•  190
    Emotional Truth: Ronald de Sousa
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 247-263. 2002.
    The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events and characters depicted. To have emotions is to c…Read more
  •  43
    Réponses à Proust, Bouchard et Dumouchel
    Dialogue 46 (1): 179-187. 2007.
  •  47
    What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (review)
    Dialogue 38 (4): 908-910. 1999.
    This pithy book is for any psychologist or philosopher who wants to do psychology in a biologically informed way. Emotions are an object lesson, and the lesson is mostly negative: emotions are no one thing, and most of them are something we know not what.
  •  5
    Emotional Knowledge and the Emotional A Priori
    Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1): 106-112. 2020.
    In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.”
  •  6
    Is Contempt Redeemable?
    Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1): 23-43. 2020.
    In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.
  •  10
    Letters to the Editor
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5): 107-122. 1995.
  •  6
    The Structure of Emotions
    Noûs 25 (3): 367-373. 1991.
  •  64
    The Natural Shiftiness of Natural Kinds
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4). 1984.
    The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed 'natural' relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most 'natural' in that s…Read more
  • Die Rationalität der Emotionen
    In Sabine A. Döring (ed.), Philosophie der Gefühle, Suhrkamp. 2009.
  •  56
    Arts and minds (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 60 (4): 860-861. 2007.
  •  8
    Les émotions contemplatives et l’objectivité des valeurs
    Philosophiques 45 (2): 499-505. 2018.
    Ronald de Sousa
  •  11
    "Emotion" by William Lyons (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1): 142-149. 1984.
  •  14
    In Julien Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.), Petit Traité des Valeurs. pp. 132-139. 2018.
  •  3
    Emotional Gestalten
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1): 13-15. 2012.
  •  2
    The Structure of Love.Alan Soble
    Ethics 101 (4): 867-868. 1991.
  •  10
    Types and Ontology
    with Fred Sommers and John O. Nelson
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (3): 406-408. 1967.
  •  11
    Emotions, Education and Time
    Metaphilosophy 21 (4): 434. 1990.
  • Brian Easlea, Science and Sexual Oppression (review)
    Philosophy in Review 2 214-217. 1982.
  • Modelos conexionistas: consecuencias para la ciencia cognitiva
    Análisis Filosófico 9 (2): 183. 1989.
  •  51
    Kripke on Naming and Necessity
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3): 447-464. 1974.
    Some wag reported the following story: Scholars have recently established that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not, after all, written by Homer. They were actually written by another author, of the same name.The majority of current theories of naming and reference, including ones as divergent in other respects as those of Russell and Searle, would rule this story impossible. They would do so on roughly these grounds: the sense and reference of the name ‘Homer’ is determined, given the absence of …Read more
  •  7
    What Can't We Do With Economics? Some Comments on George Ainslie's Picoeconomics
    Journal of Philosophical Research 22 197-210. 1997.
    Ainslie’s Picoeconomics presents an ingenious theory, based on a remarkably simple basic law about the rate of discounting the value of future prospects, which explains a vast number of psychological phenomena. Hyperbolic discount rates result in changes in the ranking of interests as they get closer in time. Thus quasi-homuncular “interests” situated at different times compete within the person. In this paper I first defend the generality of scope of Ainslie’s model, which ranges over several p…Read more
  •  163
  •  68
    The rationality of emotions
    Dialogue 18 (1): 41-63. 1979.
  •  27
    Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary …Read more
  •  11
    Teleology and the Great Shift
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (11). 1984.
  •  15
    Self-Deceptive Emotions
    Journal of Philosophy 75 (11). 1978.