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93This book collects twenty-five of the author's essays, each of which addresses a descriptive or a foundational issue that arises at the interface between linguistic semantics and pragmatics, on the one hand, and the philosophy of language, on the other. Arranged into three interconnected parts (I. Matters of Meaning and Truth; II. Matters of Meaning and Force; III. Knowledge Matters), the essays suggest that some key topics in the above-mentioned fields have often been approached in ways that co…Read more
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419Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of AssertionPhilosophical Investigations 42 (3): 264-270. 2019.Timothy Williamson has argued that, unless the speech act of assertion were supposed to be governed by his so-called Knowledge Rule, one could not explain why sentences of the form "A and I do not know that A" are unassertable. This paper advances three objections against that argument, of which the first two aim to show that, even assuming that Williamson's explanandum has been properly circumscribed, his explanation would not be correct, and the third aims to show that his explanandum has not …Read more
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69Introduction to 'Interpreting J. L. Austin'In Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-14. 2017.
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779Performativity and the 'True/False Fetish'In Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 96-118. 2017.
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36Addendum to “Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth”Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (1): 109-110. 2014.This paper is an addendum to [Tsohatzidis, 2013]
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56The gap between speech acts and mental statesIn Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 220--33. 1994.
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118Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology (edited book)Springer. 2007.This book includes ten original essays that critically examine central themes of John Searle’s ontology of society, as well as a new essay by Searle that summarizes and further develops his work in that area. The critical essays are grouped into three parts. Part I (Aspects of Collective Intentionality) examines the account of collective intention and action underlying Searle’s analysis of social and institutional facts, with special emphasis on how that account relates to the dispute between in…Read more
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121Review of John R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (9). 2010.
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258Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (edited book)Routledge. 1994.Foundations of Speech Act Theoryoffers a timely, thorough and, above all, compelling examination of the complexities of illocutionary acts, performatives, and their phenomenological basis. Savas Tsohatzidis has collected an impressive range of international scholars on the subject. Clearly demonstrating the relevance of speech act theory to semantic theory, the collection further interrogates the inability of pragmatic theories of illocution to properly locate such speech acts within the logic o…Read more
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24Axioms of reference and rules of quotationIn Elke Brendel (ed.), Understanding Quotation, De Gruyter Mouton. pp. 7--323. 2011.
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32Yes-no questions and the myth of content invarianceIn John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 244-266. 2007.
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137Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2017.In this volume, Savas L. Tsohatzidis brings together a team of leading experts to provide up-to-date perspectives on the work of J. L. Austin, a major figure in twentieth-century philosophy and an important contributor to theories of language, truth, perception, and knowledge. Focusing on aspects of Austin's writings in these four areas, the volume's ten original essays critically examine central elements of his philosophy, exploring their interrelationships, their historical context, their rece…Read more
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675Lost Hopes and Mixed QuotesIn P. De Brabander (ed.), Hybrid Quotations, Benjamins. 2005.The analysis of mixed quotation proposed in Cappelen & Lepore (1997), purportedly as a development of Davidson's accounts of direct and of indirect quotation, is critically examined. It is argued that the analysis fails to specify either necessary or sufficient conditions on mixed quotation, and that the way it has been defended by its proponents makes its alleged Davidsonian parentage questionable.
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79Four types of counterexample to the latest test for perlocutionary act namesLinguistics and Philosophy 9 (2). 1986.
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259A problem for a logic of 'because'Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (1): 46-49. 2015.A problem is raised for the introduction rules proposed in Benjamin Schnieder’s ‘A logic for “because”’, arising in connection with (a) inferences that the rules should not, but do, validate and (b) inferences that the rules should, but do not, validate
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634Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect DiscourseLogique Et Analyse (232): 527-534. 2015.This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumption…Read more
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76Grammars as objects of knowledge: the availability of dispositionalismLanguage Sciences 24 (2): 97-106. 2002.An anti-dispositionalist interpretation of grammatical knowledge would maintain that such knowledge exists whether or not it can be behaviourally manifested; a dispositionalist interpretation, on the other hand, would identify that knowledge with the in principle possibility of certain behavioural manifestations. The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary case for the dispositionalist interpretation by accomplishing two complementary tasks: first, rejecting a prominent argument agains…Read more
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155John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2007.This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of…Read more
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6Existence Assumptions and the Distinction Between Implications and ImplicaturesFacta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 2 (1): 113. 2000.
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724Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truthLogic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4): 445-452. 2013.This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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235How to Forget that 'Know' is FactiveActa Analytica 27 (4): 449-459. 2012.This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.
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121A Purported Refutation of Some Theories of AssertionPhilosophical Forum 45 (2): 169-177. 2014.Several influential philosophical accounts of assertion have recently been claimed by Peter Pagin to commit a fundamental mistake. The present paper argues that Pagin's defence of that claim is flawed: The criterion he proposes for evaluating theories of assertion is unreliable; and even if it were supposed to be in itself reliable, it could not be used, in the way he proposes, either against the kinds of theories he intends to undermine or in favour of the kind of theory he intends to support.
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Aristotle University of ThessalonikiRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |