Sandro Rinaldi Feliciano

In Philosophy of Science, Carnap, Hume, Descartes, Pascal, Popper, Kuhn and many others (none was irrelevant at all), are some kind of state-of-art. The last two cited above showed to us the most studied theories even they’re not totally correct. Popper with the hypothetical-deductive model, bring us the falsifiability as the way to proof the validity of a scientific theory and/or substitute others theories. Popperian system is in some ways used as pos-procedure in theoretical studies of publications when articles turn public and scientists try to find conceptual errors or miscalculations. In practical science it’s more easy way, because its fallible if no one can reproduce it. Kuhn, in the other hand, says that science is made by revolutions, and the current model was a paradigm, where “normal science” was made and, once problems evolves inside the model, their solutions generates a new paradigm. This essay premise is to look Scientific-Fiction (that is always showed as merely histories) could influence directly or indirectly scientific development, if this influence could be in a popperian way, if this influence is in a kuhnian way, or if this influence are diggered by scientific community as propaganda as Feyerabend suggested. Could be historical enhancement with Fleck view of science, or sociological bias like David Bloor and Steven Shapin argued.

It is possible that, as you read this, there is someone out there standing in for you, speaking in your voice, acting in your stead, making agreements on your behalf, or conceding a point you might not have wanted them to. They are not your congressperson, your lawyer, or your spouse—nor anyone else authorized by means of a formal, corporately organized election or selection procedure. There is another sort of representative out there, someone you did not elect, someone you perhaps would not elect, of whom you may never have heard, speaking or acting on your behalf right now—they are an informal political representative. Formal political representation is a familiar topic within democratic theory. Much less discussed, though no less widespread, is informal political representation: a practice in which a person speaks or acts for a group before an audience, despite never having been elected or selected to do so by means of a corporately organized election or selection procedure. Informal political representation is an everyday feature of our public communicative landscape. It is woven taut into the fabric of our political lives. Malala Yousafzai claims: “I speak not for myself, but so those without a voice can be heard.” U2 frontman Bono claims to “represent a lot of people who have no voice at all.” President Trump, before his nomination, was said “to give a voice to those who have long felt silenced." The informal representative, though neither elected nor selected, is ubiquitous and politically influential. They increase the visibility of marginalized and oppressed groups, give voice to interests not adequately expressed in formal political fora, influence public discourse, and serve as conduits between the represented and policymakers. They can, as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., did in Montgomery, negotiate on a group’s behalf. But so far, few have attempted to provide a theory of this phenomenon that gives full attention to both its conceptual and normative foundations. My dissertation provides a theory of informal political representation that does not treat the phenomenon as a mere deviant case of formal political representation, but rather takes informal political representation on its own terms. Committee: Tommie Shelby (chair), Tim Scanlon, Dick Moran, Eric Beerbohm