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1IntuitionismIn Hugh LaFollette & Ingmar Persson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Blackwell. pp. 287-310. 2013.What makes an action morally obligatory, the one that we are morally required to do? Different moral theories give different answers to this question. The simplest answer would be that just one consideration is relevant to the rightness of an action. Act‐consequentialism (which we will refer to as “consequentialism,” unless otherwise indicated) is a popular and influential theory that claims just this. On this view, the only morally relevant consideration is the effect an action will have on the…Read more
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1Holism about valueIn Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism, Routledge. pp. 166--184. 2008.
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4Decision Theory and Degree of BeliefIn Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains sections titled: The Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern Rational Choice Theory Prescription and Description Ramsey's Theory Dutch Books and the Epistemic Objection Savage's Theory What is Preference and Why is it More Basic than Qualitative Probability? Context Freedom and the Transitivity of Preference The Causal Independence of Acts and Events The Constant Act Problem Allais's and Ellsberg's Examples Conclusion.
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6Davidson's Measurement‐Theoretic AnalogyIn Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 2013.Donald Davidson is famous for, among other things, his theory of radical interpretation – an account of how it is that we can attribute meanings to people's words, and contents to their mental states, based on an apparent paucity of evidence. This account is infused with ideas from, and applications of, the general theory of measurement, as well as one specific instance of that theory – decision theory. In addition, however, Davidson also applies measurement theory – in the form of his “measurem…Read more
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62Radical Interpretation and Logical PluralismTopoi 38 (2): 277-289. 2019.I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that…Read more
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44Book ReviewsJ. David Velleman,. The Possibility of Practical Reason.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. viii+302. $65.00 ; $19.95 (review)Ethics 113 (2): 450-455. 2003.
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29Naturalism And Normativity: Reply to McNaughton and RawlingProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1): 187-203. 2004.McNaughton and Rawling's anti-reductionist intentions are to be welcomed, but are not well served by their continuing adherence to a neo-Humean notion of the 'descriptive'. Their too-willing acceptance of this notion is reflected in a denial of appropriate dialectical weight to considerations about the way 'pattern' disappears from the domain of value when we try to characterize the constituent features of the latter in non-evaluative terms. The need for a satisfactory account of the immanence o…Read more
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172Naturalism and NormativityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1). 2003.Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We (like perhaps Derek Parfit) hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappr…Read more
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Benefits, holism, and the aggregation of valueIn Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Utilitarianism: the aggregation question, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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54Blameworthiness and DependencePhilosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 110-124. 2024.Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the a…Read more
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211Reason to Feel GuiltyIn Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-36. 2022.Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. We also advance a third thesis connecting desert of feeling guilty with the fitti…Read more
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298True BlameAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3): 736-749. 2023.1. We sometimes angrily confront, pointedly ostracize, castigate, or denounce those whom we think have committed moral offences. Conduct of this kind may be called blaming behaviour. When genuine,...
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15Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations (review)Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184): 390-393. 1996.
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20The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Philosophy (edited book)Routledge. 2018.The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Philosophy presents the first comprehensive, state of the art overview of the complex relationship between the field of translation studies and the study of philosophy. The book is divided into four sections covering discussions of canonical philosophers, central themes in translation studies from a philosophical perspective, case studies of how philosophy has been translated and illustrations of new developments. With twenty-nine chapters written by int…Read more
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117Contours of the PracticalIn David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 240. 2013.
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23Robust Realisms and RealitiesInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (1): 103-114. 1999.
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52ParticularismIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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114Deontology and valueRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 197-208. 2000.Integration and coherence are central values in human existence. It would be a serious objection to any proposed way of life that it led to us being alienated or cut off from others or from some importan part of ourselves. Morality, with the strenuous demands it makes on us, is one area in which alienation is both particularly threatening and peculiarly undesirable. If morality cuts us off from some important part of ourselves then it appears unattractive, and if it cuts us off from others then …Read more
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Vaughn R. McKim and Stephen P. Turner, eds., Causality in Crisis? Statistical Methods and the Search for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences Reviewed by (review)Philosophy in Review 19 (2): 127-129. 1999.
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277Achievement, welfare and consequentialismAnalysis 61 (2). 2001.significant role for accomplishment thereby admits a ‘Trojan Horse’ (267).1 To abandon hedonism in favour of a conception of well-being that incorporates achievement is to take the first step down a slippery slope toward the collapse of the other two pillars of utilitarian morality: welfarism and consequentialism. We shall argue that Crisp’s arguments do not support these conclusions. We begin with welfarism. Crisp defines it thus: ‘Well-being is the only value. Everything good must be good for …Read more
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87Reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence: The case of the bayesian jurorTopoi 18 (2): 117-126. 1999.There is a substantial literature on the Bayesian approach, and the application of Bayes'' theorem, to legal matters. However, I have found no discussion that explores fully the issue of how a Bayesian juror might be led from an initial "presumption of innocence" to the judgment (required for conviction in criminal cases) that the suspect is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". I shall argue here that a Bayesian juror, if she acts in accord with what the law prescribes, will virtually never reach…Read more
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85The Oxford handbook of rationality (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2004.Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers…Read more
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44I—David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Descriptivism, Normativity and the Metaphysics of ReasonsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 23-45. 2003.Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of no…Read more
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225Can Scanlon avoid redundancy by passing the buck?Analysis 63 (4). 2003.Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness by adopting a buck-passing account of …Read more
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32The exchange paradox, finite additivity, and the principle of dominancePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 71 49-76. 2000.
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