Nick Huggett

Philosophers have claimed that: (a) Born–Oppenheimer approximation methods for solving molecular Schrödinger equations violate the Heisenberg uncertainty relations; therefore, (b) ‘quantum chemistry’ is not fully quantum; and (c) therefore chemistry does not reduce to physics. This paper analyses the reasoning behind Born–Oppenheimer methods and shows that they are internally consistent and fully quantum mechanical, contrary to (a)–(c). Our analysis addresses important issues of mathematical rigour, physical idealization, reduction, and classicality in the quantum theory of molecules, and we propose an agenda for the philosophy of quantum chemistry more grounded in scientific practice.

Recent work on the philosophy of high energy physics experiments has considerably advanced our understanding of their epistemology, for instance concerning measurements by the ATLAS collaboration at the Large Hadron Collider (Beauchemin, Synthese 194:275–312, 2017). In this paper we aim to highlight and analyze complementary low energy ‘tabletop’ experiments in particle (and other kinds of fundamental) physics. In particular, we contrast ATLAS measurements with high precision measurements of the electron magnetic moment. We find, for instance, that the simplicity of the latter experiment allows for uncertainties to be minimized materially, in the very construction of the apparatus. We also sketch how a notion of ‘frugality’ can be used, in light of considerations of simplicity, to understand the value of low energy experiments with respect to the entrenched field of high energy experiment.

In The Emperor’s New Mind [Penrose, 1989], Roger Penrose proves a variant of the halting problem, and uses it to argue that humans have cognitive capacities beyond the computable. In this short note I explicate his argument, and show how it fails, via a corollary of his result. My response to Penrose is in fact of a kind with a number of prior responses: he assumes human powers, that (as the corollary shows) no computer could have. However, as far as I am aware, no one has previously addressed this specific form of the argument, in the direct way that I will.

The two fundamental pillars of physics for over 100 years have been quantum theory and general relativity, but their unification at short distances remains elusive, both technically and conceptually. This work is a philosophical investigation of the second kind of problem, and in particular of the striking fact that in many approaches to ‘quantum gravity’ classical spacetime structures are not merely quantized, but arguably absent—so that spacetime is not merely a classical limit, but ‘emergent’. This issue is not only central to the problem of quantum gravity, but of deep significance for our philosophical understanding of physical reality, promising a conceptual revolution at least as profound as Einstein’s. We give an introduction to the question of spacetime emergence in general, for philosophers of metaphysics and science, and argue that spacetime functionalism explains how something non-spatiotemporal could ever appear as space and time. More technical chapters investigate the issue in detail for causal set theory, loop quantum gravity, and string theory, and the book also serves as a philosophical introduction to those theories for philosophers of physics. Our results help physicists clarify what new conceptual framework—not resting on space and time—may be necessary to achieve a theory of quantum gravity; and show philosophers how the world may not be spatiotemporal at root, and what kind of a world we might then live in.

Numerous approaches to a quantum theory of gravity posit fundamental ontologies that exclude spacetime, either partially or wholly. This situation raises deep questions about how such theories could relate to the empirical realm, since arguably only entities localized in spacetime can ever be observed. Are such entities even possible in a theory without fundamental spacetime? How might they be derived, formally speaking? Moreover, since by assumption the fundamental entities cannot be smaller than the derived (since relative size is a spatiotemporal notion) and so cannot ‘compose’ them in any ordinary sense, would a formal derivation actually show the physical reality of localized entities? We address these questions via a survey of a range of theories of quantum gravity, and generally sketch how they may be answered positively.

This paper investigates the formation and propagation of wavefunction `branches' through the process of entanglement with the environment. While this process is a consequence of unitary dynamics, and hence significant to many if not all approaches to quantum theory, it plays a central role in many recent articulations of the Everett or `many worlds' interpretation. A highly idealized model of a locally interacting system and environment is described, and investigated in several situations in which branching occurs, including those involving Bell inequality violating correlations; we illustrate how any non-locality is compatible with the locality of the dynamics. Although branching is particularly important for many worlds quantum theory, we take a neutral stance here, simply tracing out the consequences of a unitary dynamics. The overall goals are to provide a simple concrete realization of the quantum physics of branch formation, and especially to emphasise the compatibility of branching with relativity; the paper is intended to illuminate matters both for foundational work, and for the application of quantum theory to non-isolated systems.

We conduct a case study analysis of a proposal for the emergence of time based upon the approximate derivation of three grades of temporal structure within an explicit quantum cosmological model which obeys a Wheeler-DeWitt type equation without an extrinsic time parameter. Our main focus will be issues regarding the consistency of the approximations and derivations in question. Our conclusion is that the model provides a self-consistent account of the emergence of chronordinal, chronometric and chronodirected structure. Residual concerns relate to explanatory rather than consistency considerations.

