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415In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.
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192Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approachesTrends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (8): 314-321. 2008.
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185Introspection and subliminal perceptionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1): 1-23. 2004.Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both…Read more
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184Confounding factors in contrastive analysisSynthese 141 (2): 217-31. 2004.Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the result…Read more
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116On the naturalizing of phenomenologyPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4): 365-79. 2004.In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that ev…Read more
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111Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4): 1069-1078. 2010.What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale , through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings , through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering , in which participants place a monetary wager on their deci…Read more
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93Optimizing subjective measures of consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 19 (2): 682-684. 2010.Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.
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93Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual taskConsciousness and Cognition 15 (4): 700-708. 2006.In a recent article, [Sergent, C. & Dehaene, S. . Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15, 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. . Sensation’…Read more
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83The electrophysiology of introspectionConsciousness and Cognition 15 (4): 662-672. 2006.To study whether the distinction between introspective and non-introspective states of mind is an empirical reality or merely a conceptual distinction, we measured event-related potentials elicited in introspective and non-introspective instruction conditions while the observers were trying to detect the presence of a masked stimulus. The ERPs indicated measurable differences related to introspection in both preconscious and conscious processes. Our data support the hypothesis that introspective…Read more
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65An integration of first-person methodologies in cognitive scienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5): 100-120. 2008.A number of recent publications have argued that a scientific approach to consciousness needs a rigorous approach to first-person data collection. As mainstream experimental psychology has long abandoned such introspective or phenomenological method, there is at present no generally agreed upon method for first-person data collection in experimental consciousness studies. There are, however, a number of recent articles that all claim to provide a unique contribution to such a methodology. This a…Read more
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55Consciousness and modality: On the possible preserved visual consciousness in blindsight subjectsConsciousness and Cognition 20 (4): 1855-1859. 2011.In a recent paper, Brogaard presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR’s preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard’s argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Br…Read more
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55Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agencyConsciousness and Cognition 22 (3): 810-815. 2013.Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an in…Read more
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54Measuring consciousness: Task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus durationConsciousness and Cognition 20 (4): 1659-1675. 2011.When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff . The estimated lag between the curves d…Read more
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53Cognitive and non-cognitive conceptions of consciousnessTrends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3): 137. 2012.
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53The time between intention and action affects the experience of actionFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 9. 2015.
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52Introspection distinct from first-order experiencesJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8): 11--7. 2004.As is the case with other concepts about mental affairs, the concept of introspection has many different interpretations. Some seem to consider introspecting a perceptive act and others see it as a thinking activity . For the present purpose, we will claim it as a common understanding in all such theories that introspection presupposes consciousness . States of consciousness, broadly discussed in the philosophical and empirical literature as first order states of consciousness, are states in whi…Read more
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48Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and SethConsciousness and Cognition 19 (4): 1081-1083. 2010.In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans , Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply…Read more
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46The role of phenomenological reports in experiments on consciousnessPsycoloquy 12 (29): 1-10. 2001.
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45Visual expectations change subjective experience without changing performanceConsciousness and Cognition 71 (C): 59-69. 2019.
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44An integrative view on consciousness and introspectionReview of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 129-141. 2017.The relation between first and higher order mental states is currently unknown. In particular, the relation between conscious experience and introspection is difficult as the same methods are used to investigate them. In order to make progress in the scientific understanding of consciousness, introspection or both, it is fundamental to understand whether their relation is serial or reciprocal. Although the amount of empirical evidence directly addressing this question is sparse, the little that …Read more
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38A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of AwarenessCognitive Science 42 (6): 1833-1859. 2018.In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the…Read more
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37A TMS study of the ventral projections from v1 with implications for the finding of neural correlates of consciousnessBrain and Cognition 54 (1): 58-64. 2004.
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34Measuring and testing awareness of emotional face expressionsConsciousness and Cognition 22 (3): 806-809. 2013.Comparison of behavioural measures of consciousness has attracted much attention recently. In a recent article, Szczepanowski et al. conclude that confidence ratings predict accuracy better than both the perceptual awareness scale and post-decision wagering when using stimuli with emotional content . Although we find the study interesting, we disagree with the conclusion that CR is superior to PAS because of two methodological issues. First, the conclusion is not based on a formal test. We perfo…Read more
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32Special Issue on the Return of Subjectivity Edited by Dan ZahaviPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 399-400. 2004.
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30Multiple Factors and Multiple Mechanisms Determine the Quality of Conscious Experiences: A Reply to Anzulewicz and WierzchońCognitive Science 42 (6): 2101-2103. 2018.In this Letter to the Editor, we seize the opportunity to respond to the recent comments by Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń, and further clarify and extend the scope of our original paper. We re‐emphasize that conscious experiences come in degrees, and that there are several factors that determine this degree. Endorsing the suggestions of Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń, we discuss that besides low‐level attentional mechanisms, high‐level attentional and non‐attentional mechanisms might also modulate the qual…Read more
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Aalborg UniversityRegular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |