•  190
    Emotional Truth: Ronald de Sousa
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 247-263. 2002.
    The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events and characters depicted. To have emotions is to c…Read more
  •  177
    Moral emotions
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2): 109-126. 2001.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions…Read more
  •  163
    Teleology and the great shift
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (11): 647-653. 1984.
  •  163
  •  150
    Restoring emotion's bad rep: the moral randomness of norms
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1): 29-47. 2006.
    Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at …Read more
  •  114
    Review of Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6). 2008.
  •  108
    Truth, Authenticity, and Rationality
    Dialectica 61 (3): 323-345. 2007.
    Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the difference? We need to distinguish the cr…Read more
  •  68
    Moral Emotions
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2). 2001.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions…Read more
  •  68
    The rationality of emotions
    Dialogue 18 (1): 41-63. 1979.
  •  64
    The Natural Shiftiness of Natural Kinds
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4). 1984.
    The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed 'natural' relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most 'natural' in that s…Read more
  •  56
    Arts and minds (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 60 (4): 860-861. 2007.
  •  52
    Against emotional modularity
    In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions, University of Calgary Press. pp. 29-50. 2008.
  •  51
    Prcis of “why think?” Evolution and the rational mind
    American Journal of Bioethics 8 (5). 2008.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  51
    Kripke on Naming and Necessity
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3): 447-464. 1974.
    Some wag reported the following story: Scholars have recently established that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not, after all, written by Homer. They were actually written by another author, of the same name.The majority of current theories of naming and reference, including ones as divergent in other respects as those of Russell and Searle, would rule this story impossible. They would do so on roughly these grounds: the sense and reference of the name ‘Homer’ is determined, given the absence of …Read more
  •  50
    Existentialism as Biology
    Emotion Review 2 (1): 76-83. 2010.
    Existentialism is compatible with a broadly biological vision of who we are. This thesis is grounded in an analysis of “concrete” or “individual” possibility, which differs from standard conceptions of possibility in that it allows for possibilities to come into being or disappear through time. Concrete possibilities are introduced both in individual life and by major transitions in evolution. In particular, the advent of ultrasociality and of language has enabled human goals to be formulated in…Read more
  •  47
    What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (review)
    Dialogue 38 (4): 908-910. 1999.
    This pithy book is for any psychologist or philosopher who wants to do psychology in a biologically informed way. Emotions are an object lesson, and the lesson is mostly negative: emotions are no one thing, and most of them are something we know not what.
  •  46
    Biological Individuality
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2): 195-218. 2005.
    The question What is an individual? goes back beyond Aristotle’s discussion of substance to the Ionians’ preoccupation with the paradox of change -- the fact that if anything changes it must stay the same. Mere reflection on this fact and the common-sense notion of a countable thing yields a concept of a “minimal individual”, which is particular (a logical matter) specific (a taxonomic matter), and unique (an evaluative empirical matter). Individuals occupy space, and therefore might be dislodge…Read more
  •  43
    Réponses à Proust, Bouchard et Dumouchel
    Dialogue 46 (1): 179-187. 2007.
  •  36
    Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8. 2002.
    Mangan draws his inspiration from James's account of fringe consciousness, but differs from James in focusing on something non-sensory, necessarily fuzzy, though not necessarily fleeting. A long tradition in philosophy has deemed non-sensory elements of consciousness to be indispensable to thought. But those, chiefly conceptual, forms of non-sensory fringe are not Mangan's focus. What then is Mangan talking about? This commentary envisages a number of possible answers, and tentatively concludes …Read more
  •  33
    The sociology of sociobiology
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3). 1990.
    Abstract This paper turns the tables on the criticisms of sociobiology that stem from a sociological perspective; many of those criticisms lack cogency and coherence in such measure as to demand, in their turn, a psycho?sociological explanation rather than a rational justification. This thesis, after a brief exposition of the main ideas of sociobiology, is argued in terms of four of the most prominent complaints made against it. Far from embodying tired prejudices about the psychological and soc…Read more
  •  32
    Kinds of kinds: Individuality and biological species
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (2). 1989.