Physical time plays a different role in general relativity than in quantum mechanics and the particle physics based on it. The first section of this chapter provides a brief survey of the main approaches to quantum gravity and then proceeds to consider the lessons that can be drawn from two distinct strategies for discovering a theory of quantum gravity. In the next section, the chapter first explicates the fate of time in approaches to quantum gravity that start with general relativity (GR) and attempt to quantize it. Second, it investigates approaches to quantum gravity that start from quantum particle physics. The third and fourth sections respectively offer an assessment of time as understood in string theory and 'non‐commutative' field theory. One of the important possibilities for time in quantum gravity is that it might fail to commute with space.

It has long been thought that observing distinctive traces of quantum gravity in a laboratory setting is effectively impossible, since gravity is so much weaker than all the other familiar forces in particle physics. But the quantum gravity phenomenology community today seeks to do the (effectively) impossible, using a challenging novel class of `tabletop' Gravitationally Induced Entanglement (GIE) experiments, surveyed here. The hypothesized outcomes of the GIE experiments are claimed by some (but disputed by others) to provide a `witness' of the underlying quantum nature of gravity in the non-relativistic limit, using superpositions of Planck-mass bodies. We inspect what sort of achievement it would possibly be to perform GIE experiments, as proposed, ultimately arguing that the positive claim of witness is equivocal. Despite various sweeping arguments to the contrary in the vicinity of quantum information theory or given low-energy quantum gravity, whether or not one can claim to witness the quantum nature of the gravitational field in these experiments decisively depends on which out of two legitimate modelling paradigms one finds oneself in. However, by situating GIE experiments in a tradition of existing experiments aimed at making gravity interestingly quantum in the laboratory, we argue that, independently of witnessing or paradigms, there are powerful reasons to perform the experiments, and that their successful undertaking would indeed be a major advance in physics.

The present volume collects essays on the philosophical foundations of quantum theories of gravity, such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Central for philosophical concerns is quantum gravity's suggestion that space and time, or spacetime, may not exist fundamentally, but instead be a derivative entity emerging from non-spatiotemporal degrees of freedom. In the spirit of naturalised metaphysics, contributions to this volume consider the philosophical implications of this suggestion. In turn, philosophical methods and insights are brought to bear on the foundations of quantum gravity itself. For instance, the idea of functionalism, borrowed from the philosophy of mind and discussed by several essays, exemplifies this mutual interaction the collection seeks to foster.

Noncommutative geometries generalize standard smooth geometries, parametrizing the noncommutativity of dimensions with a fundamental quantity with the dimensions of area. The question arises then of whether the concept of a region smaller than the scale—and ultimately the concept of a point—makes sense in such a theory. We argue that it does not, in two interrelated ways. In the context of Connes’ spectral triple approach, we show that arbitrarily small regions are not definable in the formal sense. While in the scalar field Moyal–Weyl approach, we show that they cannot be given an operational definition. We conclude that points do not exist in such geometries. We therefore investigate (a) the metaphysics of such a geometry, and (b) how the appearance of smooth manifold might be recovered as an approximation to a fundamental noncommutative geometry.

The modeling of black holes is an important desideratum for any quantum theory of gravity. Not only is a classical black hole metric sought, but also agreement with the laws of black hole thermodynamics. In this paper, we describe how these goals are achieved in string theory. We review black hole thermodynamics, and then explicate the general stringy derivation of classical spacetimes, the construction of a simple black hole solution, and the derivation of its entropy. With that in hand, we address some important philosophical and conceptual questions: the confirmatory value of the derivation, the bearing of the model on recent discussions of the so-called ‘information paradox’, and the implications of the model for the nature of space.

Could spacetime be derived rather than fundamental? The question is pressing because attempts to quantize gravity have led to theories in which (arguably) there are either no, or only extremely thin, spacetime structures. Moreover, recent proposals for the interpretation of quantum mechanics have suggested that 3-dimensional space may be an ‘appearance’ derived from the 3N-dimensional space in which an N-particle wavefunction lives (cross- reference). In fact, I will largely assume a positive answer, and investigate how it could be; in particular, I want to explicate the role of philosophy in producing a satisfactory explanation of spacetime, providing a roadmap for philosophical engagement with quantum gravity.

This paper aims to address conceptual issues concerning black holes in the context of string theory, with the aim of illuminating the ontological unification of gravity and matter, and the interpretation of cosmological models. §1 describes the central concepts of the theory: the fungibility of matter and geometry, and the reduction of gravity and supergravity. The ‘standard’ interpretation presented draws on that implicit in the thinking of many (but not all) string theorists, though made more explicit and systematic than usual. §2 explains how to construct a stringy black hole, and some of its features, including evaporation. §3 critically examines the assumptions behind such modeling, and their bearing on ontological questions.

This paper examines two cosmological models of quantum gravity to investigate the foundational and conceptual issues arising from quantum treatments of the big bang. While the classical singularity is erased, the quantum evolution that replaces it may not correspond to classical spacetime: it may instead be a non-spatiotemporal region, which somehow transitions to a spatiotemporal state. The different kinds of transition involved are partially characterized, the concept of a physical transition without time is investigated, and the problem of empirical incoherence for regions without spacetime is discussed.