P. Michael Albert

El presente ensayo propone un uso filosóficamente productivo de la dialéctica hegeliana del señor y el siervo, entendiéndola no como un conflicto intersubjetivo por el reconocimiento, sino como un proceso interno de autoescisión de la autoconciencia implicado en la formación de conceptos. A partir de una interpretación del capítulo sobre señoría y siervo de la Fenomenología del espíritu, se defiende que toda ontología socialmente vigente constituye un horizonte normativo históricamente situado, susceptible de ser transgredido por la experiencia práctica. Partiendo de la tesis de que la conceptualización emerge de un conflicto entre la experiencia singular y una ontología socialmente establecida, el trabajo desplaza este esquema hacia contextos sociales no modernos, en los que no existen formas altamente institucionalizadas de mediación. Para ello, articula la dialéctica hegeliana con aportes de la antropología y la etnografía, en diálogo con Lévi-Strauss y Descola, en particular la noción de estacionalidad desarrollada por Graeber y Wengrow, proponiendo así los fundamentos de una antropología dialéctica del concepto.

The purpose of our work is, first of all, to rekindle a sense of wonderment as the basic starting point for a philosophical reflection on the hand, initially focusing on the special versatility, ductility and protean character of the human hand. It is then a question of examining and reassessing its inimitable practical dimension, especially in the field of health, as an essential part of the art of healing and caring. Following the inspiration of classical works concerned with the relationship between doctor and patient, one might argue that in medical practice the hand maintains a balance between specialisation and multifunctionality. In the field of health care, despite a necessary reduction of initial possibilities and an inevitable specialisation of its tasks, the hand maintains its characteristic multifunctionality. In fact, the therapeutic hand is, all at the same time, instrumental, cognitive and pathic. Of all these features, the one that appears as the least technified or least specialised, that is the pathic or affective hand, is, nevertheless, the bedrock with respect to the others. The pathic or affective dimension is the very basis of the therapeutic hand, since it is this that drives it to act for the good of the patient, and it is this dimension that in some way must direct and involve any operation of the therapeutic hand, whose ultimate purpose is the care and healing of the human person.

Los seis textos que se incluyen a continuación contienen una breve reflexión sobre cuestiones de metafísica. A pesar de la diversidad de las temáticas, hay en todas ellas una mirada que les confiere «un aire de familia», a saber, la «mirada metafísica»: «Espiritualidad y religiosidad en Simone Weil», de Natán Verdés; «Metafísica de la psicodelia», de Gerard Masmitjà; «La relación trinitaria en la realidad cosmoteándrica de Raimundo Pánikkar», de Francesc Xavier Marquès; «Introducción a la teología analítica seguida del ejemplo del colapso modal en el teísmo clásico», de Constantí Cabestany; «Metafísica: la ciencia que no avanza», de Albert Piguillem; y «Memorias del subsuelo: un breve análisis filosófico», de Andreu Cacho.

This paper develops the pragmatic “atheoreticism” of Quine and Rorty. A position I dub “postpragmatism”—paralleling the post phases of modernism and humanism—my purpose here is to bring to a culmination what Quine and Rorty started decades before. By doing so, I argue, it becomes possible for Quine, and more so Rorty, to avoid the most common critiques of their atheoretic form of pragmatism. Chief among them, that it is mired in self-contradiction. Rather than rely upon theory to justify atheoreticism—the very stuff of their self-contradiction—I rely instead upon Rorty’s own insouciance, syncretism, and eclecticism to shift the ground of debate from concern with what is justified to concern with what is interesting.

This paper develops a position I call “apathetic pragmatism.” Apathetic pragmatism is a form of pragmatism that, through advocating “apathy” about the topic of truth, avoids the troubled identification of utility and truth found in classical and neo pragmatist theories of truth. Initially explored by Stephen Stich, I argue Stich’s case for apathetic pragmatism relies upon a theory of truth that causes vicious circularity. I then pursue a different route to apathetic pragmatism, one that sees apathetic pragmatism as a “paradigm shift” in relation to previous forms of pragmatism. It is a paradigm shift where pragmatism becomes a normative view concerning the questions that are necessary to ask, not an attempt to answer questions assumed necessary.

