•  818
    Voices and noises in the theory of speech acts
    Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (1): 105-151. 2004.
  •  505
    The Distance Between “Here” and “Where I Am”
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 13-21. 2015.
    This paper argues that Michael Dummett's proposed distinction between a declarative sentence's "assertoric content" and "ingredient sense" is not in fact supported by what Dummett presents as paradigmatic evidence in its support.
  •  368
    Lost Hopes and Mixed Quotes
    In P. De Brabander (ed.), Hybrid Quotations, Benjamins. 2005.
    The analysis of mixed quotation proposed in Cappelen & Lepore (1997), purportedly as a development of Davidson's accounts of direct and of indirect quotation, is critically examined. It is argued that the analysis fails to specify either necessary or sufficient conditions on mixed quotation, and that the way it has been defended by its proponents makes its alleged Davidsonian parentage questionable.
  •  303
    Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4): 445-452. 2013.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
  •  224
    A problem for a logic of 'because'
    Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (1): 46-49. 2015.
    A problem is raised for the introduction rules proposed in Benjamin Schnieder’s ‘A logic for “because”’, arising in connection with (a) inferences that the rules should not, but do, validate and (b) inferences that the rules should, but do not, validate
  •  175
    How to Forget that 'Know' is Factive
    Acta Analytica 27 (4): 449-459. 2012.
    This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.
  •  168
    This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumption…Read more
  •  126
    John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of…Read more
  •  90
    Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion
    Philosophical Investigations 42 (3): 264-270. 2019.
    Timothy Williamson has argued that, unless the speech act of assertion were supposed to be governed by his so-called Knowledge Rule, one could not explain why sentences of the form "A and I do not know that A" are unassertable. This paper advances three objections against that argument, of which the first two aim to show that, even assuming that Williamson's explanandum has been properly circumscribed, his explanation would not be correct, and the third aims to show that his explanandum has not …Read more
  •  88
    A Purported Refutation of Some Theories of Assertion
    Philosophical Forum 45 (2): 169-177. 2014.
    Several influential philosophical accounts of assertion have recently been claimed by Peter Pagin to commit a fundamental mistake. The present paper argues that Pagin's defence of that claim is flawed: The criterion he proposes for evaluating theories of assertion is unreliable; and even if it were supposed to be in itself reliable, it could not be used, in the way he proposes, either against the kinds of theories he intends to undermine or in favour of the kind of theory he intends to support.
  •  81
  •  78
    This book includes ten original essays that critically examine central themes of John Searle’s ontology of society, as well as a new essay by Searle that summarizes and further develops his work in that area. The critical essays are grouped into three parts. Part I (Aspects of Collective Intentionality) examines the account of collective intention and action underlying Searle’s analysis of social and institutional facts, with special emphasis on how that account relates to the dispute between in…Read more
  •  68
    The hybrid theory of mixed quotation
    Mind 107 (427): 661-664. 1998.
  •  58
    Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2017.
    In this volume, Savas L. Tsohatzidis brings together a team of leading experts to provide up-to-date perspectives on the work of J. L. Austin, a major figure in twentieth-century philosophy and an important contributor to theories of language, truth, perception, and knowledge. Focusing on aspects of Austin's writings in these four areas, the volume's ten original essays critically examine central elements of his philosophy, exploring their interrelationships, their historical context, their rece…Read more
  •  57
    An anti-dispositionalist interpretation of grammatical knowledge would maintain that such knowledge exists whether or not it can be behaviourally manifested; a dispositionalist interpretation, on the other hand, would identify that knowledge with the in principle possibility of certain behavioural manifestations. The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary case for the dispositionalist interpretation by accomplishing two complementary tasks: first, rejecting a prominent argument agains…Read more
  •  42
    A memorable thirteen-word sentence
    Semiotica 2015 (204): 95-99. 2015.
    The most distinctive, and probably the most striking, assumption of Donald Davidson's well known ‘paratactic’ analysis of the logical form of saying ascriptions is that the “that”-clause that, in such an ascription, specifies the content of the ascribed act of saying, is neither syntactically nor semantically part of the sentence effecting the ascription. The present paper identifies a neglected problem that this assumption engenders for the Davidsonian analysis. The problem arises in connection…Read more
  •  37
    This volume presents eleven original essays that critically examine aspects of John Searle's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language, and explore new ways in which some of their themes could be developed. After an opening essay by Searle in which he summarizes the essentials of his conception of language and what he currently takes its most distinctive implications to be, the critical essays are grouped into two interconnected parts – “From mind to meaning” and “From meaning to force…Read more
  •  34
    Emotional states and linguistic events: A study of conceptual misconnections
    Pragmatics and Cognition 1 (2): 229-243. 1993.
    This paper intends to contribute to the evaluation of the project of analyzing speech act concepts in terms of mental state concepts, by examining Searle's and Vanderveken's proposed analyses of certain types of illocutionary acts as expressions of corresponding types of emotional states. It is argued that the proposed analyses are all defective, that the assumptions about underlying speech act/mental state parallelisms from which their initial plausibility might be taken to derive are themselve…Read more
  •  33
    Two Consequences of Hinting
    Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4). 1989.
  •  32
    The mode of existence of illocutionary negation
    Erkenntnis 54 (2): 205-214. 2001.
    This paper examines a recent attempt to provide a negative answer to the question of the existence of illocutionary negations. It argues that the attempt is unsuccessful both because it presupposes a misinterpretation of the question's theoretical import and because, even granting that misinterpretation, it bases its proposed answer on certain assumptions that can independently be shown to be untenable.