Rafaela Hillerbrand

This article introduces Designing for Care (D4C), a distinctive approach to project management and technological design informed by Care Ethics. We propose to conceptualize “care” as both the foundational value of D4C and as its guiding mid-level principle. As a value, care provides moral grounding. As a principle, it equips D4C with moral guidance to enact a caring process. The latter is made of a set of concrete, and often recursive, caring practices. One of the key assumption of D4C is a relational ontology of individual and group identities, which fosters the actualization of caring practices as essentially relational and (often) reciprocal. Moreover, D4C adopts the “ecological turn” in CE and stresses the ecological situatedness and impact of concrete projects, envisioning an extension of caring from intra-species to inter-species relations. We argue that care and caring can influence directly some of the phases and practices within the management of (energy) projects and the design of sociotechnical (energy) artefacts and systems. When issues related to “value change” emerge as problematic (e.g., values trade-offs, conflicts), the mid-level guiding principle of care helps evaluate and prioritize different values at stake within specific projects. Although there may be several actors and stakeholders involved in project management and technological design, here we will focus on the professionals in charge of imagining, designing, and carrying out these processes (i.e., project managers, designers, engineers). We suggest that adopting D4C would improve their ability to capture and assess stakeholders’ values, critically reflect on and evaluate their own values, and judge which values prioritize. Although D4C may be adaptable to different fields and design contexts, we recommend its use especially within small and medium-scale (energy) projects. To show the benefits of adopting it, we envisage the application of D4C within the project management and the technological design of a community battery. The adoption of D4C can have multiple positive effects: transforming the mentality and practice of managing a project and designing technologies; enhancing caring relationships between managers, designers, and users as well as among users; achieving better communication, more inclusive participation, and more just decision-making. This is an initial attempt to articulate the structure and the procedural character of D4C. The application of D4C in a concrete project is needed to assess its actual impact, benefits, and limitations.

At its inception, geoethics was envisioned as a type of professional ethics concerned with the moral implications of geoscientific research, applications, and practices. More recently, however, some scholars have proposed versions of geoethics as public and global ethics. To better understand these developments, this article considers the relationship between geoethics and environmental ethics by exploring different aspects of the human-nature relation (i.e., the moral status and role of humans in relation to the non-human world). We start by noting that the main strains of geoethical thought elaborated so far represent examples of environmental virtue ethics and defend moral weak anthropocentric positions (e.g., “ethical”, “responsible” or “enlightened” anthropocentrism). Some scholars propose that such weak anthropocentric geoethics can synthesize the different positions in environmental ethics and move beyond them toward a novel and distinct approach. We compare the meaning and the use of the term “anthropocentrism” in both environmental ethics and geoethics, stressing that although geoethics is inevitably epistemically anthropocentric (i.e., anthropogenic), it does not need to be morally anthropocentric. We consider the compatibility of non-anthropocentric stances with current geoethical theory and argue for the integration of normative non-anthropocentric accounts (e.g., ecocentric) into geoethical debates and geoscience education.

Am Beispiel von Indikatoren für nachhaltige Energiesysteme zeigt dieser Artikel die Notwendigkeit von zwei Wendungen in der indikatorengestützten Entscheidungsfindung heraus: Zum einen eine individualistische Wendung, zum anderen eine kontext-sensitive Wendung. Dabei ist der Begriff der Wendung hier nicht als Kehrt- oder gar Abwendung zu verstehen, sondern als Korrektiv im Sinne einer stärkeren Hinwendung. Indikatoren liefern zwar wertvolle Informationen, sowohl für die politische (etwa Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie – ja oder nein?), als auch für die individuelle Entscheidungsfindung (welche Waschmaschine kaufe ich?). Dieser Beitrag zeigt allerdings auf, dass die Konsequenzen einer zu starken Generalisierung und die Vernachlässigung individueller und kontext-sensitiver Aspekte dem ursprünglichen Anliegen, Nachhaltigkeit zu fördern oder auch nur messbar zu machen, entgegenstehen.

