Rémi Zanni

Very often, whether in the media or in the activist circles, trade unionism is analyzed from a strictly political perspective and by means of strictly political concepts. This obscures the initial ambition and originality on a theoretical and practical level of French trade unionism, which found its most beautiful and memorable expression in the “Charter of Amiens”, the document then establishing its two cardinal principles. On one hand, it proclaims that the union constitutes a social organization based not on the sharing of opinions but only of similar material situations and of common interests articulated from them. On the other hand, it gives the union as a program a “double besogne” (“double task”) which aims at the same time and in the same movement at the gradual abolition of both economic exploitation and oppression, and of political domination. Contrary to the narratives that attempt to weaponize trade unionism in the service of some ideological and/or political purpose, this thesis intends to posit philosophically, almost phenomenologically, the prolegomena of an autonomous political conceptuality compatible with the syndicalist project of “emancipation intégrale” (“complete emancipation”), that is to say, a political conceptuality that does not revolve around the Idea of sovereignty. Drawing more than abundantly on Arendt’s categories, we set out to analyze the conditions of the possibility of a political action that would meet this criterion, that would not require any pre-existing political community to arise, but the mere possession of our human capacity for initiative, and to describe how we can give meaning (in relation to the concept of justice) to a world that seems at first sight to have none. Thus, we begin by showing how the condition for the emergence of a public space lies in the possibility for gathered men and women to indicate to each other the identical and simultaneous attention they pay not only to certain things external to them (works, events, concepts), but also to themselves, in regard to one another. We then describe how participants in such a public space compose a seeming truth and shared knowledge from the dissensus that is consubstantial with the distinctiveness of their own points of view, thus making sure that they share a common world. Finally, we explain how political actors can give meaning to this world, differentiate the just (what for them must-be) from the unjust (what for them must-not-be), either based on their personal tastes and opinions, or normative texts to which they agree to anchor their judgments.

If no one is surprised by its presence in the political sphere, lying is rarely a good thing and generally leads to public scandal. However, it is perhaps even more infamous when political actors, especially leaders, claim to formulate truths during their political activity. This is the hypothesis that this article aims to develop by drawing on a conceptual framework inspired by Hannah Arendt. In its first part, we explain how telling the truth and acting politically are two incompatible activities that mutually threaten each other. In the second part, we analyze: first, how truth conditions (pre-politically) politics; then, why there is a specifically political interest in the establishment and preservation of truth; finally, how political institutions can, without risking scandal or damaging the truth, satisfy this interest. Si personne ne s’étonne de sa présence dans la sphère politique, le mensonge est rarement une bonne chose et conduit généralement au scandale public. Toutefois, il est peut-être encore plus infâme que des acteurs, et a fortiori des responsables, politiques prétendent ès qualités formuler des vérités. C’est l’hypothèse que cet article entend développer en puisant dans une conceptualité d’inspiration arendtienne. Nous expliquons dans sa première partie en quoi dire la vérité et agir politiquement s’avèrent deux activités incompatibles qui se menacent mutuellement. Dans la seconde, nous analysons : d’abord, comment la vérité conditionne (prépolitiquement) le politique ; ensuite, pourquoi il existe un intérêt spécifiquement politique à l’établissement et à la sauvegarde de la vérité ; enfin, de quelle manière les institutions politiques peuvent, sans risquer le scandale ou d’abîmer la vérité, satisfaire cet intérêt.