Philip Clapson

The history of the phenomenon termed consciousness goes back at least to the Greeks, though in modern times begins with Descartes. It attempts to identify the state in which a mental subject has awareness of the world in various modes: seeing, sensing, feeling; and also, with the ability to think. This mode facilitates consideration of the world, and the subject's place in it. It influences what actions could be taken. In this 'recent' history the role of God (specified or assumed) has been highly influential concerning the state's existence and operation. The problem is that a science of the physical universe demands an account which fits the phenomenon into the physical world without divine influence, as consciousness fails to do. In this article an entirely different approach is adopted, termed the theory of brain-sign. It identifies the role of the brain phenomenon as purely biological, facilitating organisms' ability to communicate with others by neural signing. Signs are biologically ubiquitous and intrinsically physical. The article is in two parts. The first briefly explores the history's influence till the modern day, demonstrating the incongruence of the consciousness supposition. In the decades post Behaviourism — which was a former response to the problem of consciousness — the assumption of mind/consciousness has resumed, leading to the current chaotic status. The second part, therefore, outlines the theory of brain-sign by contrasting it with recent accounts that employ the 'consciousness' concept but which could be recast if brain-sign function had been identified and employed. Once consciousness is discarded, the biological role of brain-sign is obvious, and developments of neural science may identify the physical locality of brain-sign function. That will eliminate the supposition that an Absolute reality exists or causality is entailed, which are the claims of consciousness. Indeed, brain-sign theory changes the nature of being a human being, and other creatures, mirroring the impact of Evolution.

Consciousness and the mind are prescientific concepts that begin with Greek theorizing. They suppose human rationality and reasoning placed in the human head by God, who structured the universe he created with the same kind of underlying characteristics. Descartes’ development of the model included scientific objectivity by placing the mind outside the physical universe. In its failure under evidential scrutiny and without physical explanation, this model is destined for terminal decline. Instead, a genuine biological and physical function for the brain phenomenon can be developed. This is the theory of brain-sign. It accepts the causality of the brain as its physical characteristics, already under scientific scrutiny. What is needed is a new neurophysiological language that specifies the relation of the structure and operation of the brain to organismic action in the world. Still what is lacking is an account of how neurophysiologies in different organisms communicate on unpredictable dynamic tasks. It is this evolved capacity that has emerged as brain-sign. Thus rather than mentality being an inner epistemological parallel world suddenly appearing in the head, brain-sign, as the neural sign of the causal status of the brain capable of being held adequately in common, facilitates the communicative medium of otherwise isolated organisms. The biogenesis of the phenomenon thus emerges directly from the account of the physical brain, and functions as a monistic feature of organisms in the physical world. This new paradigm offers disciplinary compatibility, and genuine development in behavioral and brain sciences.

The physical sciences, as generally understood, are disciplines concerned with the characteristics and behavior of physical objects and states. What is evident about the current condition of consciousness is that: 1) It has no identified physical states; 2) There is no generally accepted vocabulary of its functioning, or its participant entities; and 3) No ‘normal science’ operative structure upon which a community of scientists agree. The reasons are that consciousness is a prescientific concept persisting because there is no adequate physicalist theory to replace it, and because biology operates in a way ‘invisible’ to assumed mental processes and vocabulary. What is required is a plausible theory built on a biophysical base. A theory is being developed: it is termed the _theory of brain-sign_. Brain-sign replaces consciousness as an evolved neural operation in which brains communicate with each other in the collective action of organisms, so addressing the limitations of being an isolated individual. It depends upon neural signification, in this case of the organisms’ immediate _causal orientation_ towards the world. Thus, multiple organisms are linked as one biophysical operation. Signs are biologically ubiquitous and inherently physical. Organisms are not subjective agents with transcendent powers acting in a perceivable world, but evolved organic objects with the ability to cooperate as one overarching biological process. It is anticipated this theoretical operation and vocabulary will explain brain function, which mind fails to do. It accounts for science from both its neural origins and its communal nature. ER -

There is no question that something goes on in the head, which has been called consciousness. But is it consciousness? Over the last fifty years, there has been a concerted attempt to show how consciousness can be physical, of the brain. The diversity of views is characteristic of a Kuhnian pre- normal science revolution: but the revolution has not arrived. This is because the assumption that consciousness exists is wrong. In this paper consciousness (with e.g. its subjective/objective distinction) is characterized as a pre-scientific theory. The biological ontology of the phenomenon is revealed, and its placement in organismic biology explained. The phenomenon will be termed brain-sign, as appropriate to its biological function. The nature of this function completely reconstructs our view of ourselves, and other creatures in which it is manifest. The detail and ramifications cannot be addressed at length in a paper, but a research program is outlined briefly.