For implementing ethics in AI technology, there are at least two major ethical challenges. First, there are various competing AI ethics guidelines and consequently there is a need for a systematic overview of the relevant values that should be considered. Second, if the relevant values have been identified, there is a need for an indicator system that helps assessing if certain design features are positively or negatively affecting their implementation. This indicator system will vary with regard to specific forms of AI technology. An adequate indicator system for the ethical development of recommendation algorithms, for example, will diverge considerably from another for autonomous road vehicles, although both are based on shared values. In this contribution, we propose solutions to both challenges with regard to the special case of the development of an AI-assisted rescue robot.

Im Jahr 2012 veröffentlichte das Wirtschaftsmagazin The Economist eine Ausgabe mit dem Schwerpunktthema »The third industrial revolution«. Auf dem Cover der Zeitschrift ist ein Mann vor einem Personal Computer zu sehen, der nahtlos in eine Fabrik übergeht, aus der verschiedene Produkte hervorspringen. Dieses Bild fasst wie in einem Brennglas zwei Erwartungsmuster zusammen, welche den Diskurs um die Zukunft der Produktion prägen: nämlich zum einen die Verschmelzung von digitaler Informationsverarbeitung mit stofflicher Herstellung und zum anderen die Personalisierung und Dezentralisierung der Fertigungstechnik.

Technikethik befasst sich mit dem richtigen Umgang mit Technik; sie fragt danach, wie aus ethischer Sicht die Folgen und Nebenfolgen für Mensch und Natur sowohl heute als auch in Zukunft zu bewerten sind. Um wirkkräftig zu sein, müssen diese Fragen zur Technik auf verschiedenen Ebenen gestellt werden: Von der gesetzlichen Ebene, die z. B. Treibhausgasemissionen begrenzt, über Regulierungen in Form von Normen zur Nachhaltigkeitsbewertung, bis hin zur Ingenieursethik, die nach dem richtigen Verhalten in der ingenieurswissenschaftlichen Praxis fragt. Dies ist u. a. gerade deswegen von zentraler Bedeutung, da oftmals nur die Ingenieurin als Entwicklerin und Gestalterin von Technik in der Lage ist, die Folgen und Nebenfolgen ihres Handelns antizipierend mitzudenken.

Bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts war die philosophische Ethik neben Vertragstheorien geprägt von zwei ethischen Theoriefamilien: der deontologischen Ethik und dem Konsequentialismus, Letzter vor allem in Form des Utilitarismus. Diese beiden Ethiktheorien scheinen in vielerlei Hinsicht diametral entgegengesetzt zu sein, etwa wenn die moralische Korrektheit einer Handlung entweder an ihren Folgen oder in Übereinstimmung mit einem allgemeinen moralischen Gesetz bemessen wird. Dennoch sind es in beiden Theorien die Handlungen, die bewertet werden.

Technikethik, wie sie in diesem Handbuch verstanden wird, zielt primär darauf, durch ethische Reflexion zu ›richtigen‹ Entscheidungen in der Sache beizutragen, also in der Gestaltung und Nutzung von Technik und zum Umgang mit ihren Folgen. Technik wird als embedded technology von Beginn an in einem gesellschaftlichen Kontext gesehen, in dem bereits von ersten Designüberlegungen über die Produktion, Nutzung bis zur Entsorgung jeweils Entscheidungen zu treffen sind, die eine moralische Dimension haben und damit einer ethischen Reflexion offenstehen oder sie sogar verlangen. In der Technikethik geht es primär um ›politikpflichtige‹ Elemente an Technik wie z. B. Sicherheit- und Umweltstandards, den Schutz der Bürger vor Eingriffen in Bürgerrechte, Prioritätensetzung in der Forschungspolitik, die Gestaltung von Rahmenbedingungen für Innovation etc., so wie sie hier verstanden wird.

