Samantha Brennan

What happens when the expression of parental values in child rearing runs contrary to the claim of children to be loved and respected by parents? This chapter asks whether parents who hold, and seek to express, attitudes and beliefs that are contemptuous of sexual minorities are competent parents. We argue that homophobic views held by parents can pose a serious threat to the well-being of children and that adults who harbour such views fall below the threshold of competency requisite to acquiring and maintaining the moral right to parent. We explore this issue by considering whether conservative religious fundamentalists who hold and express strongly homophobic beliefs should be considered competent parents. Some religious fundamentalists seem unwilling to love and respect children who are or might be gay. The systematic denial of love and respect to gay youth by homophobic parents causes a great deal of harm to children and arguably constitutes a form of abuse. The basic structure of the argument we set out is simple: (a) children have a right to affective caring; (b) competent prospective parents must be able to reliably provide affective caring to children; but (c) strongly homophobic parents cannot reliably provide affective to caring to children who are gay; so (d) strongly homophobic adults are not competent parents.

Feminist ethics is that branch of ethics that is concerned first and foremost with understanding the oppression of women and developing a normative analysis of its wrongness. Analytical feminist ethics uses the tools and techniques of analytical philosophy, such as conceptual analysis, to further understand the injustices revealed by feminist approaches to ethics. The chapter surveys analytic themes, trends, and tendencies within feminist ethics taking a broad lens on what counts. The chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in analytic feminist philosophical engagements with ethics, reflection on examples of important contributions to this discussion, a discussion the extent to which feminist work has changed or entered the mainstream of the field, and current and future directions in analytic feminist ethics.

The early utilitarians were strong champions for the equal treatment of women, yet contemporary feminists are some of consequentialism’s biggest critics. Arguing from a more generous account of what counts as consequentialist moral reasoning, this chapter identifies feminist criticisms of consequentialism and sees whether, and to what extent, feminism and consequentialism can be reconciled. It argues that a feminist version of consequentialism is possible and, regardless, that all feminist moral theories contain significant consequentialist elements which it would be a mistake to ignore. Finally, it suggests that all feminist approaches to ethics ought to accord some role to consequences and results, and therefore ought to contribute to debates and discussions within consequentialist ethics.

This chapter looks at a specific kind of exploitation, the exploitation of children by their parents. On my view of childhood goods, the experiences of childhood are both intrinsically and developmentally important. Parents have obligations to their children not just to focus on development goods, goods that benefit the person the child will become. Parents also have obligations to children as children, and have obligations to promote the goods of childhood. Focusing only on the instrumental good of childhood is a form of exploitation of children by their parents. While sports parents are the most obvious examples of this kind of exploitation, it can also occur to children whose parents focus on musical or academic achievement.

Aging is a topic that philosophers have largely ignored. We have had lots to say about death, some things to say about dying, but rather little to say about the life stage that usually, when all goes well, precedes it. Mirroring our lack of attention to children and childhood, we have preferred to focus our attention on idealized (rational, independent, autonomous) adults rather than adults in the last part of their lives. For much of the history of philosophy, philosophy has also ignored the lives of women. These two areas of philosophical abandonment may well be connected, for old age is much more the domain of women than of men. You cannot begin writing about justice, gender, and old age without noting that old age is gendered. Old age is gendered both in concrete terms, who the old are, and in conceptual terms, how we think about old age.

This chapter draws on authors’ experiences as fat-bodied white women philosophers, empirical research about fat discrimination, and common teaching topics and practices to reflect on fat stigma in dominant forms of teaching philosophy. We situate our critique in fat studies literature, locating the “normal professor body” within eugenic social and political movements, and the transatlantic slave trade. We outline how fat stigma specifically applies to historical and contemporary forms of Western canonical teaching practices and materials. Many of the topics philosophers teach on practical rationality evoke stereotypes about fat-bodied people as bad eaters, and activate stereotype threat for fat philosophers, thus affecting performance and credibility. We offer the case of “fat man” hypotheticals in contemporary analytic ethics as cases of perpetuating stigma, thereby undermining their pedagogical efficacy. We conclude by offering recommendations for teaching in ways that mitigate the influence of fat stigmatizing stereotypes and stereotype threat for fat philosophers.

