Nicolás Quiñones

This paper contends with the notion that the methods of machine learning (ML) are unique among the tools of science in enabling a form of theory-free inductive inference. I challenge these assertions of epistemic distinctness, attributing the prevalence of these views to an untenable conception of scientific objectivity: what I term a theory-free ideal, in homage to its normative counterpart. ML, as a formal method of induction, must rely on conceptual or theoretical resources to get inference off the ground. By means of two case studies, I argue that this theory-free ideal has a deleterious effect on the epistemic standing of ML-involving science.

The truth of generics such as ‘ducks lay eggs’ is often taken to be intuitive. For the Stoics, this intuition is flawed. Qua thoughts, they argue, generics are neither true nor false. Qua utterances, generics are not bivalently truth-apt. The Stoics ascribe the following flaw to generics: generics predicate something of a kind that is only true of some instances of the kind and that can only be predicated of ‘somethings.’ Given the Stoic rejection of Forms, forms, and essences, kinds are not somethings. And yet, the Stoics are greatly interested in the fact that generics can seem true to us. Their study is part of a normative approach in logic. The virtues of non-precipitancy and non-randomness, as well as other logical virtues, are needed in order to avoid flawed reasoning, including assent to generics.

Originally I had intended to revise or augment Naming and Necessity extensively. Considerable time has elapsed, and I have come to realize that any extensive revision or expansion would delay the appearance of a separate, less expensive edition of Naming and Necessity indefinitely. Further, as far as revision is concerned, there is something to be said for preserving a work in its original form, warts and all. I have thus followed a very conservative policy of correction for the present printing. Obvious printing errors have been corrected, and slight changes have been made to make various sentences or formulations clearer.

Alter (The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, GB: Oxford University Pres, 2023) argues for something surprising: despite being widely rejected by philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself, Jackson’s knowledge argument succeeds. Alter’s defense of Jackson’s argument is not only surprising; it’s also exciting: the knowledge argument, if it’s sound, underscores the power of armchair philosophy, the power of pure thought to arrive at substantial conclusions about the world. In contrast, I aim to make a case for something unsurprising and unexciting: that the knowledge argument does not succeed, or, even less far-reaching, that Alter’s defense of it is not persuasive. Mine is a classic file-drawer thesis, but what it has going for it is that it’s true, or so I think, and hope to illustrate why you should too.

Berger and Mylopoulos (2019) critique recent scepticism about unconscious perception, focusing on experimental work from Peters and Lau, and theoretical work of my own. Central to their wide-ranging discussion is the claim that unconscious perception occupies a default status within both experimental and folk psychology. Here, I argue to the contrary that a conscious-perception-only model should be our default. Along the way, I offer my own analysis of Peters and Lau's study, assess the folk psychological status of unconscious perception, discuss vision-for-action, and confront an important dilemma which Berger and Mylopoulos raise for the sceptic concerning the existence of unconscious mentality in general.