R. Austin Kippes

The contemporary debate between ideal theory and nonideal theories of justice (largely) centers on the extent to which political methodologies should be influenced by social and political practices. Whereas ideal theorists most often ground their principles of justice in an ahistorical and transcendent methodology, nonideal theorists methodologically determine the principles of justice in light of (1) the institutions and practices which condition the possibilities of political agents and/or (2) historical injustices and the conditions that manifest them. My dissertation engages in this debate by criticizing the presupposed relationship between theory and practice within each camp. By demonstrating the extent to which (i) all ideals and principles of justice are conditioned by social and political practices, and that (ii) their practice-conditioned normativity depends on the presupposition that these ideals and principles must extend beyond these same social and political practices, I argue that the normative nature of political philosophy is simultaneously situated and utopian. This means that we ought to understand the relationship between theory and practice as dialectically constituted.

This paper criticises the two prominent interpretations of utopianism in Plato's Republic. The traditional argues that it is mere utopianism, seriously proposing that Kallipolis is, in fact, the ideal city. The ironic argues that the Republic is a critique of the ability for reason to reconstruct human nature and is, therefore, a dire warning against utopian thinking in politics. I oppose these two interpretations and instead argue that the Republic implies a paradoxical necessity in the nature of utopianism: The ideal cannot be theorised without itself being conditioned by the politics of theorising, and yet the politics of theorising is immanently motivated by the ideal. I locate this seemingly antonymic dynamic within the education of the learner/citizen in the Republic. Although this is centred on the notion of self-governance, it cannot be imposed and instead depends on the philosophical development of one's soul that is inextricably linked to justice in the city. Therefore, the utopianism of the Republic ought to be thought of as dialectical, being simultaneously situated and yet normatively transcending.