Nathan Nobis

Some people claim that ethics depends on God: unless there’s a God who makes actions right and wrong, no actions would be objectively right or wrong, good or bad. Such people often accept the Divine Command Theory of ethics (hereafter, DCT). According to DCT, wrong actions are wrong because God forbids them and right actions are right because God commands them. This essay introduces this ethical theory and the most important responses to it, which date back to Socrates’ discussion in ancient Greece with a man named Euthyphro.

The criticisms of Falk et al. (2010) are addressed, and the question of whether claims made by Falk et al. (2007) are valid is revisited. This rebuttal contends that Falk et al. (2007) misconstrue Popper’s role in philosophy of science and hence do not provide a strong test of their hypothesis. Falk et al. (2010) claim that they never made causal statements about the impact of zoo and aquarium visits in their 2007 study. Yet, this commentary shows that Falk et al. (2007) draw several unsupported, strong causal conclusions. The criticism that primary documents were not used in Marino et al. (2010) is also addressed, as this refutation demonstrates that the analysis was based on all available documents. Finally, this commentary aims, through its criticisms of Falk et al. (2007), to catalyze better-quality research on the effects of zoo and aquarium visits.

Modern-day zoos and aquariums market themselves as places of education and conservation. A recent study conducted by the American Zoo and Aquarium Association (AZA) (Falk et al., 2007) is being widely heralded as the first direct evidence that visits to zoos and aquariums produce long-term positive effects on people’s attitudes toward other animals. In this paper, we address whether this conclusion is warranted by analyzing the study’s methodological soundness. We conclude that Falk et al. (2007) contains at least six major threats to methodological validity that undermine the authors’ conclusions. There remains no compelling evidence for the claim that zoos and aquariums promote attitude change, education, or interest in conservation in visitors, although further investigation of this possibility using methodologically sophisticated designs is warranted.

Everyone confronts questions about personal meaning and purpose, family and relationship conflicts, work-related frustrations, midlife crises, life-altering health problems, hard choices, and many more challenges in daily living. Can philosophy help with any of these issues? Advocates of “philosophical counseling” argue it can. Philosophical counseling is the application of philosophical methods, concepts, theories, arguments, and insights to concerns that are traditionally addressed by psychology-based counseling. This essay describes a leading approach to philosophical counseling, known as Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), that has been developed and used since the 1980s.

“That’s subjective!” People sometimes respond like this to claims about what’s true, what’s ethical, what others find beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, and more. To call a claim “subjective” seems in part to say that something important about the claim depends on the subject—the person—making the claim. What this “something” is varies depending on the claim. Are judgments like these truly “subjective”? What does “subjective” really mean? This essay introduces different answers to these questions.

What should have happened in the tragic case of Adriana Smith, the two-months-pregnant woman who was declared brain dead but has been on life support since February at Emory Hospital in Atlanta, so that her baby might eventually be delivered by C-section? The hospital refused to let her die, concerned it would violate Georgia’s abortion ban, so her family wasn’t given a choice to let her die. Ms. Smith should have been allowed to die because she, or her body, was no longer a person. Understanding why she wasn’t a person helps us see why her beginning fetus was not a person either and why her being newly pregnant was not a good moral reason to not let her body die. This helps us even better understand why abortion bans like Georgia’s—which were a partial root of this tragedy, due to not specifying what’s legally allowed in cases like these—are unjust laws.

What can just about any philosophical person who agrees with many goals that are often considered feminist do in response to the problems of the world? Among many other things, they can do philosophy, online, on various social media platforms, to try to help steer the world in better directions, at least a little. Now “doing philosophy” with these goals in mind can mean many different things to different people: there are many different ways to be engaged in “public philosophy.” Here though I’ll briefly describe some what I have been doing for at least a few years, which could be described as a type of “philosophical fact-checking” that basically amounts to this: when people and organizations make importantly problematic claims about philosophical and ethical issues that one has expertise in, provide responses and resources that correct that misinformation.

Anti-abortion advocates frequently insist that abortion is “killing babies” and “murdering children.” “Heartbeat” bills, or abortion bans, often use this language. Alabama’s Supreme Court even ruled that frozen embryos are children. While philosophers have much discussed how “persons” and “human beings” are best defined, there is little comparable discussion about defining “babies” and “children.” Here I argue that embryos and beginning fetuses are not “babies” or “children”: at least, nobody must agree that they are.

Traduit de l’anglais (É. U.) par François Jaquet En révoquant l’arrêt Roe v. Wade le 24 juin 2022, la Cour suprême des États-Unis permettait à treize États conservateurs de voter immédiatement des lois interdisant l’interruption volontaire de grossesse, privant ainsi des millions d’Américaines d’un droit institué quelque cinquante ans plus tôt. Cet événement historique témoigne, s’il était besoin, du caractère toujours controversé de l’avortement. Faut-il en conclure que ce sujet ne peut susciter que des débats infructueux, sans espoir de progrès ? Une telle opinion est, selon Kristina Grob et Nathan Nobis, largement contestable, si l’on recourt à la pensée critique – en définissant minutieusement les termes du débat et en mettant à l’épreuve les définitions existantes, en rejetant les nombreuses « pétitions de principes », en énonçant la structure complète des arguments et en évaluant leurs forces et leurs faiblesses. Les deux philosophes soutiennent, sur la base de considérations à la fois rationnelles et éthiques, que l’avortement n’est généralement pas immoral et qu’il doit donc demeurer un droit légal. AVRIL 2023 10 € – 96 PAGES ISBN 9782493117199 13 x 19,5 cm

Frey sets the challenge for the other authors: to explain why, morally, no humans can be subject to the kinds of experiments that animals are subject to and to explain how researchers can reliablyuse animal models to understand and cure human disease. He thinks that the first challenge has not been met; the second challenge is, unfortunately, not directly addressed in this book. Adrian Morrison states that he “abhors” positions like Frey’s, Peter Singer’s and Tom Regan’s. He asserts that all “human beings stand apart in a moral sense from all other species” and that all are worthy of “special consideration”. Regrettably he fails to defend his view by identifying the morally-relevant characteristics that all humans possess and all animals lack that might make his claim true. That omission prevents him from rationally criticizing opposing views

Katie Watson (2022) writes that “If the Supreme Court shifts the question of legality in whole or in part to state legislatures, the ethics of abortion will become an even more intense subject of debate in public, academic, and clinical realms. Therefore, this is the moment for all bioethicists to strengthen our teaching, thinking, and writing in abortion ethics” (emphasis added). . . Persuading broader audiences that ethicists might be able to help advance pro-choice causes is thereby essential to implementing Watson’s suggestion that bioethicists get more engaged. What good ethicists might do depends on others taking advantage of what they have to offer: that this would need to happen is my focus here.

To many, it seems like the debate of "when life begins" is irresolvable. This is unfortunate since this failure to make progress is largely a result of people not asking what the question means, or clarifying what is being asked, and listening carefully to try to understand the range of answers. As a philosophy professor who teaches logic and critical thinking, I suggest that asking the simple, but powerful, question, "What do you mean?" and seeking to understand different answers could help us move past this debate to more important, and challenging, ethical and legal questions about abortion.

In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously true and nearly universally accepted. But there are influential arguments against moral realism, which is analogous to epistemic realism: moral realists think that moral judgments, e.g., that something is morally good, or ought to be done, are sometimes true because there are stance-independent moral facts and properties. Moral irrealists deny this for a variety of semantic, metaphysical, psychological and epistemological reasons. They argue that moral judgments are neither true nor false since they are non-cognitive expressions of emotion or commands, or are never true since they fail to refer, or that their truth is “relative.” Drawing on the moral irrealisms of Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Mackie, Harman, and more recent thinkers, I construct parallel arguments for epistemic irrealisms. On these views, epistemic judgments are also merely expressive, a kind of command, always false, or relativistic in truth conditions: even “epistemic platitudes” like “justified beliefs are better than unjustified beliefs” and “ideally, one’s beliefs ought to be consistent” are understood not as epistemic propositions that might be believed (much less believed truly), or as attempts to accurately represent epistemic facts, or as attributions of epistemic properties. The implications of these claims are highly at odds with common epistemological assumptions, even those that moral irrealists tend to accept. I argue that these implications are rationally unacceptable and that, therefore, the premises that support them should be rejected. Since these premises are those given in defense of moral irrealisms, I thereby defend both moral and epistemic realism. Thus, I argue that “oughts,” “shoulds” and other evaluative judgments are equally legitimate in both ethics and epistemology.

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, declined to grant habeas corpus relief and order Happy’s transfer to an elephant sanctuary, relying, in part, on previous decisions that denied habeas relief for the NhRP’s chimpanzee clients, Kiko and Tommy. Those decisions use incompatible conceptions of ‘person’ which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or, in fact, compatible with Happy’s personhood.

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. We reject arbitrary distinctions that deny adequate protections to other animals who share with protected humans relevantly similar vulnerabilities to harms and relevantly similar interests in avoiding such harms. We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as a nonhuman person, Happy should be released from her current confinement and transferred to an appropriate elephant sanctuary, pursuant to habeas corpus.

As a medical ethicist, I want to explain why college vaccination requirements decidedly do not violate the core principles of medical ethics which include avoiding or lessening harms, promoting benefits, respecting people and their informed and free choices, and promoting justice and fairness. In particular, vaccine requirements do not violate the respect-related requirement to not selfishly “use” and abuse others as “means” for someone else’s benefit. Since false claims on important issues often have dire consequences, it’s important to explain why medical ethics supports vaccinating college students.