•  301
    Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on awareness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (2): 223-239. 1974.
    BRENTANO'S CLAIMS ABOUT INTENTIONALITY DO NOT BEAR SOLELY\nON A CONCERN WITH THE POSITIVE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES.\nTHEY ALSO HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL/MATERIAL\nIDENTITY. PART OF THEIR POINT IS JUST TO OPPOSE A CERTAIN\nVIEW ABOUT THE PROPER OBJECTS OF AWARENESS, NAMELY THAT\nINSOFAR AS WE ARE AWARE OF OBJECTS THEY HAVE AN EXISTENCE\n"IN THE MIND." BOTH HUME AND DESCARTES HELD SUCH A VIEW. AN\nEXAMINATION OF THE NOTIONS OF "IDEA" AND "OBJECTIVE\nREALITY" SHOWS THE INACCURACY OF R…Read more
  •  271
    Two problems of being and nonbeing in Sartre's being and nothingness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2): 167-186. 1977.
  •  198
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    I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requi…Read more
  •  130
    Husserl and Frege on meaning
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (3): 377-383. 1974.
    Husserl's theory of meaning is often regarded as a somewhat obscure attempt at a view which frege stated more clearly. I argue that while this may be true with respect to the "ideas," it is false with respect to the "logical investigations." the theory presented in the latter work is superior to frege's theory. It provides an objective foundation for the semantical distinctions which concerned frege while remaining within the confines of an ontology that is more economical than frege's
  •  129
    Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2): 231-250. 2003.
    BRENTANO'S APPROPRIATION OF THE Scholastic notion of intentionality, and of what Brentano called "the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object," was early on exploited in a reading of Kant's theory of objects and appearances. Apparently the first systematic attempt was undertaken by Hans Vaihinger. However, Vaihinger's is radically different from more recent intentionalist readings of Kant. Albeit not in every respect, I propose that a return to this aspect of Vaihinger's approach suppor…Read more
  •  121
    Intentionality, content, and primitive mental directedness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June): 583-604. 1989.
  •  118
    The identity of thought and object in Spinoza
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (3): 271-288. 1978.
  •  107
    In the Critique of Fure Reason Kant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logical function of the understanding in judgements, introduced in the f…Read more
  •  103
    Kant’s Phenomenalism
    Idealistic Studies 5 (2): 108-126. 1975.
    I want to state as clearly as I can the sense in which Kant is, and the sense in which he is not, a phenomenalist. And I also want to state the argument which Kant presents, in the Transcendental Deduction, for his particular version of phenomenalism. Since that doctrine has been stated by Kant himself as the view that we have knowledge of “appearances” only, and not of things in themselves, or that material objects are nothing but a species of our “representations,” it will of course be part of…Read more
  •  100
    Emotions, objects and causal relations
    Philosophical Studies 26 (November): 279-285. 1974.
  •  94
    Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts
    Penn St University Press. 1976.
    This book is a critical and analytical survey of the major attempts, in modern philosophy, to deal with the phenomenon of intentionality—those of Descartes, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Russell, Bergmann, Chisholm, and Sellars. By coordinating the semantical approaches to the phenomenon, Dr. Aquila undertakes to provide a basis for dialogue among philosophers of different persuasions. "Intentionality" has become, since Franz Brentano revived its original medieval use, the standard term des…Read more
  •  72
    Causes and constituents of occurrent emotion
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October): 346-349. 1975.
  •  69
    Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2): 267-268. 2002.
    Richard E. Aquila - Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 267-268 Book Review Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge Robert Greenberg. Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 278. Cloth, $45.00. This is one of the deepest and most carefully reasoned books on Kant I have read. It is a book for the scholar of the first Critique, not the "educated layman," but i…Read more
  •  68
    It is difficult to know what sense to make of Kant’s apparent assignment, in the Critique of Pure Reason, of imagination to a kind of middle position between intuition and understanding. Kant himself appears unsure about it. Sometimes he sees imagination as responsible for one or more varieties of a sub-intellectual “synthesis” of intuitions
  •  66
    Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3): 663-675. 1991.
  •  65
    Intentionality and possible facts
    Noûs 5 (4): 411-417. 1971.
  •  60
    The singularity and the unity of transcendental consciousness in Kant
    History of European Ideas 30 (3): 349-376. 2004.
    Transcendental consciousness is described by Kant as 'the one single thing' in which 'as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered.' The unity of that subject depends on intellectual functions. I argue that its singularity is just the same as that of Kant's pre-intellectual 'form' of spatiotemporal 'intuition.' This may seem excluded by Kant's claim that it is through intellect that 'space or time are first given as intuitions.' But while preintellectual form is insuffic…Read more
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    Unity of organism, unity of thought, and the unity of the critique of judgment
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (S1): 139-155. 1992.
  •  55
    Kant and the Mind (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 28 (4): 105-107. 1996.
  •  54
    Kant’s Empirical Realism (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3): 389-390. 2003.
  •  54
    On plotinus and the "togetherness" of consciousness
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1): 7-32. 1992.