms of game theory. These game theoretic models, however, don't fully account for how and why utterances are used to change social norms. This paper describes the problem and some of the solution elements. There are three existing, relevant, game-based models. The first is a game theoretic model of social norm change (Bicchieri, 2005, 2016). This accounts for how individuals make decisions to adhere to or violate norms, based on empirical expectations of how others will behave. The second is the idea of a conversational game (Lewis, 1979) and its extensions. This posits that speech acts are accommodated in a conversation to make what is said correct play. This feature can explain how some speech acts, such as slurring utterances, change the dynamics of a conversation. The third is a theory of pragmatic inference, known as Rational Speech Act theory (Goodman and Frank, 2016). This is a computational theory of pragmatics, of how listeners interpret utterances and how speakers construct utterances that can be understood. This paper proposes, without setting out the full formal model, that elements of these three theories need to be incorporated together into a game theoretic model of how utterances change long-term social norms.

Our time is marked by a resurgence of hate that threatens to increase oppression. Social media has contributed to this by acting as a medium through which hate speech is spread. How should we model the spread of hate? This article considers two models. First, I consider a simple contagion model. In this model, hate spreads like a virus through a social network. This model, however, fails to capture the fact that people do not acquire hatred from a single infectious contact. Instead, it builds up in a person's beliefs and attitudes through time until the infection reaches a level where the subject themselves becomes a generator of hate speech. Second, to accommodate this, I consider an alternative model known as complex contagion. I argue that not only is a complex contagion model more explanatory and predictive, but it can be used to explain why certain features of social media cause it to be a promoter of hate. I conclude by sketching some mitigation strategies.

Philosophical views of language have traditionally been focused on notions of truth. This is a reconstructive view in that we try to extract from an utterance in context what the sentence and speaker meaning are. This focus on meaning extraction from word sequences alone, however, is challenged by utterances which combine different types of figures. This paper argues that what appears to be a special case of ironic utterances—ironic metaphorical compounds—sheds light on the requirements for psychological plausibility of a theory of communication and thus presents a different view of communication and language to that dominant in philosophy of language. In the view presented here, the hearer does not extract the speaker’s communicative intention from the sequence of words in the utterance, but from other channels, so as to constrain the inferential space for the sentence and speaker meaning. Specifically, we examine an example of ironic metaphor discussed by Stern. He argues that ironic content is logically dependent on metaphorical content, but makes no claims about how psychologically plausible this is in terms of the processing order. We argue that a straightforward translation of logical order into temporal order makes little sense. The primary sticking point is that without a prior understanding of the speaker’s communicative intentions, it is computationally more challenging to process the sub-component meanings. An alternative solution based on communicative channels leads us to a more psychologically plausible account of the structure of communicative acts and intentions. This provides support for the psychological realism of a richer theory of communicative intent.

Harmful and dangerous language is frequent in social media, in particular in spaces which are considered anonymous and/or allow free participation. In this paper, we analyse the language in a Telegram channel populated by followers of Donald Trump, in order to identify the ways in which harmful language is used to create a specific narrative in a group of mostly like-minded discussants. Our research has several aims. First, we create an extended taxonomy of potentially harmful language that includes not only hate speech and direct insults, but also more indirect ways of poisoning online discourse, such as divisive speech and the glorification of violence. We apply this taxonomy to a large portion of the corpus. Our data gives empirical evidence for harmful speech such as in/out-group divisive language and the use of codes within certain communities which have not often been investigated before. Second, we compare our manual annotations to several automatic methods of classifying hate speech and offensive language, namely list based and machine learning based approaches. We find that the Telegram data set still poses particular challenges for these automatic methods. Finally, we argue for the value of studying such naturally occurring, coherent data sets for research on online harm and how to address it in linguistics and philosophy.

We provide a new text corpus from the social medium Telegram, which is rich in indirect forms of divisive speech. We scraped all messages from one channel of supporters of Donald Trump, covering a large part of his presidency from late 2016 until January 2021. The discussion among the group members over this long time period includes the spread of disinformation, disparaging of out-group members, and other forms of offensive speech. To encourage research into such practices of poisoning public political discourse, we added automatic annotations of offensive language to all messages. We further added manual annotations of harmful language to a portion of the posts in order to enable the analysis of more implicit forms of online harm.

This paper argues that we need to re-think the semantics/pragmatics distinction in the light of new evidence from embedding of irony. This raises a new version of the old problem of ‘embedded implicatures’. I argue that embedded irony isn’t fully explained by solutions proposed for other embedded implicatures. I first consider two strategies: weak pragmatics and strong pragmatics. These explain embedded irony as truth-conditional content. However, by trying to shoehorn irony into said-content, they raise problems of their own. I conclude by considering how a modified Gricean model can explain that irony embeds qua implicature. This leads us to prefer a local implicature model. This has important consequences for how we draw the semantics/pragmatics distinction.

It’s natural for hyperbole to mix with metaphor and irony, and other figures of speech. How do they mix together and what kind of compound, if any, arises out of the mixing? In tackling this question, I shall argue that thinking of hyperbolic figures along the lines familiar from ironic metaphor compounds is a temptation we should resist. Looking in particular at hyperbolic metaphor and hyperbolic irony, I argue, they don’t yield a new encompassing compound figure with one figure building on another. Instead, what we have is one dominant figure colored with hyperbolic tinges. So what does hyperbole bring to the mixing pot? I suggest we should think of hyperbole in hyperbolic figures as being an interpretive effect, modulating the working of the partner figure and thus rendering more emphatic.

Reclamation is the phenomenon of an oppressed group repurposing language to its own ends. A case study is reclamation of slur words. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) argued that a slurring utterance is a speech act which performs a discourse role assignment. It assigns a subordinate role to the target, while the speaker assumes a dominant role. This pair of role assignments is used to oppress the target. Here I focus on how reclamation works and under what conditions its benefits can stabilise. I start by reviewing the data and describing preconditions and motivations for reclamation. Can reclamation be explained in the same basic framework as regular slurring utterances? I argue that it can. I also identify some features that must be a prediction of any theory of reclamation. I conclude that reclamation is an instance of a much broader class of acts we do with words to change the distribution of power: it begets power, but it also requires it.

Slurring is a kind of hate speech that has various effects. Notable among these is variable offence. Slurs vary in offence across words, uses, and the reactions of audience members. Patterns of offence aren’t adequately explained by current theories. We propose an explanation based on the unjust power imbalance that a slur seeks to achieve. Our starting observation is that in discourse participants take on discourse roles. These are typically inherited from social roles, but only exist during a discourse. A slurring act is a speech-act that alters the discourse roles of the target and speaker. By assigning discourse roles the speaker unjustly changes the power balance in the dialogue. This has a variety of effects on the target and audience. We show how these notions explain all three types of offence variation. We also briefly sketch how a role and power theory can help explain silencing and appropriation. Explanatory power lies in the fact that offence is correlated with the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance created.

Hyperbole is traditionally understood as exaggeration. Instead, in this paper, we shall define it not just in terms of its form, but in terms of its effects and its purpose. Specifically, we characterize its form as a shift of magnitude along a scale of measurement. In terms of its effect, it uses this magnitude shift to make the target property more salient. The purpose of hyperbole is to express with colour and force that the target property is either greater or lesser than expected or desired. This purpose is well suited to hyperbolic expression. This because hyperbole naturally draws a contrast between two points: how things are versus how they were expected to be. We also consider compound figures involving hyperbole. When it combines with other figures hyperbole operates by magnifying the specific effects of the figure it operates on. We shall see that sometimes hyperbole works as an input for irony; and at other times it builds on a metaphor to increase the effects of that metaphor.

We think and speak in figures. This is key to our creativity. We re-imagine one thing as another, pretend ourself to be another, do one thing in order to achieve another, or say one thing to mean another. This comes easily because of our abilities both to work out meaning in context and re-purpose words. Figures of speech are tools for this re-purposing. Whether we use metaphor, simile, irony, hyperbole, and litotes individually, or as compound figures, the uses are all rooted in literal meanings. These uses invite us to explore the context to find new meanings, new purposes, beyond the literal. This special issue of Philosophical Studies brings together eight papers on various aspects and applications of figurative speech including: David Hills, Mitch Green, Liz Camp, Ofra Magidor, Larry Horn, Ken Walton, Stephen Barker, and Mihaela Popa-Wyatt.

This paper examines the mechanisms involved in the interpretation of utterances that are both metaphorical and ironical. For example, when uttering 'He's a real number-cruncher' about a total illiterate in maths, the speaker uses a metaphor with an ironic intent. I argue that in such cases both logically and psychologically, the metaphor is prior to irony. I hold that the phenomenon is then one of ironic metaphor, which puts a metaphorical meaning to ironic use, rather than an irony used metaphorically (§1). This result is then used to argue for the claim that in metaphor, it is metaphorical, not literal, meaning that determines the utterance‘s truth conditions. Gricean accounts, which exclude metaphorical meaning from truth conditional content and rely entirely on conversational implicature, are seen to be unsatisfactory. Five contextualist arguments are briefly discussed to the conclusion that metaphorical content is part of truth-conditional content, rather than implicated (§2).

Frege’s distinction between force and sense is a central pillar of modern thinking about meaning. This is the idea that a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One is the proposition P that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it. The other is S’s illocutionary force. The force/sense distinction is associated with another thesis, the embedding principle, that implies that the only content that embeds in compound sentences is propositional content. We argue that both the Force/Sense distinction and the principle of embedding are seriously challenged by figurative language, and irony in particular. We conclude that theorists need to go back to the drawing board about the nature of illocutionary acts.

The starting point for this paper is a critical discussion of claims of psychological reality articulated within Borg’s (forth.) minimal semantics and Carpintero’s (2007) character*-semantics. It has been proposed, for independent reasons, that their respective accounts can accommodate, or at least avoid the challenge from psychological evidence. I outline their respective motivations, suggesting various shortcomings in their efforts of preserving the virtues of an uncontaminated semantics in the face of psychological objection (I-II), and try to make the case that, at least for a theory of utterance comprehension, a truth-conditional pragmatic stance is far preferable. An alternative from a relevance-theoretic perspective is offered in terms of mutual adjustment between truth-conditional content and implicature(s), arguing that many “free” pragmatic processes are needed to uncover the truth-conditional content, which can then warrant the expected implicature(s) (III). I finally illustrate the difficulties their accounts have in predicting the correct order of interpretation in cases of ironic metaphor, i.e. metaphor is computed first, as part of truth-conditional content, while irony is inferentially grounded in metaphorical content (IV).