Nicolas Zaks

This paper focuses on the use of ‘qua qualifications’ in Plato’s Parmenides to shed light on the purpose of both the dialogue as a whole and its parts. It shows that the compatible respects specified by qua and the metaphysics of qua qualifications in the second half of the Parmenides allow forms to have contrary features without being contradictory or collapsing into sensible beings – contrary to what the young Socrates fears in the first half of the dialogue. The discussion demonstrates the originality of Plato’s use of qua and contributes to a more unified understanding of the Parmenides.

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary (but not individually sufficient) conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men.

Despite a short eclipse during the Hellenistic period, Aristotle’s Categories has been one of the most influential texts in the history of philosophy. Yet, while Aristotle was the first to speak about “categories” and to devote an entire treatise to them, one may wonder whether he was really the first to develop a theory of the categorial structure of reality. Contrary to the majority of modern scholars, many of the ancient Platonists claimed the invention of a full-blown categorial theory for Plato. Rightly or wrongly, they either found in Plato’s dialogues doctrines that could rival, or even surpass, Aristotle’s categories, or they developed a set of Platonic “categories” on the basis of Plato’s work.

Cet article est consacré au problème du rapport entre l’entrelacement des genres (συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν) et le logos dans le Sophiste. Après avoir brièvement présenté le problème, je discute, dans la première partie, différentes solutions proposées par les commentateurs. Je cherche à montrer qu’aucune de ces solutions n’est pleinement satisfaisante. Dans la deuxième partie, je propose une nouvelle solution au problème de la συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν fondée sur une distinction entre deux types de logos, le logos dialectique et le logos doxique. Dans la troisième partie, je cherche à justifier textuellement cette solution en recourant à la fois au texte du Sophiste lui-même et à la dernière partie du Théétète. Dans ma conclusion, je suggère que la distinction entre logos dialectique et logos doxique correspond à une différence qui traverse toute l’œuvre de Platon, à savoir la différence entre connaissance et opinion. / This paper deals with the problem of the συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν in the Sophist. In the first part, after a brief presentation of this problem, I discuss different solutions which have been proposed in the recent literature. I try to show that none of them is entirely satisfying. In the second part, I propose and explain a new solution based on a distinction between two types of logos : dialectical logos and doxastic logos. In the third part, I try to justify this solution on the basis of some passages of the Sophist and of the final part of the Theaetetus. To conclude, I suggest that the distinction between dialectical logos and doxasticlogos matches the difference between knowledge and belief made by Plato in his dialogues.

In Plato's Sophist, a mysterious Eleatic Stranger, the main character of the dialogue, undertakes a systematic definition of the philosopher's fiercest rival, the sophist. His hunt for a definition of the sophist, however, is interrupted by an attempt to refute the ontology of Parmenides. The philosophical significance of this refutation and its exact relationship to the sought-after definition remains a matter of great scholarly dispute. This book, by means of a running commentary on the dialogue, argues that the oft-neglected distinction between dialectic and appearances is not only the key to solving this and other exegetical conundrums, but also reveals the unity and originality of Plato's argument in the Sophist.

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men.

The διακριτικὴ τέχνη (the art of separating or discriminating), from which the sixth definition of theSophiststarts (226b1–231b9), is puzzling.Prima faciethe art of separating does not fit the initial division of art between ποιητικὴ τέχνη (production) and κτητικὴ τέχνη (acquisition) at 219a8–c9. Therefore, scholars generally agree that, although mutually exclusive, ποιητική and κτητική are not exhaustive and leave room for a third species of art, διακριτικὴ τέχνη, on a par with ποιητική and κτητική. However, I argue that textual evidence suggests otherwise.

This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed.