Olivia Custer

The author explains that there is indeed necessary that there be some reference to the unconditional, an unconditional without sovereignty, and thus without cruelty, which is no doubt a very difficult thing to think”. The two terms he uses to describe the object of affirmation further reinforce the understanding that Derrida is taking on metaphysics both in the sense of adopting it, and in the sense of challenging it. Thus, if doing “without sovereignty” is one of Derrida's imperatives, then that is an imperative to do without the metaphysical fulcrum. The author purposes in what follows will be to articulate in very general terms the manner in which Derrida transformed the Kantian heritage. He will emphasize that the transformation involves both opening a different perspective on some of Kant's key concepts and developing a new relation to the methodology which critical philosophy inaugurated.

L'exemple de Kant" s'emploie à montrer que l'examen de la fonction de l'exemple permet de situer les enjeux essentiels de la philosophie critique de Kant, aussi bien dans le domaine théorique que dans le domaine pratique. Nous examinons les rôles attribués par Kant aux exemples ("Darstellung" d'un objet, preuve de possibilité de la vertu, outil rhétorique ou encore œuvre de jugement politique), pour ensuite analyser les difficultés qu'il y a à justifier la possibilité de ces rôles dans les termes mêmes de sa pensée. Cette étude est aussi un plaidoyer pour l'importance de la troisième "Critique" dans l'économie de l'œuvre kantienne puisqu'il s'agit de montrer d'une part, que c'est là que la méthode transcendantale fait l'épreuve de ses propres limites, et, d'autre part, que Kant y élabore une réponse originale au scepticisme - par le biais d'une théorie originale de l'exemple.

Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction, by Olivia Custer, Penelope Deutscher, and Samir Haddad -- Part I: Openings -- 1. The Foucault-Derrida Debate on the Argument Concerning Madness and Dreams, by Pierre Macherey -- 2. Looking Back at History of Madness, by Lynne Huffer -- 3. Violence and Hyperbole: From "Cogito and the History of Madness" to The Death Penalty, by Michael Naas -- Part II: Surviving the Philosophical Problem: History Crosses Transcendental Analysis.

Responding to Elizabeth Rottenberg's invitation to consider good signs, I first raise a question about “good” and “too good” signs by referring to a letter of Louis Althusser's that describes the risk that “too good” signs will be misread. I then turn to the distinction Rottenberg makes between deconstructive signs and Immanuel Kant's historical signs. Borrowing an image from Jacques Derrida's The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), I suggest that we think of the task of abolition of the death penalty as requiring a particular kind of strangulation of Kantian discourse, a strangulation that would reach the center of its nervous system and disarm its powers without putting it to death. Finally, I turn to a recent initiative by a Belgian nongovernmental organization (Groupe d'action dans l'interet des animaux or Global Action in the Interest of Animals [GAIA]) in their campaign to abolish the practice of castrating piglets without anesthetic, reading it as an example of a strategy that mobilizes the discourse of rights while at the same time undermining the sovereign power that sustains it. This provides an image of the sort of stranglehold with a certain lightness of touch that, I argue, Derrida's work on the death penalty prescribes as the task for unconditional abolition

How can one bring about virtuous behaviour? This question is all the more pressing for Kant as his definition of the virtuous act in terms of autonomy sets up a particularproblem. Indeed, it seems that any effort to provoke an act of autonomy is doomed: should it „succeed”, the act it provoked would no longer be autonomous but rather determined by something external. A possible solution to this logical conundrum is fleetingly adumbrated by Kant in §48 of the Metaphysics of Morals. In this section, the parerga of virtue are credited with both leading to, and belonging to, virtue. Taken in conjunctionwith what the Critique of Judgement teaches us concerning the role of parerga, this suggests an indirect efficacy which is perhaps precisely that which is needed to provoke virtuous behaviour. Such at least is the hypothesis this paper develops