Milagros Maribel Barroso Rojo

A distinguishing feature of neural computation and information processing is that it fits models that describe the most efficient strategies for performing different cognitive tasks. Efficiency determines a distinctive sense of teleology involving optimal performance and resource management through a specific strategy. I articulate this kind of teleology and call it efficient teleological function. I argue that efficient teleological function is compatible with mechanistic explanation and, most likely, neural computational mechanisms are efficiently functional in this sense. They are members of a distinctive class of computational mechanisms whose efficiency is intertwined with their functionality. This is illustrated by widely discussed approaches to mind, such as Barlow’s efficient coding hypothesis or the ones associated with the so-called “predictive mind”, which propose that the brain employs highly efficient coding strategies to save energy resources that are critical to the organism’s survival.

In this paper, I consider the question of whether calibration is required for modalizing mechanisms to be reliable, that is, whether it is necessary for modalizing mechanisms to be adjusted to prevent overgeneration and undergeneration of modal beliefs. I first argue that the calibration requirement affects differently what I call bootstrapping and ordinary cases. Identifying different ways in which a modalizing mechanism could be calibrated, I argue that not all of them are effective or even viable in bootstrapping cases. Then, by taking a diachronic perspective, I offer a simplified account of how different calibration mechanisms can be bootstrapped, with an emphasis on the social dimension of modal judgment.

La investigación sobre leyes de la naturaleza constituye una de las aventuras del intelecto humano en su esfuerzo primigenio por entender la realidad y nuestro lugar en ella. En la primera parte del libro expondremos la aproximación biográfica que motiva nuestra investigación (capítulo 1). La segunda parte examina los orígenes históricos del imaginario de leyes de la naturaleza que se remontan a la filosofía natural de la época de Descartes y Newton (capítulos 2 y 3). La tercera parte sistematiza el debate estándar en filosofía de las leyes de la naturaleza, que se ha consagrado en las concepciones humeanas y anti-humeanas, en donde las primeras sostienen que las leyes son meros enunciados de regularidades (capítulo 4), mientras que las segundas afirman que ellas corresponden a alguna clase especial de necesidades naturales (capítulos 5 y 6). En la cuarta parte propondremos nuevas perspectivas sobre las leyes de la naturaleza que escapan al debate estándar. Examinaremos el problema de Wigner acerca de la efectividad de las matemáticas en la formulación de leyes físicas (capítulo 7), elaborando la concepción inferencial de las leyes que ofrece una respuesta al problema wigneriano (capítulo 8). Asimismo, indagaremos el carácter modal de las leyes de la naturaleza (capítulo 9) y el supuesto metafísico que afirma que la realidad tiene una estructura, que ha sido asociada a las leyes (capítulo 10). Finalmente, en la quinta parte del libro cerraremos nuestra investigación elaborando el eliminativismo nómico, que nos insta a abandonar el imaginario de leyes de la naturaleza tanto en ciencias como en nuestra interpretación filosófica de las mismas (capítulos 11 y 12).

The use of dispositions has been put into question many times in the philosophical literature, especially with regards to how dispositional attributions can be justified. Yet, dispositions are an important part not only of our everyday talk but also of our scientific practices. In this paper, we develop an argument that infers the epistemic justification of dispositional talk from itsindispensability for carrying out basic epistemological projects, and we apply it to the use of dispositions in evolutionary biology. For doing this, we first advocate for a function-based strategy for the epistemic justification of dispositional attributions. We next review the functional role of some key dispositional notions in evolutionary biology, such as fitness and evolvability. Then, we show that alternative non-dispositional substitutes of these dispositions fail to fulfill their roles to the same degree. We conclude that the use of dispositions is justified in evolutionary biology.

I argue that there are different orders of mechanisms with different constitutive relevance and individuation conditions. In common first-order mechanistic explanations, constitutive relevance norms are captured by the matched-interlevel-experiments condition (Craver et al. (2021) Synthese 199:8807–8828). Regarding individuation, we say that any two mechanisms are of the same type when they have the same concrete components performing the same activities in the same arrangement. By contrast, in higher-order mechanistic explanations, we formulate the decompositions in terms of generalized basic components (GBCs). These GBCs (e.g., logic gates) possess causal properties that are common to a set of physical systems. Mechanistic explanations formulated in terms of GBCs embody the epistemic value of horizontal integration, which aims to explain as many phenomena as possible with a minimal amount of abstract components (Wajnerman Paz (2017a) Philos Psychol 30:213–234). Two higher-order mechanisms are of the same type when they share all the same GBCs, and they are organized as performing the same activities with the same interactions. I use this notion of mechanistic order to enhance the mechanistic account of computation (MAC) and provide an account of the epistemic norms of computational explanation and the nature of medium-independent functional properties and mechanisms. Finally, I use these new conceptual tools to address four criticisms of the MAC.