Paul Joosse

Moving beyond frameworks of charisma scholarship that stress antagonism between charisma and establishment society, this article discerns and theoretically accounts for more mutualistic forms of influence between charismatic leaders and elite representatives of traditional or rational-legal institutions. Specifically, we combine contemporary work in the cultural sociology of charisma with Girard’s notion of mimesis to provide a theory of charismatic mimicry; we explain situations where, rather than opposing the charismatic leader, elites align themselves with the new sources of legitimacy being proffered by the charismatic leader. At times, these institutional elites even co-opt new charismatic protocols into their own vocabularies of leadership. We demonstrate the usefulness of our model for interpreting the case of the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and his encounters with European leaders.

While several studies have explored the interactional dynamics of charismatic power, most have neglected the role of what Weber termed the charismatic aristocracy. This article revives the classical concept to respond to contemporary calls for performative, follower-centric approaches to charisma. Specifically, the charismatic aristocracy is placed at the center of an analysis of a reiterative moment in charismatization: when influential followers generate content for the emerging charismatic persona. In these germinal moments, the dialogical nature of charisma is most clear, precisely because it is then that charismatic leaders often are not themselves confident in their status and can be found responding to instructional cues—indeed following the lead—of those positioning themselves as obsequious followers. Drawing on 10 years of observations, multistage interviews, and media collections, I provide an interactionist account of the charismatic emergence of John de Ruiter, leader of a successful new religious movement. I conclude by tabling a model that conceives of the charismatic aristocracy as an important fulcrum for expectation, affectation, and recognition in charismatic interactions.

QAnon is beginning to gain attention in scholarly circles, but these sources often disagree about how to categorize the movement. This amounts to the meta-dispute between those who view QAnon primarily as a religious “cult,” and those who grant it greater credibility as a political populist movement. Using quantitative and qualitative methods we test the proposition that QAnon could be a mix of both. Results from both analyses suggest that QAnon is best understood primarily as a political populist movement, but one that utilizes religious rhetoric. The findings thus highlight the asymmetric nature of the conflation of religion and politics in the contemporary American civil sphere.

Since 1992, clandestine radical environmentalist cells, calling themselves the Earth Liberation Front, have carried out arson attacks in an effort to punish corporations for environmentally deleterious practices. I examine the radical environmental movement and find that its recent rise to prominence and notoriety is part and parcel of the larger development of the more general anti-globalization/anti-capitalist movement. Specifically, I examine how, despite its libertarian conservative origins, the ideology of Earth First! changed after an influx of new members with anti-state, anarchist sympathies. Finally, I assess the applicability of three major criticisms of “globalization from below” to the case of the ELF, namely: a) that its preoccupation with the transnational sphere and abandonment of electoral politics is misguided, b) that direct actions such as property destruction are counterproductive to the wider aims of the movement, and, c) that its strategies of contention are too episodic, and do very little to encourage practical, inclusive, local, and sustained action in the service of global justice.

Working beyond the inclination to inaugurate alternative theoretical traditions alongside canonical sociology, this article demonstrates the value of recovering latent gender theory from within classic concepts—in this case, Weber’s “charisma.” Close readings of Weber reveal, (a) tools for theorizing extraordinary, non-masculinist agency, and, (b) clues that account for the conventional wisdom (popular and scholastic) that charisma is “not for women.” While contemporary movements may be tempted to eschew charismatic leadership per se because of legacies of dominance by men, there is value in Weber’s formulation, which anticipated the performative turn in social theory that would destabilize biologistic gender ontologies. Value in this exchange also flows back to Weber: by confronting his intermittent tendency to describe charisma in terms that we now recognize as “customs of manly power,” we reveal heretofore unseen imperfections (i.e., traditionalist modes of legitimation) in his ideal-type. This engagement thus demonstrates an empowering mutuality between contemporary gender theory and “the classics.” The article ends by theorising the nexus of gender and charisma in the case of Trump, pointing to possibilities for vitiating Donald Trump’s charisma, as well as for anti-Trumpian charisma.