Roe Fremstedal

In this book, Roberto Di Ceglie offers an historical, theological, and epistemological investigation exploring how commitments to God and/or the good generate the optimum condition to achieve knowledge. Di Ceglie criticizes the common belief that to attain knowledge, one must always be ready to replace one's convictions with beliefs that appear to be proven. He defends a more comprehensive view, historically exemplified by outstanding Christian thinkers, whereby believers are expected to commit themselves to God and to related beliefs no matter how convincing the evidence contradicting such beliefs appear to be. He also argues that both believers and unbelievers can commit themselves to God and the good, respectively, thereby creating a spiritual turn in epistemology that enables them to generate the best possible condition for conducting rational enquiries and discussion.

The long review essays guides through Habermass large work Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. After a thorough summary it discusses his concept of the history of philosophy (with its links to social and political history as well as its supposed progress structure), the theory of the three paradigms of objectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, the criticism of metaphysics, and the shortcomings of his concept of religion. It then discusses his concrete interpretation of the history of thought and points to numerous factual errors. Finally, it situates Habermass approach historically and shows its connections to Comtes sociology.Jürgen Habermas: Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. Bd. 1: Die okzidentale Konstellation von Glauben und Wissen, Bd. 2: Vernünftige Freiheit. Spuren des Diskurses über Glauben und Wissen. Frankfurt a. M. 2019: Suhrkamp. 918 u. 820 S.

I raise a problem about the possibility of metaphysics originally due to Kant: what explains the fact that the terms in our metaphysical theories (e.g., ‘property’, ‘grounding’) refer to entities and structures (e.g., properties, grounding) in the world? I distinguish a meta-metaphysical view that can easily answer such questions (‘deflationism’) from a meta-metaphysical view for which this explanatory task is more difficult (which I call the ‘substantive’ view of metaphysics). I then canvass responses that the substantive metaphysician can give to this Kantian demand for an explanation of reference in metaphysics. I argue that these responses are either inadequate or depend, implicitly or explicitly, on the idea of ‘joint carving’: carving at the joints is part of the explanation of referencefacts quite generally and our metaphysical terms in particular refer because they carve at the joints. I examine Ted Sider's recent work on joint carving and structure and argue that it cannot fill the explanatory gap. I conclude that this is reason ceterus paribus to reject the substantive view of metaphysics. Kant's critique, far from being obsolete, applies to the most cutting-edge of contemporary meta-metaphysical views.

This volume provides a comprehensive account of Friedrich Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion. The contributors cover the historical context of Schleiermacher's work, specific aspects of his philosophy of religion, and the ways that his work can contribute to contemporary debates. Friedrich Schleiermacher is considered one of the outstanding representatives of 19th-century Protestant theology. This volume brings together scholars from both continental and analytic traditions to explore Schleiermacher's preeminent role in post-Kantian philosophy of religion. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. The first section situates Schleiermacher in the context of the 19th-century philosophy of religion. These chapters analyse his relation to thinkers such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, as well as to prominent theologians in the Protestant and Catholic traditions. The second section explores different aspects of Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion such as absolute dependence or religious feelings. Finally, section three addresses how Schleiermacher's insights can contribute to contemporary philosophy of religion. These chapters address current debates, particularly on religious experience, feminism, and philosophy of emotions. Friedrich Schleiermacher's Philosophy of Religion will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, and 19th-century religious thought.

As Socrates famously noted, there is no more important question than how we ought to live. The answer to this question depends on how the reasons that we have for living in various different ways combine and compete. To illustrate, suppose that I've just received a substantial raise. What should I do with the extra money? I have most moral reason to donate it to effective charities but most self-interested reason to spend it on luxuries for myself. So, whether I should live my life as I have most moral reason to live it or as I have most self-interested reason to live it depends on how these and other sorts of reasons combine and compete to determine what I have most reason to do, all things considered. This Element seeks to figure out how different sorts of reasons combine and compete to determine how we ought to live.

I focus here on the teleological suspension of the ethical as it appears in Fear and Trembling. A common reading of Fear and Trembling is that it explores whether there are religious reasons for action that settle that one must do an action even when all the moral reasons for action tell against doing it. This interpretation has been contested. But I defend it by showing how the explicit teleological suspension of the ethical mirrors implicit teleological suspensions of the epistemological and prudential, and by articulating how it might be necessary for God to suspend the ethical in order to forgive us for our wrongdoings to others. I also discuss whether God’s commands are implicitly conditional, whether religious reasons to act, believe, and forgive are in each case grounded in divine commands, and what role love plays in each type of teleological suspension.

