Rosa Mayorga

In this ambitious study of the development of Charles Peirce 's realism, Mateusz Oleksy attempts "to show that over the course of his entire career Peirce significantly modified his position on realism ". Oleksy differentiates between Peirce 's earlier scholastic realism and Peirce 's mature realism, which Oleksy calls pragmatic realism. "One of the main theses of this book," he proclaims in the introduction, "is that PR is incompatible with SR as a whole, and that it replaces the latter in Peirce 's mature thought". Oleksy proposes to defend this thesis in the four ensuing chapters, "knowing very well that Peirce would most likely protest, since all throughout his career he declared loyalty to SR".

On April 18, 2019, a small group of Peirce scholars arrived in Milford, the small Pennsylvania town where Charles and Juliette Peirce spent the last few decades of their lives. The purpose of the gathering was to dedicate the monument to Charles Peirce that had been completed some months before, in August, at the Peirce gravesite in the Milford Cemetery. Organized under the auspices of the Charles S. Peirce Society, and with additional support of the Charles S. Peirce Foundation, the program of activities for the two-day event, "Charles Peirce: In Lasting Memory," consisted of invited papers on Peirce's life; the graveside monument dedication ceremony; a visit to the Columns Museum which houses Peirce memorabilia;...

I arrived here March 1st. The others came the following Thursday. I find the Tortugas quite inaccessible. Fort Taylor here is damp… It is uninhabitable… In the barracks, however, I find an excellent place for the experiments and good quarters… No authorization to use them has come… I am sorry to say that all the transportation has cost very much more than I expected & the work will take more time… If I had only come down beforehand myself and looked at the situation, I should have been able to save money… I wish you would kindly inform me by telegraph whether you could not afford me $400 additional.2With the purpose of conducting gravity experiments, Charles Peirce, accompanied by his wife, Juliette, arrived in Key...

Traditionally considered opposing views, realism and idealism were both endorsed by Charles Peirce, founder of pragmatism. Robert Lane proposes to defend the underlying consistency of Peirce's views on these two issues by tracing their evolution and the coextensive effect on the rest of his innovative philosophy. This is no easy task, as anyone who has attempted to study Peirce's vast oeuvre can confirm. Among the many challenges to this undertaking is the fact that much of Peirce's thought, which covers the whole gamut of philosophical topics, is contained in unpublished manuscripts. Lane includes the latter, along with Peirce's better-known writings, in this clearly-argued, thoroughly-researched, and most...

Although Peirce, as far as we know, did not visit Cuba (or any other Latin American country), it is argued that his favorable impression and interesting remarks about the Cuban character are likely the result of the time he spent in Key West, Florida, while conducting gravity experiments for the Coast Survey. This paper tries to provide a snapshot of this little-known period in Peirce’s life, the time of Cuba’s struggle for independence from Spain, and ends with brief comments on pragmatism and Cuba, past and present.

Charles Peirce did not seem to have a consistent view regarding ethics. His occasional remarks on this subject appear to be contradictory at best and cynical at worst. As a result, many have suggested that his comments on ethics, especially those expressed in the 1898 Cambridge Conference lectures, should be dismissed or ignored. This chapter argues that Peirce's views on ethics can be best understood by comparing them to his views on scholastic realism and nominalism. When analyzed in this way, Peirce's observations on ethics can serve as the grounds for a robust moderate moral realism that can compare favorably with contemporary metaethical theories.

Talisse proposes a reconstruction of a pragmatist view of democracy based on Peirce's scientific method. I argue that on the one hand, Talisse's “Peircean” account of democracy is not truly Peircean because it ignores his metaphysics; on the other hand, that his account minimizes Peirce's possible contribution by focusing too narrowly on his epistemology. I show how Talisse's account is open to the same kind of objections he makes to Dewey's theory, and how Peirce's remarks on ethics can contribute towards a more compelling pragmatist democratic theory than Talisse allows