Pierfrancesco Basile

What is consciousness? What is the place of consciousness in nature? These and related questions occupy a prominent place in contemporary studies in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, often involving complex interdisciplinary connections between philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, biology and cognitive neuroscience. At the same time, these questions play a fundamental role in the philosophies of great thinkers of the past such as, among others, Plotinus, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, William James and Edmund Husserl. This new collection of essays by leading contemporary philosophers of mind and historians of philosophy seeks to address these questions from both a systematic and a theoretical perspective and to create a new and fruitful forum for future discussion. In the attempt to do justice to the richness of our mental life, the volume features in-depth examinations not solely of mainstream physicalist doctrines, but also of largely neglected positions such as Cartesian dualism, idealism and panpsychism.

At the beginning of his magnum opus, Process and Reality (1929), Whitehead lists a series of beliefs which he thinks are widely held by contemporary philosophers. They are all condemned as dangerously mistaken. What are these myths? Why are they rejected? In the works of which modern thinker did they arise? What precisely went wrong? At what stage in the development of Western thought did this happen? By tackling these questions, Pierfrancesco Basile makes it possible to grasp the main concepts of Whitehead's process metaphysics - especially the crucial notion that being and power are one and the same - and appreciate the complex way this is rooted in the modern philosophical tradition.

According to the editors of this book, “The history of philosophy as taught today is a highly selective activity. In its determination to tell a particular story, it passes over in silence large swathes of otherwise interesting philosophical work”. This claim would have been worthy of serious consideration had it been made a few decades ago—that is to say, at a time when analytic philosophy was a clearly recognizable philosophical movement. The “particular story” according to which the works of the British idealists were allegedly sacrificed would then have been easily identified as the story of how the young Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore showed the absurdity involved in holding that...

What is consciousness? What is the place of consciousness in nature? These and related questions occupy a prominent place in contemporary studies in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, often involving complex interdisciplinary connections between philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, biology and cognitive neuroscience. At the same time, these questions play a fundamental role in the philosophies of great thinkers of the past such as, among others, Plotinus, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, William James and Edmund Husserl. This new collection of essays by leading contemporary philosophers of mind and historians of philosophy seeks to address these questions from both a systematic and a theoretical perspective and to create a new and fruitful forum for future discussion. In the attempt to do justice to the richness of our mental life, the volume features in-depth examinations not solely of mainstream physicalist doctrines, but also of largely neglected positions such as Cartesian dualism, idealism and panpsychism.

In this Festschrift honoring the work of Timothy L. S. Sprigge, Sprigge summarizes his philosophy (a synthesis of absolute idealism, panpsychism, and utilitarianism), defends his position against criticism raised by philosophers in the preceding chapters of this volume, and offers in an addendum a proof for the existence of the Absolute, namely, a final and all-embracing Consciousness akin in many ways to Spinoza’s God. This defense of his philosophy consists mainly of responses to various points of criticism raised about his view of time, the relation between his metaphysics and ethics, panpsychism, the Absolute, and animal rights.

Whitehead's system may be interpreted as a majestic attempt at recasting Leibniz's theory of monads in terms of sounder ontological categories. After a brief introductory section on the sources of Whitehead's knowledge of Leibniz's philosophy, the paper explains why Whitehead turned to Leibniz for metaphysical inspiration. Attention then shifts to Whitehead's understanding of the problems involved with Leibniz's theory of monads and his alternative explanation of monadic causation. Whitehead's endeavour to install windows in Leibniz's monads may not be entirely convincing, but there are philosophical gems scattered here and there in his analyses – true moments of insight that repay close examination

Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least goodprima faciereasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the paper discusses the main difficulty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes?

It may not be easy to see what Hume, Bradley and James have in common. It is usually recognised that they are empiricist, insofar as they believed that it is experience which furnishes us with all the materials for thinking. Nonetheless, there are many other philosophers which are empiricist in this sense, and Hume is commonly referred to as a ‘sceptic’, Bradley as an ‘idealist’, and only James as a ‘radical empiricist’. Hence I need to provide some justification for putting them under the same one label of ‘Radical Empiricism’.

This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate version of the theory ever produced. Once the logical structure of the composition problem has been clarified, however, it becomes possible to see that—contrary to what has been argued by David Ray Griffin in his important book, Unsnarling the World-Knot—even Whitehead’sversion of the doctrine fails to provide a satisfactory solution. The paper is brought to an end with a general reflection on the shortcomings of current critiques of panpsychism. Whitehead’s panexperientialism cannot be accepted as it stands and panpsychism as a general philosophical position is not supported by a conclusive proof; nevertheless, the notion that experience is a pervasive feature of reality has the unquestionable merit of being a wholly adequate response to a real philosophical perplexity

Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but an eternally active, self-actualizing creative power. Eventually, Spinoza the Monist and Russell the Pluralist are at one in holding that process and activity rather than enduring things are the most fundamental realities

Bradley believes that the metaphysician’s dream of contemplating reality sub specie aeternitatis cannot be fulfilled. The theory of thought put forward in The Principles of Logic provides him with a basis for arguing that human understanding is inadequate to the task of grasping the ultimate truth about what there is. His position is far from being a sceptical one, however, and he argues that we can rise up to an imperfect knowledge of the nature of reality. ‘I am so bold as to believe that we have knowledge of the Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete’. Among the most important things we know, are the following. They are all centred upon the distinction between appearance and reality