Peter Zachar

The scientific study of emotion has been characterized by classification schemes that propose to 'carve nature at the joints.' This article examines several of these classifications, drawn from both the categorical and dimensional perspectives. Each classification is given credit for what it contributes to our understanding, but the dream of a single, all purpose taxonomy of emotional phenomena is called into question. Such hopes are often associated with the carving at the joints metaphor, which is here argued to be harmful to scientific realism, and better rejected in favor of a pragmatic approach. Questioning the mere discovery theory of scientific progress, I argue that psychologists discover facts about their domain of study, but have to decide how to classify them. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

This article critically examines Louis Charland’s claim that personality disorders are moral rather than medical kinds by exploring the relationship between personality disorders and virtue ethics. We propose that the conceptual resources of virtue theory can inform psychiatry’s thinking about personality disorders, but also that virtue theory as understood by Aristotle cannot be reduced to the narrow domain of ‘the moral’ in the modern sense of the term. Some overlap between the moral domain’s notion of character-based ethics and the medical domain’s notion of character-based disorders is unavoidable. We also apply a modified version of John Sadler’s “moral wrongfulness test” to borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. With respect to both diagnoses, we argue that they involve negative moral evaluations, but may also have indispensable nonmoral features and, therefore, classify legitimate psychiatric disorders.

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined

We are thankful for the opportunity to reflect more on the difficult problem of the relationship between moral evaluations and the construct of personality disorders in response to the commentaries by Mike Martin and Louis Charland. We begin by emphasizing to readers that this important problem is complicated by the different perspectives of the various disciplines involved, especially, philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology. Incredulity, anger, and dismay are among the reactions we encountered in discussions of these issues, especially with some mental health professionals. Strong reactions on either side of a disciplinary divide occasionally present barriers to a dispassionate discussion of the topic. ..

When i was in graduate school, I inadvertently walked in on a fellow student taking his comprehensive exams. He was extremely frustrated because two of the questions asked about conceptual issues in personality and personality disorders. This student was not expecting such questions and considered them to be unfair. I knew other students in that same program who would have considered it a gift to get such “interesting” questions. Those clinical and counseling psychologists with theoretical–philosophical interests are often attracted to the topics of personality and personality disorders. It has, therefore, puzzled me why these same topics are largely ignored by those philosophers who study the conceptual issues of ..

Thomas, Bracken, and Timimi (2012) make an important contribution in critiquing the extent to which the profession of psychiatry can be so bureaucratic that patients are treated as problems to be solved in an ‘efficient’ assembly line fashion rather than as individual persons. The trouble with bureaucracies is that they promote a cold and impersonal accounting approach in which critical reflection on purposes is circumvented by decision-making algorithms (Zachar and Bartlett 2009). Psychotherapy treatment manuals definitely satisfy the bureaucratic instinct, and the fifteen-minute medication management session even more so (Harris 2011). Ideally, evidence-based medicine (EBM) should be used to promote the goals of ..

The thesis of this article is that an attitude akin to pragmatism is internal to the scientific enterprise itself, and as a result many scientists will make the same types of non-essentialistic interpretations of their subject matter that are made by pragmatists. This is demonstrably true with respect to those scientists who study the biological basis of emotion such as Panksepp, LeDoux, and Damasio. Even though these scientists are also influenced by what cognitive psychologists call the essentialist bias, their research programs are coherent with Peter Zachar?s rejection of natural kinds in favor of practical kinds. When the confrontation with complexity leads a scientist to offer non-essentialist interpretations, two popular options are to go eliminativist or go nominalist. Pragmatists prefer the nominalistic option, and we provide reasons for suggesting that scientists should as well

I critically analyze Kagan’s claim that in order to advance the science of emotion we should abandon the practice of referring to emotions with common folk psychological names, such as fear and anger. Kagan recommends discovering more homogenous constructs that are segregated by the type of evidence used to infer those constructs. He also argues that variable origins, biological implementations, and psychological and sociocultural contexts may combine to create distinct kinds of emotional states that require distinct names. I acknowledge that such a splitting strategy will provide increased validity, but also claim that atomizing alone may not give us everything we want from a scientific classification

The Contrast Between the nomothetic versus the idiographic was popularized in psychology by Gordon Allport (1937). In the early 1930s, Allport made his name by advocating for a quantitative, trait-based approach to the study of personality in contrast with the prevailing case study approach. In doing so, he was following the trend toward greater reliance on measurement in psychology as a whole. Allport, however, had grave doubts about the sufficiency of quantitative measurement for developing an understanding of individual psychological functioning. The nomothetic versus the idiographic was meant to give voice to these doubts.1 For Allport, the nomothetic referred to the study of populations with the aim ..

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 3-14, January 2022. Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.

Commentary on four articles in a special issue on “theories of emotion,” comparing the theories with respect to five conceptual contrasts. The first four contrasts are essentialism versus nonessentialism, discriminative versus integrative theories, individual versus social focus, and instrumentalism versus scientific realism. Although scientific psychologists appear to have reached consensus in favor of nonessentialism and they freely use both realist and instrumentalist interpretations, there is no consensus on the other two contrasts. The final contrast explored addresses attitudes toward the use of philosophy in scientific theorizing, and whether philosophy is best kept in the background or brought into the foreground.

Reply by the current authors to the comments made by Jaak Panksepps , James.A. Russell and Louise Sundararajan on the original article by Peter Zachar . I consider the utility of the concept of natural kind, and explore difficulties in applying it reliably. I examine categorical and dimensional approaches to affect with respect to both scientific realism and nominalist approaches to classification. I agree that eliminativist analogies are beneficial but argue that they cannot fully account for the relationship between folk and scientific psychology. I also claim that neither Panksepp's nor Russell's models are incommensurable with Sundararajn's deeper approach to affective science. I suggest that Panksepp's conclusions about the structure of primary affect may be incompatible with the dimensional model, which illustrates the limits of translational work. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Cet article explore la classification des troubles psychiatriques dans la perspective du modèle des espèces pratiques. En nous basant sur certains travaux en philosophie des sciences qui soutiennent que les éléments chimiques et les espèces biologiques ne possèdent pas de véritables essences, nous affirmons que les troubles psychiatriques ne devraient pas être compris, eux non plus, de façon essentialiste. Les troubles psychiatriques sont des « espèces pratiques », non des « espèces naturelles ». Ce modèle représente une approche pragmatiste de la classification qui pose, compte tenu de l’infinie complexité du monde, qu’une multitude de décisions peuvent jouer un rôle légitime dans la définition des limites des catégories. Il s’agit d’une approche nominaliste contemporaine qui considère les concepts et les catégories comme provisoires et partiels, sans toutefois rejeter l’idée qu’ils sont des espèces légitimes. Ce modèle rejette ce que Ian Hacking a nommé le structurisme inhérent, sans pour autant rejeter les espèces. Le modèle des espèces pratiques rejette aussi l’éliminativisme. Il est en accord avec les arguments non essentialistes offerts par les éliminativistes, mais il n’accepte pas leurs conclusions austères. Je discute finalement les complications et les imperfections du modèle.This article explores the classification of psychiatric disorders from the perspective of the practical kinds model. Based on work in the philosophy of science which argues that chemical elements and biological species do not have real essences, it is argued that psychiatric disorders should not be understood essentialistically either. Psychiatric disorders are practical, not natural kinds. This model represents a pragmatist approach to classification which holds that, because the world is so complex, a multitude of decisions can play legitimate roles in defining category boundaries. It is a contemporary nominalistic approach that views concepts and categories as provisional and partial, but does not reject the notion that there are legitimate kinds. It rejects what Ian Hacking has called inherent structurism, but not kinds. The practical kinds model is also anti-eliminativist. It agrees with the non-essentialistic arguments offered by eliminativists, but does not accept their austere conclusions. Complications and shortcomings of the model are discussed