Some risks have extremely high stakes. For example, a worldwide pandemic or asteroid impact could potentially kill more than a billion people. Comfortingly, scientific calculations often put very low probabilities on the occurrence of such catastrophes. In this paper, we argue that there are important new methodological problems which arise when assessing global catastrophic risks and we focus on a problem regarding probability estimation. When an expert provides a calculation of the probability of an outcome, they are really providing the probability of the outcome occurring, given that their argument is watertight. However, their argument may fail for a number of reasons such as a flaw in the underlying theory, a flaw in the modeling of the problem, or a mistake in the calculations. If the probability estimate given by an argument is dwarfed by the chance that the argument itself is flawed, then the estimate is suspect. We develop this idea formally, explaining how it differs from the related distinctions of model and parameter uncertainty. Using the risk estimates from the Large Hadron Collider as a test case, we show how serious the problem can be when it comes to catastrophic risks and how best to address it.

Climatologists have recently introduced a distinction between projections as scenario-based model results on the one hand and predictions on the other hand. The interpretation and usage of both terms is, however, not univocal. It is stated that the ambiguities of the interpretations may cause problems in the communication of climate science within the scientific community and to the public realm. This paper suggests an account of scenarios as props in games of make-belive. With this account, we explain the difference between projections that should be make-believed and other model results that should be believed.

Designing complex products involves working with uncertainties as the product, the requirements and the environment in which it is used co-evolve, and designers and external stakeholders make decisions that affect the evolving design. Rather than being held back by uncertainty, designers work, cooperate and communicate with each other notwithstanding these uncertainties by making assumptions to carry out their own tasks. To explain this, the paper proposes an adaptation of Kendall Walton’s make-believe theory to conceptualise designing as playing games of make-believe by inferring what is required and imagining what is possible given the current set of assumptions and decisions, while knowing these are subject to change. What one is allowed and encouraged to imagine, conclude or propose is governed by socially agreed rules and constraints. The paper uses jet engine component design as an example to illustrate how different design teams make assumptions at the beginning of design activities and negotiate what can and cannot be done with the design. This often involves iteration – repeating activities under revised sets of assumptions. As assumptions are collectively revised, they become part of a new game of make-believe in the sense that there is social agreement that the decisions constitute part of the constraints that govern what can legitimately be inferred about the design or added to it.

In the applied sciences and in engineering there is often a significant overlap between work at universities and in industry. For the individual scholar, this may lead to serious conflicts when working on joint university–industry projects. Differences in goals, such as the university’s aim to disseminate knowledge while industry aims to appropriate knowledge, might lead to complicated situations and conflicts of interest. The detailed cases of two electrical engineers and two architects working at two different universities of technology illustrate the kinds of problems individual scholars face in university–business collaborations. These cases are based on qualitative interviews and additional data and demonstrate that, while value conflicts emerge on the organizational level, it is primarily the individual researcher who must deal with such conflicts. This analysis adds to existing studies in two ways: first, it explicitly addresses normative issues framed in terms of ethical and social values, thereby going beyond the common social-science perspective of university–business collaboration. Secondly, it provides qualitative insights, thereby identifying details and issues not apparent in quantitative studies. In particular, it is evident that university–industry collaborations are prone to value conflicts not only in research but also in education and job training.

