•  2
    W. V. Quine (1908–2000)
    In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Analyticity and the a priori Knowledge and the realm of the cognitive Evidence The relation of evidence to knowledge: observation sentences Naturalized epistemology and normativity Realism Metaphysics and regimentation: logic and extensionality Ontology and its relativity Conclusion.
  •  5
    Quine's Naturalism Revisited
    In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley. 2013.
    Michael Glanzberg: Quine on Reference and Quantification: This essay reviews Quine's main theses about the nature of reference and quantification, their origins, and their limitations. It presents Quine's view that reference is a derivative semantic notion, along with his proposal to eliminate proper names, and his speculation about how our ability to refer might develop. Turning to quantification, it shows the close connections between quantifiers and regimentation in Quine's work, and discusse…Read more
  • Quine's Naturalism Revisited
    In Gilbert Harman & Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
  •  15
    Wittgenstein, Frege and the Vienna Circle
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (3): 1319-1320. 1990.
  •  136
    The difference between Carnap and Quine over analyticity is usually thought to turn on a disagreement as to whether there is a notion of meaning, or rules of language, which enable us to define that idea. This paper argues that the more important disagreement is epistemological. Quine came to accept a notion of analyticity. That leaves him in a position somewhat like Putnam's in ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’: that there is a notion of analyticity, but that it is of no philosophical importance…Read more
  •  26
    Quine
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 237-299. 2000.
    [Elliott Sober] In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological …Read more
  •  32
    Quine
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 237-299. 2000.
    In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim …Read more
  •  25
    Signigicance in Quine
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1): 113-133. 2014.
  •  27
    Carnap and Quine on the Nature of Evidence
    The Monist 100 (2): 211-227. 2017.
  •  12
    XV*—Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge†
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1): 269-290. 1991.
    Peter Hylton; XV*—Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge†, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 269–290, https://do.
  •  29
    Russell, idealism, and the origins of analytic philosophy
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 183 (1): 122-124. 1993.
  •  1
    Hegel and analytic philosophy
    In Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge University Press. pp. 445--85. 1993.
  •  20
    Review of An Essay on Facts by Kenneth Russell Olson (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 409-411. 1992.
  •  87
    Willard Van Orman Quine
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010.
  •  39
    Quine, II
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1). 2000.
  •  50
    Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 107 (12): 648-652. 2010.
  •  40
    6 The Theory of Descriptions
    In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, Cambridge University Press. pp. 202. 2003.
  •  68
    Rorty and Quine on Scheme and Content
    Philosophical Topics 25 (2): 67-86. 1997.
  •  60
    Quine's Naturalism
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1): 261-282. 1994.
  •  5
    Quine, II
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1): 281-299. 2000.
  •  46
    II_– _Peter Hylton
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 281-299. 2000.