S. Matthew Liao

Does greater CEO power come with more responsibility? Previous scholarly work in this field entails divergent results on this question. Based on the upper echelons theory and CEO power literature, this study aimed to explore the mechanisms underlying how different sources of CEO power, including structural, ownership, expert, and prestige power, affect firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and whether such relationships are moderated by firm visibility. Using a panel dataset comprising 6604 yearly observations of Chinese publicly traded firms from 2009 to 2019, we found that structural power is negatively related to CSR practices and that expert power is positively related to CSR practices, whereas ownership power and prestige power have no direct relationship with CSR practices. Our results show that firm visibility weakens the negative relationship between structural power and CSR practices and strengthens the relationship between expert power and CSR practices, respectively. Overall, this study reconciles the mixed results of previous studies on the impact of CEO power on CSR and integrates the effect of firm visibility as a contextual factor. This article concludes with practical recommendations on how to manage CSR engagement.

The prospect of using cell-based interventions (CBIs) to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior—brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment.

This roundtable discusses the presence and evolution of Contact Improvisation (CI) in mainland China and Taiwan. The participants come from various backgrounds from Beijing, Hangzhou, and Taiwan and share their personal journeys with CI, highlighting its introduction, development, and significance in their dance communities. They reflect on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on CI activities and the role of CI in fostering connections, trust, and spirituality in their local communities. In terms of CI’s future in these regions, they express optimism and emphasize its inclusive and open nature. They also stress the importance of overcoming language barriers to facilitate international exchange and understanding within the global CI community. This conversation sheds light on the unique perspectives and contributions of mainland China and Taiwan to the world of Contact Improvisation.

Millions of people around the world struggle with addiction. Despite genuinely wanting to succeed, many people struggle to maintain their recovery goals. Why is this? In this paper, I address what I term the “difficulty problem” of addiction—the puzzling challenge of maintaining recovery goals despite genuinely wanting to succeed. I first show that prominent models of addiction—including the disease, learning, and choice models—only partially account for why recovery remains challenging even for those genuinely wanting to succeed. I then introduce the concept of “confidence distortions” to help illuminate this difficulty problem. People with addiction can develop two distinct distortions: overconfidence in their ability to control substance use and underconfidence in their ability to function without substances. These distortions can coexist and interact in ways that undermine recovery efforts. I demonstrate how empirical research on self-efficacy and metacognition supports this framework. I then explore how treatment approaches might be enhanced by targeting these confidence distortions. This confidence distortion framework complements existing models while offering new insights into why recovery remains challenging even for those who genuinely want to succeed and offers new hope for addressing one of addiction’s most persistent challenges.

This chapter discusses the issue of personhood raised by the film _Iris_ (2001). The film tells the story of Dame Iris Murdoch (Judi Dench), a successful English philosopher and author who develops dementia. The story chronicles her deterioration from a brilliant and dominating personality into a confused and dependent adult. The movie asks the fundamental philosophical question, “What makes us human?” Dementia challenges our perception of personhood by slowly and inevitably robbing the individual of his or her cognitive abilities. Individuals like Iris, who define themselves by their intellectual accomplishments, suffer existential struggles in their self-identification. Persons with dementia fear being devalued or discriminated against; yet, as their functional abilities decline, a balance must be struck between their capacity to make decisions and their protection.

The prospect of using memory modifying technologies raises interesting and important normative concerns. We first point out that those developing desirable memory modifying technologies should keep in mind certain technical and user-limitation issues. We next discuss certain normative issues that the use of these technologies can raise such as truthfulness, appropriate moral reaction, self-knowledge, agency, and moral obligations. Finally, we propose that as long as individuals using these technologies do not harm others and themselves in certain ways, and as long as there is no prima facie duty to retain particular memories, it is up to individuals to determine the permissibility of particular uses of these technologies.

Anthropogenic climate change is arguably one of the biggest problems that confront us today. There is ample evidence that climate change is likely to affect adversely many aspects of life for all people around the world, and that existing solutions such as geoengineering might be too risky and ordinary behavioural and market solutions might not be sufficient to mitigate climate change. In this paper, we consider a new kind of solution to climate change, what we call human engineering, which involves biomedical modifications of humans so that they can mitigate and/or adapt to climate change. We argue that human engineering is potentially less risky than geoengineering and that it could help behavioural and market solutions succeed in mitigating climate change. We also consider some possible ethical concerns regarding human engineering such as its safety, the implications of human engineering for our children and society, and we argue that these concerns can be addressed. Our upshot is that human engineering deserves further consideration in the debate about climate change

It is increasingly common for bioethicists to consult with the public to solicit their judgments and attitudes about ethical questions and issues, especially ones that arise with new and emerging technologies. However, it is not always clear what the purpose of this engagement is or ought to be: do bioethicists seek the input of the public to help them arrive at a morally correct justified policy position, or do they seek this input to help them shape and frame their already-established moral position, or something else entirely? In this essay, we discuss four distinct possible functions of collecting moral judgments from the public: issue spotting, messaging for adherence and social stability, substantive moral guidance, and procedural fairness. For each function, we offer core examples from the literature before discussing the strengths and weaknesses attendant to each. We conclude with several preliminary questions bioethicists can ask themselves to clarify their own purpose for soliciting moral judgments from the public.

In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.

Our current work seeks to provide direct empirical evidence on whether Chinese international students’ experiences studying abroad promote dialectical thinking. We collected behavioral data from 258 Chinese international students studying in multiple regions. We found that there was a main effect among the four conditions. More specifically, when primed with studying abroad or typical day, participants were more likely to show tolerance for contradiction by deeming both sides of contradictory scientific statements as convincing and rating them more favorably. Therefore, it is plausible that Chinese international students’ experiences studying abroad promote their dialectical thinking. More work is needed to further this line of research by extending these effects with other measures of dialectical thinking such as perception of interconnectedness and prediction of change, adopting differing paradigms to provide more robust findings, and probing the underlying processes as to why experiences studying abroad promote dialectical thinking.

Parents and physicians often grapple with the agonizing decision of whether to continue life-sustaining treatment for critically ill infants. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework called the Fundamental Conditions Approach (FCA) to guide these difficult choices. Building on S. Matthew Liao’s work, the FCA evaluates whether an infant possesses or can develop the fundamental capacities necessary for engaging in basic activities that constitute a good life. These capacities include the ability to think, respond to facts, develop interpersonal relationships, and interact with one’ environment. We argue that if an infant lacks nearly all of these fundamental capacities and medical interventions cannot restore them, there are stronger ethical grounds for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Conversely, if an infant retains some fundamental capacities or could develop them with treatment, there are compelling reasons to continue care. To illustrate its practical and ethical implications, we apply the FCA to complex cases such as Tinslee Lewis and other infants with severe congenital conditions. We also compare the FCA with other prevailing models, including the best interest standard, the Life Worth Living Approach, the relational potential standard, and medical vitalism. We contend that the FCA offers more concrete guidance while avoiding some of the limitations inherent in these alternatives. While the FCA cannot eliminate all uncertainty in these challenging situations, we conclude that it provides a substantive and intuitively plausible approach to decision-making about life sustaining treatment for critically ill infants.

Bioethics is the study of ethical issues arising out of advances in the life sciences and medicine. Historically, bioethics has been associated with issues in research ethics and clinical ethics as a result of research scandals such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and public debates about the definition of death, medical paternalism, health care rationing, and abortion. As biomedical technologies have advanced, challenging new questions have arisen for bioethics and new sub-disciplines such as neuroethics and public health ethics have entered the scene. This volume features ten original essays on five cutting-edge controversies in bioethics written by leading philosophers. I. Research Ethics: How Should We Justify Ancillary Care Duties? II. Clinical Ethics: Are Psychopaths Morally Accountable? III. Reproductive Ethics: Is There A Solution to the Non-Identity Problem? IV. Neuroethics: What is Addiction and Does It Excuse? V. Public Health Ethics: Is Luck Egalitarianism Implausibly Harsh? S. Matthew Liao and Collin O’Neil’s concise introduction to the essays in the volume, the annotated bibliographies and study questions for each controversy, and the supplemental guide to additional current controversies in bioethics give the reader a broad grasp of the different kinds of challenges in bioethics.

The introduction introduces the history of the concept of human rights and its philosophical genealogy. It raises questions of the nature of human rights, the grounds of human rights, difference between proposed and actual human rights, and scepticism surrounding the very idea of human rights. In the course of this discussion, it concludes that the diversity of positions on human rights is a sign of the intellectual, cultural, and political fertility of the notion of human rights. The chapter concludes with an overview of the chapters present in the volume.

Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.

Most people think that, other things being equal, you are at liberty to decide for yourself whether to have children. However, there are some people, aptly called anti-natalists, who believe that it is always morally wrong to have children. Anti-natalists are attracted to at least two types of arguments. According to the Positives Are Irrelevant Argument, unless a life contains no negative things at all, it is irrelevant that life also contains positive things. According to the Positives Are Insufficient Argument, while life does contain some positive things, as a matter of fact, almost everyone’s life contains more negative things than positive things. In this article, I first offer new reasons to reject these arguments. I then offer a positive, human rights account of why not only is it not wrong to bring people into existence, but parents in fact have a human right to do so.

What makes something a human right? What is the relationship between the moral foundations of human rights and human rights law? What are the difficulties of appealing to human rights? This book offers the first comprehensive survey of current thinking on the philosophical foundations of human rights. Divided into four parts, this book focuses firstly on the moral grounds of human rights, for example in our dignity, agency, interests or needs. Secondly, it looks at the implications that different moral perspectives on human rights bear for human rights law and politics. Thirdly, it discusses specific and topical human rights including freedom of expression and religion, security, health and more controversial rights such as a human right to subsistence. The final part discusses nuanced critical and reformative views on human rights from feminist, Kantian and relativist perspectives among others. The essays represent new and canonical research by leading scholars in the field. Each section is structured as a set of essays and replies, offering a comprehensive analysis of different positions within the debate in question. The introduction from the editors will guide researchers and students navigating the diversity of views on the philosophical foundations of human rights.

Prozac's introduction in the late 1980s, caused a furor and focused debate on the acceptability of a drug that could do more than merely cure illness, pharmacological mood enhancement – that is, the use of drugs to improve mood beyond a level that is merely normal or healthy. As the possibilities and demand for mood enhancement increase, existing legislation will prove inadequate, designed as it is to regulate pharmaceuticals mainly for therapeutic use. This chapter explains why mood enhancement might be desirable, explores some key ethical issues associated with it, and suggests how policy makers can respond to ensure that people use mood enhancement safely and responsibly. Whether it is appropriate to enhance one's mood might also depend on the manner in which the mood is experienced. While unpleasant states like depression may be appropriate and valuable in some cases, they can be disruptive and disabling if they continue indefinitely.

It is quite likely that parents will soon be able to use genetic engineering to select the sex of their child by directly manipulating the sex of an embryo. Some might think that this method would be a more ethical method of sex selection than present technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) because, unlike PGD, it does not need to create and destroy “wrong gendered” embryos. This paper argues that those who object to present technologies on the grounds that the embryo is a person are unlikely to be persuaded by this proposal, though for different reasons

Participants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in considerations of commercial interest, and we argue that these concerns are insufficient to override the moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. However, we also develop a proposal that enables commercial interests to be protected, while promoting the duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results.