ABSTRACTA paper in two parts, the first is a critique of the commonly held view among both cognitivist and non-cognitivist sport philosophers that conscious mental representation of knowledge that is a necessary condition for skill acquisition. The second is a defense of a necessary causal condition for skill acquisition, a necessary causal condition that is mimetic, physically embodied, and socially embedded. To make my case I rely throughout on a common thought experiment in and beyond the philosophy of sport literature, the seminal work of Kuhn and Quine counter the representational theory of knowledge, and recent argument in the philosophy of sport related to neurophysiology, cognition, and intentionality. Ultimately I conclude that the failure of a necessary representational condition and its replacement by a necessary casual condition in skill acquisition jeopardizes much of what has been said in the philosophy of sport about not just skill acquisition but the more popular topic of high-level skill. It does, because it challenges the assumption that there is some necessary baseline knowledge that which, according to cognitivists, is brought forward in some way into highly skillful performance or, according to non-cognitivists, is somehow left behind or subsumed into a background in highly skillful performance.

Before he became infamous for character assassination disguised as literary executorship, Rufus W. Griswold established his reputation in America as a critic and early literary anthologist. In 1842, Griswold released the first edition of his massive Poets and Poetry of America with prominent Philadelphia publisher Carey and Hart. At nearly five hundred royal octavo pages—complete with elaborate frontispiece; ornamental title page with an etching by George Hewitt Cushman after Thomas Creswick; twelve-page, double-columned “historical introduction”; authorial headnotes; and selections of verse from more than one hundred poets active in the roughly seventy years since American independence—Griswold’s volume was...

Andrey Bely's autobiographical novel Kotik Letaev and Terrence Malick's film The Tree of Life do not share a common subtext. Nevertheless, they have strikingly similar themes. They each deal with an adult's confrontation of his past through memory, a memory that extends back before birth. Coming to terms with the past prepares the adult protagonist of each work for his destiny. The essay discusses Malick's use of William Blake's mysticism and Bely's dependence on the religious-philosophical ideas of Rudolf Steiner. Memory plays an important role in both works as it touches on the recapitulation of cosmic origins in the development of the individual human being. What the quester discovers through memory enables him to find the way back to Eternity from which he has descended. Both artists invoke the World Tree uniting heaven and earth and its association with the Cross of Christ. In both the novel and the film the world is seen first through a child's eyes, then through growing understanding of the adult. Malick illustrates with cinematography what Bely describes in words. Malick uses music in a way that fleshes out what Bely attempted to create through using musical tropes in language.

Andrey Bely's autobiographical novel Kotik Letaev and Terrence Malick's film The Tree of Life do not share a common subtext. Nevertheless, they have strikingly similar themes. They each deal with an adult's confrontation of his past through memory, a memory that extends back before birth. Coming to terms with the past prepares the adult protagonist of each work for his destiny. The essay discusses Malick's use of William Blake's mysticism and Bely's dependence on the religious-philosophical ideas of Rudolf Steiner. Memory plays an important role in both works as it touches on the recapitulation of cosmic origins in the development of the individual human being. What the quester discovers through memory enables him to find the way back to Eternity from which he has descended. Both artists invoke the World Tree uniting heaven and earth and its association with the Cross of Christ. In both the novel and the film the world is seen first through a child's eyes, then through growing understanding of the adult. Malick illustrates with cinematography what Bely describes in words. Malick uses music in a way that fleshes out what Bely attempted to create through using musical tropes in language.

Based on an interpretation of the work of martin Heidegger, this article o ers a shi away om social and cultural anthropology, which explores sociocultural aspects, and also om general anthropology, which aims to summarise all dimensions of human being. the author de nes the speci city of existential anthropology: observing and conceiving human beings as they exist and continue to exist towards death. With a few twists in relation to Heidegger’s thought, the author discusses what is theoretically and methodologically at stake in this per‐ spective, opening existential anthropology to a large empirical eld.

In this paper, I argue that, beyond a philosophy of sport, space should be made for a ‘philosophy from sport.’ A philosophy from sport is one that can allow us to see sport as more than instantiating broader social values or possessing an isolated set of unique values. It can, as I believe a philosophy from sport, by paying special attention to the actual practice of sport, bring with it ways of developing, informing, even justifying a set of broader social values. Using as a test case Michael Sandel’s arguments counter markets in What Money Can’t Buy, with a particular focus on his critique of naming rights for stadiums and arenas, I maintain that sport shows how markets can be reformed in order not to suffer the charge that they breed inequality and corruption or indecency. In fact, with sport, I argue it is possible to see exactly how markets can serve equality, decency, and ultimately the pursuit of excellence. Relying, in part, on the work of philosophers of sport from div..