In recent years, computational sciences such as computational hydrodynamics or computational field theory have supplemented theoretical and experimental investigations in many scientific fields. Often, there is a seemingly fruitful overlap between theory, experiment, and numerics. The computational sciences are highly dynamic and seem a fairly successful endeavor---at least if success is measured in terms of publications or engineering applications. However, for theories, success in application and correctness are two very different things; and just the same may hold for "methodologies" like computer simulations. A lively debate on the epistemic status of computer simulations has thus emerged within the philosophy of science. This paper discusses possible problems when computer simulation and laboratory experiment are intertwined. In present experiments, stochastic methods in the form of Monte Carlo simulations are often involved in generating experimental data. It is questioned as to how far a realistic stance can be maintained when such stochastic elements are involved. Taking experiments in high energy physics as a study case, this paper contends that using these types of entangled material and numerical experiments as a source of new phenomena or for theory testing must presuppose a certain understanding of causality and thus binds us at least to a weak form of realism

In the applied sciences and in engineering there is often a significant overlap between work at universities and in industry. For the individual scholar, this may lead to serious conflicts when working on joint university–industry projects. Differences in goals, such as the university’s aim to disseminate knowledge while industry aims to appropriate knowledge, might lead to complicated situations and conflicts of interest. The detailed cases of two electrical engineers and two architects working at two different universities of technology illustrate the kinds of problems individual scholars face in university–business collaborations. These cases are based on qualitative interviews and additional data and demonstrate that, while value conflicts emerge on the organizational level, it is primarily the individual researcher who must deal with such conflicts. This analysis adds to existing studies in two ways: first, it explicitly addresses normative issues framed in terms of ethical and social values, thereby going beyond the common social-science perspective of university–business collaboration. Secondly, it provides qualitative insights, thereby identifying details and issues not apparent in quantitative studies. In particular, it is evident that university–industry collaborations are prone to value conflicts not only in research but also in education and job training.

This paper aims to show that modeling complex systems inevitably involves non-propositional knowledge and thus the uncertainties associated with the corresponding model predictions cannot be fully quantified. This is exemplified by means of the climate system and climate modeling. The climate system is considered as a paradigm for a complex system, whereby the notion of complexity adopted in this paper is epistemic in nature and does not equate with the technical definition of a complex system as for example used within physics or complexity theory. The epistemic notion of complexity allows to view the climate system as complex with respect to some features, while simple with respect to others. This distinction is of practical significance for political decision making as it allows to treat some climate predictions as (fairly) certain, while acknowledging high uncertainties with others.

Between the fourth and the recent fifth IPCC report, science as well as policy making have made great advances in dealing with uncertainties in global climate models. However, the uncertainties public decision making has to deal with go well beyond what is currently addressed by policy makers and climatologists alike. It is shown in this paper that within an anthropocentric framework, a whole hierarchy of models from various scientific disciplines is needed for political decisions as regards climate change. Via what is sometimes referred to as ‘uncertainty cascade’ in the technical literature, the uncertainties of various models accumulate in the input to political decision making. This paper aims to chart the uncertainties in the multi-disciplinary enterprise of current climate modeling in broad strokes. It is shown that the uncertainty cascade makes it impossible to quantify uncertainties in the form of probability estimates. Moreover the paper highlights how global climate models fail to provide probability estimates. A better treatment of the uncertainties of climate predictions on the political level would require an overhaul of the current IPCC practice that separates the various scientific fields in various working groups

Most scientists agree that; at least for the time being; unquantified uncertainties are inevitably connected to predictions of climate models. Uncertainties; however; do not justify political inaction. This paper addresses the question of how epistemic uncertainties are of relevance for practical decision making. It is shown how common decision approaches based on the precautionary principle fail to adequately deal with uncertainties as they arise in climate modeling. I argue that with regards to climate change; unquantified uncertainties can neither be ignored in decision making nor be reduced to quantified ones by assigning subjective probabilities. This distinguishes the ethical problems associated with climate change from other problems regarding energy supply and demand like; for example; those associated with nuclear power.

The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral theorists make sharp, binary distinctions between right and wrong acts. However, an important argument speaking in favour of our non-binary analysis is that it better reflects our considered intuitions about the ethical trade-offs we face in discussions of nuclear power. The aim of this article is to make this argument sharp by explaining how it can be rendered compatible with, and supported by, the Capability Approach, which is quickly becoming one of the most influential frameworks for thinking about human development