Olivier Renaut

Vice is often compared with bodily diseases in Plato’s dialogues, as if bodily diseases were an insightful scheme to understand how a psychic structure can be infected, contaminated, and then completely corrupted. But what is a strict analogy in the Republic seems to refer clearly to a causal interaction between body and soul in the Timaeus: vice can emerge from a malign disposition of the body, and, conversely, vice can cause or feed new bodily diseases in a disharmonious and neglected body. This paper argues that there is a consistent use of the analogy between vice and disease in the Republic and the Timaeus; the claim that psychic diseases are involuntary in the Timaeus is actually compatible with the agent’s responsibility regarding his ethical and physical good condition, within a strong normative approach to diseases, both of the body and the soul.

Dieser Band versammelt eine Auswahl von Vorträgen, die auf dem Platonicum XII Symposium über Platons Parmenides gehalten wurden, vom 15. bis 19. Juli 2019 in Paris. Der Band beinhaltet fünfzig Beiträge, die von der Lebendigkeit und Vielfalt der platonischen Studien zu diesem schwierigen Dialog zeugen. Er gliedert sich in sechs Abschnitte, die einen Weg durch den Dialog nach seinen wichtigsten Artikulationen darstellen: I. An der Schwelle zum Parmenides II. Parmenides im Kontext III. Dialog, Dialektik, Übungen IV. Die Theorie der Formen V. Die Hypothesen VI. Parmenides und seine Rezeption.

Le retour aux anciens constitue une stratégie souvent mise en œuvre pour réhabiliter le rôle des émotions dans la vie éthique, que les éthiques déontologiques et utilitaristes auraient minoré. On analyse l’emploi que fait Martha Nussbaum de la référence aux anciens, en particulier Aristote et les Stoïciens, depuis la publication de La Fragilité du bien jusqu’à ses récentes prises de position contre certaines émotions jugées incompatibles avec les principes libéraux de sa pensée éthique et politique. On espère ainsi montrer comment Nussbaum écarte de notre vie démocratique contemporaine certaines émotions pourtant jugées capitales dans la vie éthique grecque, notamment la colère et la honte.

The description of vision occurs in the Timaeus in 45b-47b, following a double pattern characteristic of this dialogue: The physicist first gives a mechanical explanation of sight that involves two fluxes of light, that of the eye and that of the body in the field of vision. He then goes on to give a functionalist explanation that puts vision at the source of the sciences of astronomy, mathematics, and even philosophy. In this complex passage of the Timaeus, vision is a power that informs us how an affection, that gives rise to sensations, could give rise to knowledge. This article begins by investigating the main ideas in passage 45b-47b of the Timaeus and goes on to explain what is at stake in competing interpretations concerning the role of vision in thought in this particular passage. It argues that, through a constitutive dualism between the sensible and the intelligible – implying an epistemological gap – vision is an instrument towards the intelligible.

Broadly speaking, something can be called intermediate for Plato insofar as it occupies a place between two objects, poles, places, time, or principles. But this broad meaning of the intermediate has been eclipsed by the Aristotelian critique of the intermediate objects of the dianoia, so that it has become more difficult to think of the intermediates as functions of the soul. The aim of this paper is to show how, in the Republic, thumos is analogously treated as an intermediate with other kinds of intermediate objects, and tentatively to relate this psychological intermediate in a broader theory with doxa, as its epistemological ground in the course of action.

Taking Timaeus 42a-b and 69c-72e as a starting point, this paper claims that emotions are rational in Plato only in a derivative sense. First, what we call “emotions” are, in the Timaeus, a complex state not only of “mind”, but of the compound “body and soul”, or, rather of the “incarnate soul”; in this sense, they are non-rational for they derive from necessity. Second, in the framework of a psycho-physiological account, emotions are, prima facie, irrational affections, insofar as they may prevent reason from working properly. Third, it is true, however, that there are some emotions that actually help the reason to command, but the cognitive dimension that is commonly found within emotions comes from a distinct and separate power, δόξα, that makes these emotions display a kind of derivative “rationality”. With such a psycho-physiological explanation, the Timaeus can better explain how to rationalize our actions and ways of being through these intermediate states, by bypassing the apparently natural process that goes from sense-perception to what is found pleasant or painful and by giving these emotions their proper (though extrinsic) object of value.

This article aims at showing that the definition of pleasure in Plato’s dialogues cannot be separated from a political educational program and an anthropology that consider pleasure as the main vehicle towards virtue. The political use of pleasure is as important as its definition, insofar as its manifestation and content are the prerogatives of the legislator. All pleasures are politically meaningful in the Republic and in the Laws, and among them especially the triad hunger, thirst and sex ; in making pleasures a “public” issue, as pleasures are object of surveillance and political control, Plato gives several means in order to shape the way pleasures are felt in the city, and in order to make the community of pleasure and pain a fundamental role in unifying the city under the reason’s commands.