Abstract: The contemporary discussion of radical skepticism – the category of skepticism that defends the thesis that knowledge is impossible – is presented in two different arguments: skeptical arguments of epistemic closure (AFE) and epistemic underdetermination (ASE). We intend to describe how the skeptical paradox is constructed. Then, how the two classes of argument are related to the principles of underdetermination and epistemic closure. Finally, we will present the logical argument which…
Read moreAbstract: The contemporary discussion of radical skepticism – the category of skepticism that defends the thesis that knowledge is impossible – is presented in two different arguments: skeptical arguments of epistemic closure (AFE) and epistemic underdetermination (ASE). We intend to describe how the skeptical paradox is constructed. Then, how the two classes of argument are related to the principles of underdetermination and epistemic closure. Finally, we will present the logical argument which shows that AFE implies ASE and not the opposite; we will follow the proof steps presented by Duncan Pritchard (2005), to reinforce some aspects about the structure of the skeptical argument for the thesis that ASE is the standard argument of radical skepticism.