I argue that Kierkegaard has an account of thought experiment. While his contemporary Ørsted’s contributions to the early history of the concept of ‘thought experiment’ have been recently acknowledged, Kierkegaard’s contributions remain largely unrecognized. I argue that Kierkegaard’s method of ‘imaginary construction’ [Tanke-Experiment] aims at identifying underlying invariants in objects of experience. I outline similarities between Ørsted’s pursuit of invariants in the sciences and Kierkegaard’s fictional variations in Repetition. One implication is that Kierkegaard’s view is more scientific and methodological than is standardly thought by Kierkegaard scholars, who more commonly treat imaginary construction as a literary device. A further implication is that Kierkegaard, like Ørsted, is interested in the success or failure of mental acts, rather than (or in addition to) practical action, as is more standardly associated with Kierkegaard. One original development, beyond what Kierkegaard inherits from Ørsted, is the role of thought experiments as exceptions. An exception is a case that falls outside a rule without breaking it. Exceptions can neither establish a rule nor refute its necessity; however, they turn attention to relevant principles and further determine their content. I highlight similarities between Ørsted’s account of thought experiments and Kierkegaard’s as a method of variation.

This essay argues for a new conception of bad faith based partly on Harry Frankfurt's famous account of personal autonomy in terms of higher‐order volitions and caring, and based partly on Sartre's insights concerning tacit or pre‐thetic attitudes and “transcendent” freedom. Although Sartre and Frankfurt have rarely been connected, Frankfurt's concepts of volitional “wantonness” and “bullshit” (wantonness about truth) are similar in certain revealing respects to Sartre's account of bad faith. However, Sartre leaves no room for Frankfurt's central point that people can volitionally commit themselves to develop certain motives and reduce others, thereby shaping an authentic identity through volitional “identification” and “alienation” of motives. Frankfurt in turn minimizes the role that a sense of liberty to form and alter higher‐order volitions plays in experiences of autonomy, which Sartre recognizes in the transcendence of the “for‐itself.” When these points are combined, we get a tri‐level theory of intrasubjective volitional stances that explains Sartre's cases better than his own theory can, and also clarifies how sincere or procedurally autonomous self‐relation is possible.

Kant’s “primacy of the practical” doctrine says that we can form morally justified commitments regarding what exists, even in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. In this paper I critically examine three different varieties of Kant’s “moral proof” that can be found in the critical works. My claim is that the third variety—the “moral-psychological argument” based in the need to sustain moral hope and avoid demoralization—has some intriguing advantages over the other two. It starts with a premise that more clearly coheres with Kant’s mature account of moral motivation, and it invokes plausible empirical-psychological theses to motivate a commitment to the full-blown classical deity—the result Kant clearly wanted. From the point of view of its structure, I think this third variety of moral argument also has the most by way of contemporary interest.

According to unconditional motivational internalism, there is an a priori constraint on an agent's forming a sincere moral judgement, namely that she is, at least to some minimal extent, motivated to act as it dictates. In order to undermine this internalist position, proponents of motivational externalism typically appeal to the possibility of the amoralist—i.e. an individual who makes sincere moral judgements, but who is completely unmoved to act accordingly. This strategy is known as the challenge of amoralism. Against this strategy, I will argue that in order to represent a genuine case of amoralism, and a credible counterexample to unconditional motivational internalism, an agent would have to simultaneously satisfy an epistemically inconsistent set of conditions. Thus, the conclusion I will attempt to defend in this paper is that the challenge of amoralism does not succeed in posing a legitimate threat to unconditional motivational internalism.

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ and the _Critique of Practical Reason_, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.

While Kierkegaard’s philosophy focuses on concrete human existence, his thought has rarely been challenged regarding concrete and contemporary moral issues. This volume offers an overview of contemporary ethical issues from a Kierkegaardian perspective, deliberately taking him out of the sphere of Theology and Christian Ethics, and examining the ways in which his works can provide fruitful insight into questions which Kierkegaard certainly never himself envisaged, such as accepting refugees into our communities, understanding how we relate to social media, issues of identity with regard to bioengineering or transgender identity, or problems of interreligious dialogue. The contributions in this volume, by international scholars, seek to address both the challenges and insights of Kierkegaard’s existential ethics for our contemporary societies, and its relation to topics of current interest in the field of moral philosophy. The volume is organized into three major sections: the first focusing on the relation between ethics and religion, a topic of primary importance with regard to the development of religious foundationalism and the challenges of dealing with diverse belief systems within our communities; the second on our understandings of ourselves and our relations to others with regard to issues of media and community; and the third targeting more specifically questions of identity, and the ways in which the developments of modern science impact identity construction. This work offers new paths for critically engaging with the moral issues of our times from an existential perspective.