Roberto Lambertini

The present chapter investigates the use of the expression bonum commune in two political works by William of Ockham: the third part of the Dialogus and the Octo quaestiones de potestate papae. The choice of these works is motivated by the fact that they represent the final – and most mature – phase of the English Franciscan’s political reflection. Relying on the findings of previous scholarship, the author believes it is appropriate to focus on the use of the expression rather than on a determination of its meaning, which seems to be taken for granted by Ockham. The contribution highlights three main uses of the expression: (1) as a criterion for distinguishing, along the lines of Aristotle’s Politics, between upright and deviant constitutional forms; (2) as a limit to the exercise of power by a legitimate power; and (3) as “a conceptual device” that aims to relativise the conclusions of political theory (e.g., the identification of the best constitutional form), motivated by Ockham’s awareness of the intrinsic contingency and mutability of historical events. Indeed, safeguarding the common good in certain situations, according to the English Franciscan, may require a solution that deviates from the ideal paradigm. In the course of the analysis, it appears that Ockham, despite his reputation as an individualist philosopher, consistently applies the principle of the subordination of the individual good to the common good.

Enrico del Carretto was a Franciscan theologian who called himself a bachelor of theology late in life, after becoming bishop of Lucca in 1300. He was among those Friars Minor who at the same time were loyal to John XXII and firmly believed in the Franciscan doctrine of Apostolic poverty. In his written contribution to the debate about Apostolic poverty, he maintained that a religious order is not a mere collection of individuals. The introductory section of this chapter briefly explains why such a claim was essential to Enrico’s defense of the Franciscan doctrine of poverty. In the following sections I show how Enrico develops a theory of human communities for this purpose, in which he distinguishes at least three levels: (a) mere aggregation, (b) societas, and (c) collegium, ordo or civitas. On his account, the main difference between a societas and civitas consists in the existence (or absence) of power relations among the members of the communities. Interestingly enough, though he thinks the establishment of power relations relies on acts of the will, he claims that a civitas and a religious order are real beings as opposed to beings of reason.

Writing his Moralis philosophia, Roger Bacon discussed issues relevant to medieval political discourse. He felt the need to appeal to the authority of Aristotle, but having no access to Aristotle’s Politica, he tried to reconstruct its main tenets through the writings of other thinkers, such as Avicenna and Alfarabi. The result of this attempt is a sketch of a political theory that goes mainly under the name of Aristotle but has little to do with the actual contents of the Politica. In the following years, Bacon remained faithful to his first reconstruction. The author suggests that, with all probability, Bacon, never read the actual text of the Politica. the result is that Bacon’s contribution in this field was not influenced by Aristotle’s political masterpiece, but by other texts, in particular by Avicenna’s Philosophia prima. Such an assessment should not imply a negative judgement on Bacon. Rather, we should consider him among those authors who contributed to the rich diversity of medieval political thought independent of Aristotle’s Politica.

Studying Giles of Rome’s De ecclesiastica potestate, scholars usually focus their attention on the first part, where the Augustinian master argues in favor of his extreme theory of papal power. The present paper deals with the second part of the treatise, devoted to the relationship between the Church and temporal possessions. The main issues discussed in this part are therefore not political and ecclesiastical power, but ownership and poverty. The paper underlines in the first place the connection existing between Giles of Rome’s treatment of these problems and the controversy between Secular and Mendicant clergy. Although originally a mendicant friar himself, Giles tries to avoid any interpretation of mendicant proverty that could undermine the right of the Church to exercise lordship over temporal goods. In the second place, the paper shoes how Giles’ account of the origin of private poverty is functional to his claim that the Church possesses all rights on temporal goods at the highest level. In this way, the Church is the sole authority that can grant a right of property, so that every human being depends on the Church also for his legitimate possession of temporal goods.

Studying Giles of Rome’s De ecclesiastica potestate, scholars usually focus their attention on the first part, where the Augustinian master argues in favor of his extreme theory of papal power. The present paper deals with the second part of the treatise, devoted to the relationship between the Church and temporal possessions. The main issues discussed in this part are therefore not political and ecclesiastical power, but ownership and poverty. The paper underlines in the first place the connection existing between Giles of Rome’s treatment of these problems and the controversy between Secular and Mendicant clergy. Although originally a mendicant friar himself, Giles tries to avoid any interpretation of mendicant proverty that could undermine the right of the Church to exercise lordship over temporal goods. In the second place, the paper shoes how Giles’ account of the origin of private poverty is functional to his claim that the Church possesses all rights on temporal goods at the highest level. In this way, the Church is the sole authority that can grant a right of property, so that every human being depends on the Church also for his legitimate possession of temporal goods.

Nella prima parte dello studio l'A. esamina la dottrina egidiana della prudentia evidenziando i temi principali esposti nel De regimine sull'argomento, cioè la posizione della prudenza come virtù intermedia tra le virtù morali e le intellettuali, la giustificazione egidiana di tale collocamento, l'esame delle parti «integrali» e di quelle «soggettive» della prudenza. La parte finale offre un confronto fra la dottrina egidiana e le idee emergenti dagli specula principis precedenti. La posizione egidiana sul tema della prudenza risulta vicina a Tommaso e ad Aristotele, ma non manca di aspetti originali, in particolare rispetto al ruolo della prudenza come virtù per eccellenza del sovrano che, afferma l'A., «introduce un'accentuazione pratico-politica in un contesto che, negli specula precedenti, era aperto ad una pluralità di connotazioni, da quelle della sapientia di stampo biblico, a quelle più espressamente filosofiche, a quelle connesse con la tematica del rex iustus»

Nella prima parte l'A. individua la presenza dell'Etica Nicomachea nel De regimine principum di Egidio. Nella seconda parte esamina le possibili mediazioni nella ricezione egidiana dell'Etica. Nella terza parte offre alcuni esempi dell'influenza dottrinale dell'Aquinate nella classificazione delle virtù, nella loro connessione e nel rapporto tra magnanimità e umiltà. Nell'ultima sezione esamina il modo in cui Egidio, pur avendo presenti le proposte dell'Aquinate, segua una linea di pensiero originale, in particolare nel modo in cui inserisce nel suo specchio della virtù del principe, ispirato ad Aristotele, la virtù dell'umiltà

Nella prima parte del lavoro l'A. rintraccia le parti della Politica che vengono impiegate nel terzo libro del De regimine nonché il contesto e le funzioni della loro utilizzazione. Nella seconda parte esamina il ruolo di mediazione che la Sententia libri Politicorum di Tommaso d'Aquino svolse nella ricezione egidiana della Politica, l'influenza esercitata dal De regno di Tommaso nella ricostruzione egidiana del profilo del governo e del principe ideale, e infine la questione dei rapporti del De regimine con il commento e le questioni sulla Politica di Pietro di Alvernia. Nell'ultima parte del lavoro l'A. analizza l'uso che Egidio fa di riferimenti alla Politica nell'elaborare alcune sue tesi, ovvero l'origine e la classificazione delle comunità umane, la visione della monarchia come migliore forma di governo, la reinterpretazione della visione politica platonica, la questione della successione ereditaria del potere e infine il rapporto tra il re e la legge. Nella conclusione l'A. sottolinea l'autonomia egidiana nella lettura della Politica

Gerald Odonis and Francis of Marchia, both Franciscan masters of theology active in the early fourteenth century, played an important role in the controversies that split the Franciscan Order as a result of Pope John XXII's decisions concerning the theory of religious poverty. They fought on opposite fronts: Odonis was elected Minister General after the deposition of Michael of Cesena, whom Francis supported in the struggle against the pope. This paper reconstructs the different stages at which Francis became a target of Odonis' repressive actions against his dissident former confreres, from the first mention of Francis' name in the lists of rebels to the letter Quid niteris, where Odonis reproaches Francis for his purported violations of the Franciscan Rule. Odonis most probably intentionally avoided entering the slippery ground of the poverty controversy and preferred attacking Francis on ecclesio-political issues.

It is well known that Francis of Marchia and William of Ockham joined Michael of Cesena's rebellion against the pope, together escaping from Avignon and signing documents supporting Cesena's defence of Franciscan poverty. The relationship between the works of the two thinkers, on the other hand, is the subject of ongoing investigation. After discussing Francis' rejection in his Commentary on the Sentences of Ockham's theory of quantity, this paper shows how Francis' Improbatio became a source for Ockham's Opus Nonaginta Dierum. Building on Offler's ground-breaking critical edition of the latter work, it is argued that Ockham made extensive use of Francis' Improbatio, even though on several points he felt it necessary to reformulate the arguments of his confrère or even to substantially modify his positions. The two Franciscan theologians differed deeply both in their basic philosophical commitments and in their methodological attitude. These differences emerged even when they were—so to speak—fighting on the same front.