Most of us accept that, even if morality requires us to promote the good, we do not have to live up to its demands all the time. Sometimes we can favor our own interests, or provide special benefit to our friends and family. This paper assumes that these options can be overridden if we pass a certain threshold and asks if there is a common structure between these thresholds for options and the thresholds for rights. This moderate deontological account allows for aggregation in considering the total amount at stake, but also requires that the good be structured in a certain way. In the case of rights, there are two relevant structural constraints: an _existential constraint_ (some individual must have as much at stake as the right bearer), and a _universal constraint_ (everyone being considered must have some minimum amount at stake). Both of these constraints also apply to thresholds for options.

This chapter addresses the trade-offs that occur in protecting children’s interests, and in doing so engages with the question, “In what does children’s well-being consist?” How much of children’s welfare is attached to the child they are now and how much to the future person they become? The chapter argues for the view that parents are not merely charged with the task of delivering children safely to the threshold of adulthood. Because of the nature of children’s rights as rights that protect children’s interests, parents also have obligations to promote the goods of childhood.

Micro-inequities are small, unjust inequalities often pointed to as part of the larger story about the unequal place of women in the workforce. This paper sets out to examine micro-inequities in the context of women’s careers in the academic discipline of philosophy. It also offers a philosophical analysis of micro-inequities, looks at some explanations about why moral philosophy has struggled with the problem of small harms, and argues that we need to rethink their moral significance. I argue that we should not treat acts and their results only on an individual basis. The existence of micro-inequities highlights a significant problem with doing so as cumulative effects are easily ignored when we do this. A final section offers some suggestions about solutions appropriate to the kind of wrongs that micro-inequities are.

An emerging story about the persistence of workplace inequality—in the absence of formal barriers to entry and progress for women, minorities, and disabled persons—looks to the twin causes of implicit bias and micro-inequities. I discuss why these phenomena often go together. I then argue that while the initial idea of a micro-inequity is easy to understand—specific examples, useful analogies, and colorful metaphors abound—careful analysis of the moral significance of micro-inequities is needed. I distinguish the kind of moral analysis needed from questions about the mechanisms by which micro-inequities add up to larger harms, as well as questions about praise, blame and moral responsibility. I also make clear that, while morally significant, micro-inequities are not the only problem facing women, the disabled, and minorities in the workplace. Finally, I argue in favour of institutional responses to micro-inequities rather than approaches that focus on the wrongness of individual acts.

This chapter argues that it is time to rethink the necessary connection between parenting and marriage and think about children, rather than romantic love, as another possible foundation for the family. The argument presented here is both as a rejoinder to those on the right who say “But what about the children?” and as a response to worries raised by queer activists and feminists about the focus on same-sex marriage as the single most important political issue facing progressive communities today. Protection of the vulnerable is argued to be the only good reason to have the state involved in marriage in the first place.

Philosophical reflection on death dates back to ancient times, but death remains a most profound and puzzling topic. Samantha Brennan and Robert Stainton have assembled a compelling selection of core readings from the philosophical literature on death. The views of ancient writers such as Plato, Epicurus, and Lucretius are set alongside the work of contemporary figures such as Thomas Nagel, John Perry, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Brennan and Stainton divide the anthology into three parts. Part I considers questions about the nature of death and our knowledge of it. What does it mean to be dead? Is it possible to survive death? Is the end of life a mystery? Part II asks how we should view death. What (if anything) is so bad about dying? If death is nothingness, should it be feared or regretted? Part III examines ethical questions related to killing, particularly abortion, euthanasia and suicide. Is killing ever permissible? Under what conditions or circumstances?

This volume features a careful selection of major works in political and social philosophy from ancient times through to the present. Every reading has been painstakingly annotated, and each figure is given a substantial introduction highlighting his or her major contribution to the tradition. The anthology offers both depth and breadth in its selection of material by central figures, while also representing other currents of political thought. Thirty-two authors are represented, including fourteen from the 20th century. The editors have made every effort to include translations that are both readable and reliable. In order to ensure the highest standards of accuracy and accessibility, the editors have consulted dozens of leading academics during the course of the volume’s development (many of whom have contributed introductory material as well as advice). The result is an anthology with unparalleled pedagogical benefits; _The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought_ sets the new standard for social and political philosophy instruction.