Rafael Ferber

This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” is published, along with some comments.

In the extensive literature on Plato's “unwritten doctrine” there is still no treatise on the question: Why did Plato not write the “unwritten doctrine”? The present study presents this and can also be read as an introduction to Plato's unwritten philosophy. Drawing on analyses of the decisive passages from the Platonic dialogues,as well as the Seventh Letter, it argues that Plato did not publish the “unwritten doctrine” in writing not only because of the inadequate reception conditions of unprepared readers, but also because he did not claim to have a definitive knowledge of the principles and also therefore could not fix them in writing for the public once and for all.

This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” is published, along with some comments.

This contribution begins by analysing the argument against conceptualism in the Parmenides and then extends it to “the not-being” (to mê on) in the Sophist, or that which “is what is not” (258c2-3). It concludes with the puzzle that, in this case, the being of “the not-being” also has “understanding (nous), life (zôê) and soul (psychê)” (249a9). The main new points are (1) if “the not-being” has understanding (nous), “the not-being” –according to the ontological argument of the Parmenides – also has thought (noêma), which has a second “not-being” as its object and (2) the question of wether Plato would have interpreted Fragment 3 of Parmenides, to gar auto estin noein te kai einai, not only in the sense that thinking implies being, but also in the sense that being implies thinking.

The article uses Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s fundamental paradox, as a thought model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate (I) Zeno’s fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then (II) I construct a mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible (III) to copy the solutions to the fundamental paradox on the mind-body paradox. Three of them fail. But (IV) one of them – the Aristotelian one – gives us an interesting hint. Finally (V), this hint is pursued somewhat further and (VI), through comparison with Zeno’s fundamental paradox, the impossibility of a solution to the mind-body problem is shown again. The main new point of this article is the comparison of the mind-body problem with Zeno’s fundamental paradox.

The paper gives (I) a short introduction to Aristotle’s theory of the soul in distinction to Plato’s and tries again (II) to answer the question of whether the individual or the general active mind of human beings is immortal by interpreting “When separated (χωρισθεìς)” (de An. III, 5, 430a22) as the decisive argument for the latter view. This strategy of limiting the question has the advantage of avoiding the probably undecidable question of whether this active νοῦς is human or divine. The paper closes with an outlook (III) on the Christian belief in the resurrection of body and soul in a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικóν) (1 Corinthians: 15, 44) by accentuating the ethical aspect of the belief in individual immortality as a “need of reason” (Vernunftbedürfnis) (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, A 256–258).

This is the shortened version of a paper given at the XI Symposium Platonicum, held in Brasilia, July 4th to 8th 2016. It deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images, but that “consistency [of the logoi] should suffice for truth” (‘the non-standard interpretation’). (b) The non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus. (c) There is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.

What distinguishes the Platonic Socrates of the early from the Platonic Socrates of the middle Platonic dialogues? According to a well-known opinion, the “dividing line” lies in the difference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Socrates of the early dialogues, all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the middle dialogues, there are good-independent desires. The paper argues first (I), that this “dividing line” is blurred in the “Symposium” and second (II), that we have in the “Symposium” a more distinctive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty. This introduction of separate ideas and the lack of (noetic) understanding of separate ideas – here the idea of beauty – may indicate the limit not only of the Platonic Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues, but of the historical Socrates as well.

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" (R.509b8) has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We hereby make three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, showing that self-predication of the form of the Good, or of any form, is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an “ens imaginarium” and a “chimaera” to Plato’s Idea of the Good.

This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” is published, along with some comments.

In this I draw attention to the strangeness (atopia) that Plato’s Republic has not only for Plato’s contemporaries, but also for us. This strangeness for us consists of the fact that Plato’s Republic does not allow for a plurality of philosophical opinions, but enforces one true philosophy (philosophia alêthê) or one conception of the Good to all citizens. The platonic Republic describes not only a state, but also a kind of pre-Christian church. Second, I emphasize that the Socratic principle in which every soul does everything for the Good (panta prattei) can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualiste Socrates for whom irrational desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. Third, I discuss the laughter after Socrates’ claim that the Good is even “beyond being”. Who here is laughing about whom, Glaucon about Socrates, or Socrates about Glaucon, or perhaps Plato about himself?

What did the early Greek philosophers think about animals and their lives? How did they view plants? And, ultimately, what type of relationship did they envisage between all sorts of living beings? On these topics there is evidence of a prolonged investigation by several Presocratics. However, scholarship has paid little attention to these issues and to the surprisingly "modern" development they received in Presocratics' doctrines. This book fills this lacuna through a detailed (and largely unprecedented) analysis of the extant evidence. The volume includes also the first extensive collection of the ancient sources pertaining to living beings and life in early Greek philosophy, organized chronologically and thematically.